Touts and Despots by Martino, Enrique
1 
 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Dissertation 
Touts and Despots:  
Recruiting Assemblages of Contract 
Labour in Fernando Pó and the Gulf of 
Guinea, 1858–1979 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
doctor philosophiae 
(Dr. phil.) 
Kultur-, Sozial- und Bildungswissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
Enrique Martino 
 
Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Prof. Dr. Jan-Hendrik Olbertz 
Dekanin der Kultur-, Sozial- und Bildungswissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
Prof. Dr. Julia von Blumenthal 
Gutachter: 1. Prof. Dr. Andreas Eckert 
  2. Prof. Dr. Alexander Keese 
Datum der Einreichung: 18 November 2015 







This dissertation follows Fernando Pó’s labour recruiters wherever they went—
between the 1860s and 1920s recruiters traversed the entirety of the Gulf of Guinea and 
enlisted mostly Kru from Liberia and Fang from Rio Muni, Cameroon and Gabon; 
between the 1930s to 1960s they gathered particularly around the Bight of Biafra and 
brought an unprecedented number of contract workers into the island’s booming cacao 
plantations, mostly Igbos and Ibibios from south-eastern Nigeria. Recruiters tended to 
appear in a modality that I will describe and theorize as ‘touts’. They operated almost 
exclusively with an excess of language and money—deceit and informal advances. 
They operated ‘outside’ the law and the regulated, yet it was only the shape of the 
contract on Fernando Pó—forced, long and irrevocable—that allowed recruiters to 
deploy their techniques. Recruiters created and relayed a series of wholly 
impermissible twists: quasi-enslavement through fraud that was a form of kidnapping, 
quasi-debt bondage with informal wage advances enabled by the contracts, and even a 
movement of really quite free but fugitive labour across borders and work-sites. A 
sustained attention on the ambivalent practices of recruiters reveal a series of 
juxtapositions of free and unfree that produced creative potentials for intensification 
and unravelling, rather than single points along a ‘free-unfree’ labour spectrum. 
Keywords: Equatorial Guinea, West Africa, Contract Labour, Recruiters, Free and 
Unfree Labour  
Diese Dissertation folgt Fernando Pó Arbeitskraftanwerbern wohin sie auch gingen  
dort, wo sie zwischen den 1860er und 1920er Jahren den gesamten Golf von Guinea 
überquerten und hauptsächlich Kru von Liberien und Fang von Rio Muni, Kamerun 
und Gabon anwarben; und dort, wo sie ab den 1930er bis 1960er Jahren vor allem um 
die Bucht von Biafra eine noch nie dagewesene Anzahl an Vertragsarbeitern, vor allem 
Igbos und Ibibios aus dem südöstlichen Nigeria auf die florierenden Kakaoplantagen 
der Insel brachten. Die Anwerber tauchten vornehmlich als eine Modalität auf, die ich 
als ‘tout’ beschreibe und theoretisiere. Diese operierten fast ausschließlich mittels eines 
Exzesses an Sprache und Geld  mittels Täuschung und informellen Vorschüssen. Zwar 
agierten sie ‘außerhalb’ des Rechts, doch erlaubte genau die Vertragsform von 
Fernando Pó, die langfristig und unwiderruflich zur Arbeit zwang, den Anwerbern die 
Ausübung ihrer Techniken. Eine Reihe an unerlaubten Verdrehungen wurden 
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geschaffen und durchgereicht: Quasi-Versklavung durch Täuschung in Form von 
Kidnapping, Quasi-Schuldknechtschaft mittels informellen Lohnvorschüssen, die die 
Verträge ermöglichten sowie die grenz- und Arbeitsort überschreitende Migration einer 
relativ freien, allerdings flüchtigen Arbeitskraft. Der anhaltende Blick auf die 
ambivalenten Praktiken der Anwerber legt eine Reihe an Nebeneinandern von ‚frei’ 
und ‚unfrei’ offen, was kreative Potentiale für deren Intensivierung und Auflösung 
schuf, und über einzelne Punkten entlang eines Spektrums der freien-unfreien Arbeit 
hinausgeht.  
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1. Introduction: Recruiting with Language and Money 
My dissertation is about labour recruiters in Spain’s last plantation colony, the island 
of Fernando Pó in the Gulf of Guinea. I have tried to find and follow the recruiters 
who after the transatlantic slave trade brought labourers into imperial plantations: this 
time to plantations run on indenture and this time to plantations that were right off the 
West African coast. To get labourers onto the two colonial plantation islands in the 
Gulf of Guinea, Fernando Pó and São Tomé, William Clarence-Smith says, “every 
formula was tried. Slavery, indentured labor, forced labor, [debt and] tax-induced 
migration, and free-wage labour”.1 These formulae were tried in no particular order. 
The arc of Spanish imperial rule in the Gulf of Guinea was not an incremental new 
dawn; there were few signs of “progress”. Unlike the colonial labour “ideologies” of 
the post-war British and French empires in Africa, the Spanish colonization of the 
territories in the Gulf of Guinea did not seek to discard the past and install step-wise 
or mission-oriented reforms where “free” labour was held to be a “basic test of the 
responsible colonizer.”2 Fernando Pó is more than an exception to the vision that the 
colonial century in African history contains the arc of a colonially-imposed 
breakthrough from unfree to free labour. Rather, it is a peculiar place from whose 
perspectives and experiences one can partially rethink the internal and global 
operations of the entire arc. 
The framing of labour history along the broad “unfree” to “free” timeline provided by 
imperial rule relays a notion that if “unfree” relations subsisted into the second half of 
the twentieth century, then these must have been the result of a remnant or of the 
resurgence of a barely superseded pre-colonial time. Fernando Pó reveals that the 
“transition” was not “failed”, that it was not only marked by complexity and 
incompletion. In particular, it is Fernando Pó’s recruiters who reveal that the 
                                                 
1William G. Clarence-Smith, ‘Cocoa Plantations and Coerced Labor in the Gulf of Guinea, 1870–
1914’, in Breaking the Chains: Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage and Emancipation in Africa 
and Asia, ed. Martin A. Klein (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 150–70, 153. 
2Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British 
Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23. 
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“transition” could go into a variety of sanctioned and unsanctioned directions and end 
up with novel and unexpected “free” and “unfree” forms. Fernando Pó adds a series 
of crystallizations and co-existing shades that shifts the usual narratives of post-
abolition imperial labour relations and the process of colonization in Africa. To reveal 
these various shifts, I focus on the recruiters who have rarely been the focus of a 
consistent and full inquiry.3 This is why I have decided to inquire into what the 
recruiters actually did, who they were, where they organized their deployments, which 
steps were taken, what changed hands, what information and misinformation did they 
channel, who saw whom in which light. 
In African—but also global—labour history few have offered “a rare glimpse into the 
actual mechanics of the labour market”. In the history of colonial migration this 
glimpse tends to open up into a space that was almost wholly made up by 
“intermediaries and interlopers” who emerged from the “struggle for labour”. 4 
Recruiters, in their own voice only make rare guest appearances in the colonial 
archive, even less than the subaltern labourers themselves. There are only a handful of 
first-hand accounts of the recruiters themselves, whose reasoning or justification for 
their own actions, their relationship to the colonial state and to the workers whom 
they recruited, is as ambivalent as the way I will portray them in this dissertation. 
Studying the recruiters involved in the mobilities around indentured labour is 
difficult, not because of a lack of sources—as sources about recruiters are abundant—
but because of our own conceptualization of the figure of the recruiter; a legacy of the 
top-down colonial sources.  
Recruiters orchestrated the obscure groundwork of the so-called “Labour Question”—
an endemic obsession pervading the African colonial archive but also many other 
                                                 
3Giovanni Arrighi, ‘Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the 
African Peasantry in Rhodesia’, Journal of Development Studies 6, 3 (1970): 197–234, 209. See also 
Alan Jeeves and Jonathan Crush, eds. White Farms, Black Labor: The State and Agrarian Change in 
Southern Africa, 1910–50 (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1997). 
4Martin J. Murray, ‘“Blackbirding” at “Crooks” Corner: Illicit Labour Recruiting in the Northeastern 
Transvaal, 1910–1940’, Journal of Southern African Studies 21 (1995): 373–97, 376; For detailed 
exceptions Alan Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South Africa’s Mining Economy: The Struggle for the Gold 
Mines’ Labour Supply, 1890–1920 (Kingston: Queen’s Press, 1985), 3–34, 239–64; and Andrew 
MacDonald, ‘Colonial Trespassers in the Making of South Africa’s International Borders 1900 to C. 
1950’ (PhD Thesis, Cambridge University, 2012), 242–90. 
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capitalist archives elsewhere. 5  In Fernando Pó the shortage and compulsive 
recruitment of labour was unusually pronounced. “There exist here the problema de 
braceros. It is said ‘we lack braceros’ and this is the principal and almost sole 
obsession of the planters.” Apart from the rhythms and discipline of plantation 
cultivation, “recruitment is the principal activity of plantation businesses”.6 “De la 
recluta cuenta se y no se acaba”—“once talk of recruitment starts it cannot stop”.7 
The sources are unanimous: “Speaking in terms unequivocal and without the slightest 
fear of contradiction the labour problem in Fernando Poo is of paramount 
importance.”8 The “so-called problema is principal and decisive”, it was said to be the 
“principalisimo of all colonial politics”.9 “The archive seems to be only about el 
problema bracero”, says the historian Enrique Okenve.10 
                                                 
5 Frederick Cooper, ‘Work, Class and Empire: An African Historian’s Retrospective on E. P. 
Thompson’, Social History 20, 2 (1995): 235–41; Jeff Crisp, ‘The Labour Question in the Gold Coast, 
1870–1906’, in Proletarianisation in the Third World: Studies in the Creation of a Labour Force Under 
Dependent Capitalism, ed. Barry Munslow and Martin H. J. Finch, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 18–
42; The Spanish wording of these “chronic labor shortages” were put in the same terms elsewhere, for 
example in Guatemala “the planters’ persistent cry [was] ‘faltan brazos’”, David McCreery, ‘Debt 
Servitude in Rural Guatemala, 1876–1936’, The Hispanic American Historical Review, 63 (1983), 
735–59, 739. In relation to colonial Assam, the alarmist-obsession of “scarcity” has be seen as a ploy to 
impose long-term contracts on imported labourers resulting from the aversion of planters to hire local 
labour who could demand much higher wages and control their day to day labour. Kaushik Ghosh, ‘A 
Market for Aboriginality: Primitivism and Race Classification in the Indentured Labour Market of 
Colonial India’, in Subaltern Studies X: Writings on South Asian History and Society, ed. Gautam 
Bhadra, Gyan Prakash, and Susie Tharu (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 8–48. 
6Román Perpiñá Grau, De colonización y economía en la Guinea española: investigación, sobre el 
terreno, de la estructura y sistema de colonización en la Guinea española, con referencia especial a lo 
económico (Barcelona: Tall. Ibero Americanos, 1945), 118. 
7Ángel Miguel Pozanco, Guinea mártir: narraciones, notas y comentarios de un condenado a muerte 
(Barcelona: Colección Actualidad, 1937), 86–87. 
8Kicks-Dadzie to Resident, Calabar, September 1939, ‘Confidential Report: Labour in Fernando Poo’, 
NAE, CALPROF 5/1/195. 
9Román Perpiñá Grau, ‘Mano de obra africana, factor de coste colonial: investigación sobre el peso de 
los braceros contratados en Fernando Poo’, Cuadernos de Estudios Africanos 3 (1947): 127–44, 127. 
10 Enrique Okenve (personal correspondence, 5 July 2014). The “‘manpower crisis’ obsessively 
preoccupied colonial officers and settlers alike. […] In fact, one only needs to look at the colonial 
archives to realize that, in addition to government personnel, the bulk of the documentation deals with 
labour matters.” Enrique Sang Okenve Martinez, ‘Equatorial Guinea 1927–1979: A New African 
Tradition’ (PhD Thesis, London, SOAS, 2007), 174. “[W]hat really preoccupied the colonials was 
ways of getting cheap labor power into its plantations.” Gonzal Sanz Casas, ‘Política colonial y 
organización del trabajo en la isla de Fernando Poo: 1880–1930’ (PhD Thesis, Barcelona, Universidad 
de Barcelona, 1983), 222. The other historians who have done archival work of a social history of 
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The problem of labour scarcity and the associated recruitment campaigns is the 
running theme across Fernando Pó’s colonial history. Fernando Pó was West Africa’s 
largest island, and it is one of the most understudied places in African and Atlantic 
history, even though it generated some of most significant colonial labour migrations. 
The social history of Equatorial Guinea through the work of Ibrahim Sundiata has 
paid close attention to the recruiting of labourers during the first three decades of the 
twentieth century, when a substantial portion, but not the majority of contract workers 
were brought in by the Liberian state. Spanish scholars have also paid close attention 
to the destructive and often short-lived despotic recruitment of the indigenous Bubi of 
the island and of the Fang in Rio Muni.11 In this dissertation I briefly detail these and 
various other formal and informal forms of recruitment in Spanish Guinea and the 
Gulf of Guinea, from the late 19th century to the 1970s, from Angola to Sierra Leone, 
from Ghana to Liberia, or rather Sinoe county in Liberia, and then Bata, Niefang, 
Ebebiyín, Ambam, Woleu-Ntem, in Rio Muni, Cameroon, and Gabon. However, I 
decided to focus particularly on one sub-set of recruiters, namely the illegal canoe-
going Nigerian recruiters who were the principal labour smugglers or suppliers to the 
islands planters between the 1930s and the 1950s. 
                                                                                                                                           
labour are Ibrahim Sundiata and Gustau Nerín (see bibliography), and Dolores García Cantús, 
‘Fernando Poo: una aventura colonial española en el África Occidental, 1778–1900’ (PhD Thesis, 
Universitat de València, 2004), 577, who says the “question of the falta de braceros continued to be the 
principal obstacle for the full development of agriculture in the colony, and was accompanied by the 
ever expanded recourse to coercion.” 
11The time frame seems to be accounted for by the fact that until the 1990s the only guide to the 
Spanish archives was made by the UNESCO, a guide that indexed only items up to the year 1930. 
Gonzal Sanz Casas, ‘Los finqueros y el uso del trabajo forzado en la agricultura colonial de la isla de 
Fernando Poo’, Arxiu d’Etnografia de Catalunya, 3 (1984), 123–36; Dolores García Cantús, ‘El trabajo 
forzado bubi en la colonia española de Fernando Poo, 1891–1912’, Between Three Continents: 
Rethinking Equatorial Guinea on the Fortieth Anniversary of its Independence from Spain, Hofstra 
University, New York, April 2-4 2009. For authors who have retained this emphasis without looking at 
the archive, because the archive did not allow for it, see Liniger-Goumaz’s spree of overview 
publications and Clarence-Smith’s early articles on Spanish Guinea. For a splendid but overlooked 
piece of writing, almost the only one that looks at Fang labour in Rio Muni during the Republican and 
Francoist period in any detail, but also without archive, see Valentin Oyono Sa Abegue, ‘L’évolution 
Des Structures Productives et Sociales de L’économie de La Guinée Equatoriale 1858–1968’ (PhD 
Thesis, Université de Lyon II, 1985). This imbalance has only recently been redressed through the 
work of Gustau Nerín and soon, through the upcoming publications of Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida. See 
also Benita Sampedro Vizcaya, ‘Rethinking the Archive and the Colonial Library: Equatorial Guinea’, 




Figure 1 Cayucos or canoes arriving in Santa Isabel, 1940s12 
Along the Cross River Delta in south-eastern Nigeria, recruiters were drawn from 
some of the groups who just two generations prior had still been organizing the slave 
trade. The paradox I had to confront was while they were being described as a type of 
“new” slave traders they were nothing of the sort. There were never more than fifty to 
two hundred of these individual recruiters at a time; they could each mobilize dozens 
of new recruits every year. They did this through different means, sometimes they 
conducted a type of fraud that essentially amounts to a non-violent kidnapping, other 
times, more commonly, all that was needed was the false promise of a large wage 
advance or a well-placed job, whether in Fernando Pó or elsewhere. These recruiters 
came up with harassing and tempting stories, but their principal way of being 
effective came from their handling and relaying of wage advances. They tended to 
continue with ever more elaborate misdirections as to the specifics of the destination. 
During the first half of the twentieth century this was the only effective mode of 
sourcing labourers for two- to four-year contracts outside surges within the territory of 
Spanish Guinea and Liberia of despotic conscription and arrest. 
These informal recruiters tended to appear in a modality I describe and theorize as 
touts.13 Recruiter-touts were not licensed, they were not even directly delegated by 
                                                 
12Caption: “Los cayucos solían llegar a Santa Isabel con viajeros y mercancías procedentes de la 
costa”, in Martínez, Poto Poto, 40. 
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imperial capital, by employers. Touts often started off penniless—with a few forged 
papers and a hired canoe at most—and armed themselves only with promises or the 
capacity to speak about and relay fictitious places and fictitious money. They set off 
autonomously, inflating language and money, as well as with the indispensable know-
how enabling them to bypass imperial bureaucracies. This skill-set was necessary and 
generated because the unauthorized emigration to Fernando Pó was being repressed 
by the British in Nigeria, while in Fernando Pó itself the authorities tried to 
standardize and lower the recruiter’s commissions and the worker’s wage advances. 
In contrast to a well-established line of reasoning in migration studies, the “bulk” of 
the trajectories of migrant labour around Fernando Pó in the Bight of Biafra, cannot 
be said to have been “channelled” through an “independent networks of friends, 
family and villagers’’. People in these corners of the Gulf of Guinea were also “on the 
move, flowing into factories, construction projects, mines, plantations, agricultural 
frontiers, and commercial networks across the globe,”14 and almost all of them were 
being brought into colonial workplaces by touts. 
Theirs was a complicated network with many components, the transport linkages, 
legacies, individual gangs, canoe-rowers, commissions, forgeries, briberies, and so 
one; a recruitment “assemblage”15 that involved thousands of people and objects. An 
                                                                                                                                           
13The term “tout” was coined in the so-called “rogues’ cant” or “peddler’s French” by eighteenth-
century street thieves and meant: “to act as a lookout, spy on”. The tout is in a sense the ‘first job’ of 
the underworld. Tout as a verb, touting, acquired its principal meaning: ‘to look out for jobs, votes, 
customers, etc., to try to get them’ by the early 1730s, and only with the consumer revolution in the 
1920s does a new meaning of embellishment appear: ‘praise highly in an attempt to sell’. ‘Tout’, 
etymonline.com.  
14Adam Mckeown, ‘Global Migration, 1846–1940’, Journal of World History 15, 2 (2004), 155–189, 
167. See also Philip D. Curtin, Why People Move: Migration in African History (Waco: Markham 
Press Fund, 1995); Dennis D. Cordell, Joel W. Gregory, and Victor Piché, Hoe and Wage: A Social 
History of a Circular Migration System in West Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996). 
15In archaeology, assemblage is default term for a group of artefacts that are found with some sort of 
association to each other. An assemblage is made up linkages, it becomes a solidified arrangement of 
plural objects that come together through relations and are propelled in their combination. Even though 
assemblages are composed of heterogeneous qualities and are always in formation, they achieve a 
consistency, a hardened direction, an emergent unity; but these can also be extraordinarily unstable. An 
automobile is for example an assemblage: each component can have its own heterogeneous history and 
design. The wheel dates back millennia, rubber is a much latter and bloodier attachment, motors can 
also be composed and decomposed, and each part has its own history in autonomous trajectories of 
experimentation and standardization, and the like; properties of velocity or drag, or the institutional 
regulations and licenses of roadways, that are also part of the assemblage. This concept of assemblage 
comes from a French post-structuralist tradition, via Deleuze and Guattari, though others have done 
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investigation into this type of “underground” of recruitment has rarely been achieved 
in colonial African history so I consider this to be my principal empirical contribution. 
I also consider my dissertation a West African contribution to Global Labour History 
because recruiters, and especially their techniques, have only been examined in detail 
in post-colonial Peru, the Bay of Bengal and parts of South Africa. 
1.1 Economies of Deception and Escalation: Panyarring and Dash 
The element of novelty in my dissertation is that I analyze and conceptualize the two 
primary techniques of touts at length. These two techniques are what I call sublated 
panyarring and dash-peonage, which I explore in the two core chapters of this 
dissertation, the panya chapter and the dash chapter. 
By panyarring I refer to the 20th century south-eastern Nigerian sense of the word as 
“removal to the unknown”—as Ugo Nwokeji says his Igbo informants remembering a 
type of enslavement under early colonial rule defined it. They directly associated 
panyarring with Panya, and panya meant España or Fernando Pó in pidgin. This 
panya panyarring operated through an inversion of the kidnapping techniques of the 
Atlantic slave trade. Even though touts were often labelled slave traders, they were of 
course not armed. They did not use chains, they did not “remove people to the 
unknown” through the political violence of raids or the sanctioned violence of 
creditors. Touts did not induct you into capitalist labour systems through the conduits 
of slaving violence but rather through language alone, through a quasi-kidnapping 
arising from misinformation as to the destination or the type of work. Many 
Nigerians, tens of thousands, ended up forcibly contracted to Fernando Pó’s planters 
and considered their temporary fate to be a type of slavery—which in effect it was, 
just for a delimited period. This operation only worked because once on the island 
signing a contract was obligatory. 
By dash I mean the dash in its elementary structure, what Jane Guyer calls an 
“ancillary to an exchange”. Dash in Fernando Pó’s pichinglis as in many of the 
                                                                                                                                           
much to elaborate on it, see particularly Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Conversations on Science, 
Culture, and Time (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 141–2. 
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Pidgins spoken on the West African coast meant this “gift-money” that comes before 
but, like a supplement, is constitutive of the exchange.16 The dash was and is used in 
precolonial and also postcolonial contexts to facilitate, mediate and stabilize very 
different types of exchanges, such as bribes, obligatory commissions and even 
informal wage advances. The dash that emerged in relation to Fernando Pó’s contract 
engendered a type of peonage. Increasingly from the early 1940s on the majority of 
workers stayed on Fernando Pó for a second contract, because almost all of the 
promised “dash” money of their earnings from the first contract went to the recruiter 
as their commission. This time the re-contracted workers demanded their own very 
substantial dash before they entered a further contract. In this constellation workers 
gathered around touts on the island as they played a prime role in renegotiating these 
high informal advances. Workers did not see this as a gift or a bonus but as a wage 
advance because for them it was a way to effectively increase total wages for a fixed 
contract, or even to be paid their wages at all as many planters went bankrupt or 
withheld and deducted official wages. Planters would often try to justify the forced 
recontracting of their labourers for a third contract with reference to this large dash 
even though labourers wanted to leave or hire themselves elsewhere, usually for a 
higher dash. The dash quickly exceeded the formal official wages, and so what the 
planters were doing is deploying the moral arguments of debt-bondage to try to 
extend their workers’ contracts. At the same time this rising dash that was being 
pushed up by workers led to ever higher rates of desertions—the logistics and 
negotiations for which were all arranged by touts. These desertions were aimed at the 
higher dashes paid out by other planters, particularly the ones who had to now provide 
better working conditions to attract workers on their second or third contract; some 
                                                 
16Jane Guyer, Marginal Gains: Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 20, 59. For a theorization of the combination of a stable price and the “dash” as a 
negotiated component, an amount to be named, assessed, inspected and deemed appropriate see Jane 
Guyer, ‘Comparisons and Equivalencies in Africa and Melanesia’, in Money and Modernity: State and 
Local Currencies in Melanesia, ed. David Akin and Joel Robbins (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1999), 232–46, 237. The word “dash” is derived from the sixteenth century Portuguese doação, 
meaning gifting or giving money or goods. Paul Christophersen, ‘A Note on the Words Dash and Ju-Ju 
in West African English’, in Perspectives on Black English, ed. Joey Lee Dillard (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1975), 212–15, 213. For the pre-colonial and more contemporary forms of the dash see my 
blogpost ‘Dash: the gift of West African commercial life, etymology and a brief genealogy’, find 
through search engine. 
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even had 12 contracts in one go because they kept deserting and receiving more 
dashes. 
Panya and dash; my dissertation tries to understand and trace the transformation of 
these two African or commercial Afro-European practices in Fernando Pó. In the 
recruitment economies of the mid-twentieth-century Bight of Biafra panya and dash 
were reconfigured by the creative actions and reinterpretations of African touts and 
workers. A history of these practices cannot be written as simple economic exchange; 
rather, they represent two parallel and asymmetrical modalities where notions derived 
from the world of exchange do not add up, namely: theft and gifts. To understand the 
operations of panya panyarring and dash-peonaje in the recruitment of contract labour 
in Fernando Pó one cannot use conventional political economy of wage labour or 
orthodox theories of the contract.  
I do not argue that pre-colonial practices of kidnapping and gift-giving, which had 
been integral to the slave trade on the West African coast, continued in the colonial 
period but that panyarring and dash were reinvented and readapted under colonial 
conditions, specifically in relation to the Spanish imperial labour contract. A 
transformation had taken place. Following this transformation from the precolonial to 
colonial period is my principal conceptual contribution to African history and even to 
global history. To global history because I take these two concept-practices that 
Nigerian touts and workers generated, and then read other sources and historical 
periods through their lens. Dissecting panya can explain why violence is sometimes 
seemingly absent in the world of unfree post-slaving recruitment; dash reveals the 
contradictory role of money in debt bondage. These two modes, quasi-kidnapping and 
quasi-debt-bondage, whose dynamics emerged through the bottom-up, have not 
received systematic and comparative attention in African or global labour history. 
1.2 Main Findings and Contributions 
By tracing the recruiting patterns in Fernando Pó and across the Gulf of Guinea, and 
even across islands and enclaves of indenture more generally, I came to two principal 
findings: the technique of panya contains an intrinsic spatial movement of recruiters 
and dash contains a similar dynamism that takes the form of an in situ escalation. 
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Both of these techniques, as I posit throughout the core chapters and elaborate in the 
final two chapters, were only made possible by the existence of the contract. I 
characterize the contract as “despotic” because it was the imperial violence exercised 
through the contract on the island that underpinned these two techniques. This is why 
I talk about a tout-despot recruiting assemblage that included the contract as a 
necessary component, without which exchange and circulation could not take off. 
The first finding emerges from the fact that touts did not and could not operate within 
a fixed hinterland: they unleashed themselves in waves, and operated necessarily on a 
patchwork of ever-new fringes, constantly pursuing new victims to disappoint or 
impressing well-versed hopefuls with the promise of ever-larger sums of advanced 
wage-money. The second finding, the escalation of dash, in turn, results from a lack of 
hinterland, and hence a lack of new labour. With panya and dash as recruiting 
technique there was no cycle, no circular migration, no equilibrium. Braceros who 
had been to panya left after two years, after their first contract, or because of the dash 
they stayed on for a further two or four years. They then left, so a new generation of 
workers had to fill the ranks, but these came always from somewhere else, where 
touts would improvise the same techniques and add onto them ever more elaborate 
fabrications and false guarantors. There was a constant drift of recruiters across the 
entirety of the Gulf of Guinea, from west to south from the 1880s on, and internally in 
Nigeria itself, where by the late 1940s only a large handful of “illegal recruiters 
[were] still operating in the northern half” of the Eastern Provinces “where the people 
are more ignorant and where they can get victims by promising them work in Port 
Harcourt or Calabar”.17  
The shade of the first pattern grew out of the essential component of duplicity in the 
touts’ toolkit. The slave trade conceptually contaminated its supposed opposite—free 
migrant contract labour—through the revelations and scandalization of typical and 
ongoing recruitment techniques which are referred to in the revisionist literature on 
indentured labour as the “deception argument”, as Marina Carter says sceptically in 
relation to arkatis or the touts in the Bay of Bengal who recruited indentured labour 
                                                 
17British VC and LO (Spencer-Cooke) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 26 June 1950, ‘Labour 
Report for the period 1st of April to the 30th of June 1950’, TNA, CO 554/169/1. 
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for Mauritius.18 A generation of historians in the 1980s known by detractors as the 
“Modernization School, sometimes also indicated as the Imperialist or Colonial 
Group” turned the fact that “most indentured migrants left their homes voluntarily” 
with “hopes of better conditions and opportunities” into a realization of volition and 
desire in migration, an expression of will.19 Such accounts of indentured labour have 
continued to circumscribe the possibility that indenture was “founded on duplicity”. 
While aware of the “persisting evidence of fraud in indentured recruitment”, many 
authors turn “specific” instances of deception usually “related to destination” into a 
minor and incidental detail in the larger scheme of self-initiated migration for self-
improvement along capitalist lines.20  
Nevertheless, revisionist scholars who are rightly cautious and weary of representing 
indentured migration within the rhetoric of unfreedom, all vindicate the foundational 
insight of the “Tinkerian paradigm”, as Tinker himself says in his 1974 book on 
indenture as A New System of Slavery, “‘fraudulent statements [and] false pretences’” 
were constitutive of the world of recruiters who mastered the art of presenting a 
“picture of what was to come which was often distant from reality”. 21  In mid-
twentieth century Fernando Pó, whether those who experienced their displacement as 
a “willing” response to a transparent offer or whether they were “drawn to a new land 
by the better-than-factual stories”, all went side by side on the same canoes 
                                                 
18Marina Carter, ‘Strategies of Labour Mobilisation in Colonial India: The Recruitment of Indentured 
Workers for Mauritius’, Journal of Peasant Studies 19, 3/4 (1992): 229–45, 230. 
19Paul E. Baak, ‘About Enslaved Ex-Slaves, Uncaptured Contract Coolies and Unfreed Freedmen: 
Some Notes about “Free” and “Unfree” Labour in the Context of Plantation Development in Southwest 
India, Early Sixteenth Century-Mid 1990s’, Modern Asian Studies 33, 1 (1999): 121–57, 125; David 
Northrup, Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 1834-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 7; see also David Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 200; Verene A. Shepherd, ‘“The Other Middle Passage?” 
Nineteenth-Century Bonded Labour Migration and the Legacy of the Slavery Debate in the British-
Colonized Caribbean’, in Working Slavery, Pricing Freedom: Perspectives from the Caribbean, Africa 
and the African Diaspora, ed. Verene A. Shepherd (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 343–377. 
20Carter, ‘Strategies of Labour Mobilisation in Colonial India’, 238. 
21Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830-1920 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), 116, 124; see Richard B. Allen, ‘Re-Conceptualizing the “New System 
of Slavery”’, Man In India 92 (2012): 225–45. 
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“smuggled across the waters in the Bight of Biafra.”22 In Fernando Pó the dynamic of 
deception had to be more accentuated because the island had a consistently terrible 
reputation, so that after braceros returned to their home regions a new generation of 
workers did not follow in their footsteps, but had to be sought out from somewhere 
else. Only because of this constant drift of touts internally in Nigeria and previously 
across the entirety Gulf of Guinea, could panya keep working.  
Touts single-handedly recruited well over 100,000 people into Fernando Pó, yet they 
also operated on the island by redirecting the braceros who were already on the island 
or who were being brought in through channels set up by various imperial states and 
independent republics. This intervention accounts for the movement of another 
several hundred thousand people who found themselves between contracts on the 
island. They could travel hundreds, even thousands of kilometres on foot, on trucks, 
on steamers or, principally, on canoes or they could stay put on the island and still 
arrange for vast reconfigurations.  
The second pattern emerges from the dash. In a first round, some touts even promised 
that dash already, but they simply kept this dash as their own commission. During the 
second round of contracts the dash mostly landed in the pockets of labourers 
themselves. The dash was always on the increase, being escalated, because planters 
forked out ever higher ancillary money-wages for already experienced labourers. By 
the early 1950s this had led to a type of spiral of rising dashes and desertions. This 
dynamic of the dash was also accentuated in Fernando Pó because, first, smuggling 
was being effectively repressed by both the British and Spanish colonial state in the 
late 1940s, and so labour scarcity was reaching another one of its many peaks; and 
second, for those who had previously been smuggled onto the island there was no 
repatriation agreements as was common in more formally arranged indentured labour 
movements, and so many stayed on for a further contract. The dash represented a very 
considerable sum of money, which was the principal reason why people remained for 
a further two to six years.  
                                                 
22David Aworawo, ‘Decisive Thaw: The Changing Pattern of Relations between Nigeria and Equatorial 
Guinea, 1980-2005’, Journal of International and Global Studies 1, 2 (2010): 89–109, 92. 
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The dynamics of illegal and informal recruitment shift in the late 1950s when almost 
all new recruits were supplied and regulated by the British and later the Nigerian state 
through an indentured labour treaty. The 1942 “treaty” permitted an association of 
Spanish planters to pay licensed recruiters small commissions, to construct a large 
depot in a converted military barracks in Calabar and to send a dedicated steamships 
to make bi-monthly pick-ups. Cumulatively almost 200,000 workers, plus many tens 
of thousands of family members, passed through this channel.23 British colonial top-
down schemes offered single channels of supervised declarations of consent and 
reduced advances to keep total wages low and sometimes avoid the charge of debt 
bondage. In the 1960s most braceros had come through the treaty, which was a 
different but related tout-despot assemblage, as licensed recruiters were only allowed 
to hand out flyers in Nigeria and they were not allowed to mediate dashes. However 
touts were also there upstream and downstream, such as when they aided the 
desertion, at times of up to 30%, of new treaty labourers after they arrived on the 
island on steamers instead of canoes.  
The most intense phase for the dynamics of panya and dash in the Bight of Biafra was 
between the 1930s until the 1950s. Both dynamics reconfigured or undone by the high 
numbers, up to 15,000 new workers a year, coming through the labour treaty which 
finally met the labour demands of the island’s planters. For the final decade of 
colonial rule it was through this scheme “in Nigeria through which we [the Spanish 
colonial administration] have been able to finally somewhat resolve the problema 
laboral de Guinea”. 24  While the treaty came towards the end of the history of 
                                                 
23There were definitely 103,881 new recruits brought in through the treaty in the first twenty years of 
its operation (1943–1962). Comisión para el Desarrollo Económico de Fernando Poo y Rio Muni, ‘Plan 
de desarrollo económico de la Guinea Ecuatorial: 1964–1967’ (Madrid: Presidencia del Gobierno, 
1963), Anexo 10. No one has quantified 1962 to 1968, or beyond to 1975. The revised 1963 Treaty 
with the Nigerian state, doubled the length of the minimum contract to three years (and four and half in 
total). A reliable figure for 1964, says that under the treaty some “40,000 Nigerians” were under 
contract in Fernando Pó, in addition to “10,000” in Rio Muni, evidently true if not an underestimate as 
there was an unprecedented spike in production in 1967 of 37,000 tons of cacao, almost double that of 
the late 1940s. United States Department of Labor, Labor Digests on Countries in Africa (Washington: 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1966), xxxiii. 
24MAE, 10 March 1962, ‘Desarrollo de la economía en Fernando Poo’, AGA, C-81/13039, E-392. 
“These braceros are indispensable, production would plummet without them”. In 1960 there were 
about 15,000 or so Nigerian resident traders, smugglers, self-employed, and so-called libres or “free” 
or non-treaty workers on local contracts, while some 32,000 (plus 15,000 family members) were 
“indentured treaty labourers”. British Consul, Yaounde, 4 May 1961, ‘Despatch No.46’, TNA, CO 
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recruitment in the Bight of Biafra, it was touts who paved the way; they were an 
extraordinarily persistent and creative force, albeit one composed of and deploying 
many. 
Because of the structure of the Spanish archive itself—minimal and partial 
inventories, and even the absence of catalogues for whole collections and entire 
decades—about 97% of the Spanish colonial archives of Guinea has remained silent. 
Because of the difficult state in which the archive lies, a serious oversight has 
occurred in the historiography. There are no academic publications based on archival 
research in Spain, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria on the migrants who already from 
the 1930s on, and for the next half century, constituted, by far, the majority of the 
population of Fernando Pó. Even amongst the regional specialists, there is often not 
an awareness that this was one of the largest inter-colonial African labour migrations, 
and certainly the largest that went under the official banner of what the British in 
Nigeria were still calling ‘indenture’. Most facets of life under colonial rule have not 
only been under researched, but have been completely left out of the picture—there is 
only one line on the matter in the Cambridge History of Africa: “The main source of 
labour came to be Ibo smuggled in African canoes from Nigeria. The British rather 
reluctantly made this current of labour migration legal in 1942, in order to control 
it.” 25  As I will show through new empirical material, the establishment of legal 
recruitment through the “treaty” took until the late 1950s to consolidate itself, 
between the 1930s and the 1950s the main source of labour was being recruited by 
touts. 
                                                                                                                                           
554/2502. A new and inexperienced Governor, fresh off the boat, gives an underestimate of 40,233 
Nigerians in 1960 by citing unreliable census and labour statistics of registered workers. GG (Núñez), 
17 March 1962, AGA, C-81/11846; see also Alicia Campos Serrano, De colonia a estado: Guinea 
Ecuatorial, 1955–1968 (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2002), 171. 
25William G. Clarence-Smith, ‘Spanish Equatorial Guinea, 1898–1940’, in The Cambridge History of 
Africa: From 1905 to 1940, ed. Arthur D. Roberts et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 540. In the subsequent volume when the complete shift to Nigerian labour occurs in the late 
1930s, Equatorial Guinea appear as an Appendix to Basil Davidson chapter on Portuguese Africa, and 
less than a half a line mentions Nigerian “contract labourers”. Basil Davidson, ‘Appendix Equatorial 
Guinea, c.1940 to 1975’, in The Cambridge History of Africa: From c. 1940 to c. 1975, ed. Michael 
Crowder (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 806–11, 807. The only detailed treatment of the matter is 
Akinjide Osuntokun, Equatorial Guinea Nigerian Relations: The Diplomacy of Labour (Lagos: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), 38–42, a brief study which relies solely on the archive in London. See also 
Max Liniger-Goumaz, La Guinée Équatoriale: Un pays méconnu (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1979), 361–2. 
25 
 
As they were usually in it for the money—charging commission for creating a money-
debt through institutionalized bondage—when touts involved themselves in 
recruitment they were clearly the delayed underside of impersonal currencies within 
an already imperial horizon. Touts found a quasi-autonomous and informal niche in 
empire. They ventured into the hinterlands as semi-familiar self-imposed sojourners 
or insinuated themselves onto already busy side-walks to relocate people into labour-
hungry plantation patios. They carved out for themselves a slice of profits gained 
through the labour market that they were themselves generating. In their own time 
and on their own terms they became the self-organized tools of commercial conquest 
and capitalist production. They did this with negotiation—usually involving the 
relaying of advance payment of wages and many other speculative exercises, but 
unlike despots, without coercion. Despots have a lot of baggage, both in political 
theory and because of the registries they clutched and the uniforms and heavy 
weaponry they carried, that is why I laid most of my empirical and conceptual focus 
on touts.  
1.3 A Brief Outline of the Chapters 
The dissertation follows Fernando Pó recruiters wherever they went, their trials, 
obstacles and techniques. The two key chapters of the dissertation, 3 and 4, the panya 
and dash chapters, are framed by one ancillary and one supplementary chapter which 
provide an exploration of similar earlier techniques of touts in the Gulf of Guinea and 
a contextualization of how the Nigeria-connection was made possible by the 
legislative conditions on Fernando Pó. In chapter 2, I outline the previous recruiting 
assemblages in Fernando Pó’s plantation history. In chapter 5, I unpack the 
component of contract and vagrancy laws that underpinned both panya panyarring 
and dash-peonage. The core chapters, 3 and 4, consist of an entirely untapped range of 
primary sources. This wholly new empirical ground starts from Biafra proper, Igbo-
land, to the transit point of Calabar and onto Fernando Pó. Each of these chapters has 
its own empirical trajectory; chapter 3 involves hooks between the mid-twentieth 
century Cross River delta and the transformation of an early technique of the 
indentured labour and even slave trade; chapter 4 places the flight and leverage of the 
dash that peaked on the island in the 1950s into a constellation of shared drifts across 
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various islands and enclaves of indenture in global history. In chapter 6, the 
conclusion, I turn to the conceptual consequences of recruiters for the “free-unfree” 
labour spectrum in Global Labour History. 
 
Figure 2 Tout-despot assemblages; in and through the contract 
1.4 Methods and Sources 
Panya panyarring and dash-peonaje relied on known and unknown threats and 
obligations. These social fabrics are not always immediately visible in the formal 
contours of the archive but without a doubt they saturated the socio-economic life of 
labour on Fernando Pó during the 1930s and 1950s. My aim or method is not to 
marshal up and lay out a complete documentation of events in order to satisfy or fill 
























on Fernando Pó outside Fernando Pó
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up a chronology. Historicism has been known to not adequately account for and 
comprehend the dimension of everyday experience and practice, but the reality of 
action is nevertheless detectable through the archive and its voices—spread out 
heterogeneously along colonial bureaucratic debris; excisions from longer 
correspondences, samples of serial files produced by the courts and the labour office, 
one-off interrogations, depositions of workers, an occasional outpouring of the press, 
specimens of bureaucratic logging systems, lumps of colonial regulations, single 
tissues from uninterrupted military dispatches, batches of statistics, and so on—even 
though this list is not that much longer. 
This methodology is indebted to anthropology and sociology, and it allows for an 
understanding, a verstehen based partly on intuition, of the opaque immediacy and 
orality of recruitment encounters consisting largely of promises, threats and 
obligations revealed in a variety of sources and registers. This methodology does not 
require speculative leaps; instead it requires a procedural reasoning that follows the 
steps and webs that actors had to take and go through in order to get to their 
destination. To initiate and sustain movement, recruiters had to relay credits and forge 
scripts; and every cent and sentence should be accounted for if the question of why 
and how people moved is to be answered. Only recruiters and their techniques 
allowed for the constant appearance of plantation workers on Fernando Pó. 
For my dissertation a key piece of evidence comes from a single source that explains 
the operation of the entire social field. The quality of encounters can be gleaned from 
fragmentary records around a single piece of the archive, namely the contract. There 
is something very abstract about the contract. In the Spanish colonial archive it is only 
found as either a blank template or a ragged specimen confiscated from a deserter or 
forger. It is a despotic form pre-set by the colonial printing press and a format that can 
become “peopled by a spiral.” 26  These potentials in the contract had an active 
trajectory; each time a contingent event, enabling and eliminating possibilities. Panya 
and dash emerged from their own creative doing. They are not always implied in the 
contractual artefact but only the contract can explain and posit them as a sequence or 
                                                 
26 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 489. 
28 
 
loop of unpredictable effects. The contract is a point that allows these practices to 
cause themselves and go well beyond the intended parameters of the contract itself. 
As the contract is a shared template across many colonial archives, a closer 
examination of it allows for a wider conceptualization of the historical dynamics of 
the global history of free and unfree contract labour in and around the labour-
demanding centers of post-abolition modern empires. 
Global history, as Christian De Vito has reminded labour historians, is partly a spin-
off of the “conceptualization of space” and carries with it “major methodological 
implications for global labour historians. In this perspective, ‘the global’ does not 
primarily refer to world-scale space, but rather to methodology.” The “global” ceases 
to be “a synonym for ‘world’ and becomes a mind-set by which specific connections, 
transfers and movements of people, goods and ideas are visualized.”27  In Global 
Labour History, it is Marcel van der Linden who has done most to connect these 
dimensions, opting for the term “teleconnections, after the example of geologists and 
climatologists who [have] demonstrated many linkages between regions located at a 
remote distance from each other”.28 The remoteness can be bridged by doing, what 
Joseph Millers calls an empirically “comprehensive” contextualizing at an 
“analytically comprehending scale”, that does not aim to be “ahistorical” or to be 
                                                 
27Christian De Vito, ‘New Perspectives on Global Labour History: Introduction’, Workers of the World 
1 (2013): 5–30, 14; See also Antoinette Burton, ‘Not Even Remotely Global? Method and Scale in 
World History’, History Workshop Journal 64, 1 (2007): 323–28, 326; and her methodological claim 
that “the ‘problem’ entailed by world history is one primarily of method and scale rather than of 
local/global as such”. As Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press), 93, 110, says: “That global should be contrasted to local, 
even if the point is to analyse their mutual constitution, only underscores the inadequacy of current 
analytical tools to analyse anything in between”. His solution is a rigorous empiricism that relies on 
conceptual metaphors of relation, but without a focus on the potential abstraction they effect: “to 
address questions of territory and connectivity [we need] concepts that are less sweeping, more precise, 
which emphasize both the nature of spatial linkages and their limits [which] specify how commodity 
circuits are constituted, and how connections across space are extended and bounded.” See also 
Frederick Cooper, ‘Back to Work: Categories, Boundaries and Connections in the Study of Labour’, in 
Racializing Class, Classifying Race: Labour and Difference in Britain, the USA, and Africa, ed. Peter 
Alexander and Rick Halpern (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 213–32. 
28Marcel Van der Linden, Workers of the World: Essays Toward a Global Labor History (Leiden: Brill, 
2008), 373; see also Marcel Van Der Linden, ‘Introduction’, in Humanitarian Intervention and 
Changing Labor Relations: The Long-Term Consequences of the Abolition of the Slave Trade, ed. 
Marcel Van Der Linden (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1–45, 39. I think what is meant is something like 
“imperial formations”, a wonderful term used by Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan, ‘Imperial 
Formations’, in Imperial Formations, eds. Peter Perdue, Ann Laura Stoler, and Carole McGranahan 
(Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), 3–42, 8. 
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empire-centric in order to present “an unintegrated set of separate regional narratives, 
presented comparatively, and thus contrastingly, rather than as the coherent sequence 
of incremental historical adaptations that they in fact formed”.29 
In this historical method, the sources need not always be “undermined”—reduced to 
their milieu or to some other deeper more personal or economical motivation—or 
“overmined”30—examining for overstated turns of phrases, racist projections or the 
various idealist genealogies of European demagogues abroad. Sure, the colonial 
archive can be said to have been a semantic “field of force”, but it was largely a 
praxis—prescription, description, anticipation and surprise—a wholly messy index of 
what colonials got themselves into.31 The pieces are archival quotes, snippets, cut-
outs, plastered with portraits, superimposed with their own dread. I cut them short 
before their ideological echo has a chance to congeal, but I also cut them up in such a 
way that they connect to the realities of other constellations in global history. The 
Global Labour History impetus is to not take too seriously the elaborate decoys and 
rosy hubris that European colonial jargon used to mark itself off from the pre-modern. 
The decentralized scholarly output of Global Labour History, with its eye for 
thorough entanglements and its consciousness of unity in fragmentation, amounts to a 
break with the prism of discourse, micro-histories, and the meta-term “negotiation” 
that have become the new axioms in colonial African history.32  
                                                 
29 Joseph C. Miller, The Problem of Slavery as History: A Global Approach (New Haven:Yale 
University Press, 2012), 40, 132. 
30On this term as a critique of idealism and the linguistic turn, see Graham Harman, The Quadruple 
Object (Washington: Zero Books, 2011). 
31I will not try to write “against the grain” of sources, but neither will I “explore the grain with care and 
read along it”, Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common 
Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 53. The archive is not so much granular as a 
bunch of coded and crafted letters or more generally distinct piles of surfaces of inscription. These are 
not so much grains of dead dust as live splinters with their own directions. 
32Colonial—but not pre-colonial—African history has until recently been very much underrepresented 
in GLH, cf. Carolyn Brown and Marcel Van der Linden, ‘Shifting Boundaries Between Free and 




Map 1 Bight of Biafra in 194033 
                                                 
33For Nigeria all five Eastern Provinces, including the Cameroons, a British Mandate territory, are 
visible. Provinces subdivided into several divisions, whose borders are not drawn, but their relevant 
headquarters are. The circles indicate the origin of Nigerian braceros by division in 1940. For 
Fernando Pó, land use is to actual size. Sources: Nigeria, 1940, ‘A Ten-Year Plan of Development and 
Welfare for Nigeria’, TNA, CO 657/53; Jaime Nosti Nava, Notas geográficas, físicas y económias 
sobre los territorios españoles del Golfo de Guinea (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1942), 120–2; British VC 
(Michie), 28 February 1941, ‘Labour Conditions’, para. 29, TNA, FO 371/26908; Jaime Nosti Nava, 
La agricultura en Guinea española (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1955), 153. 
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2. Imperial Formations and Atlantic Constellations  
Of the eastern Atlantic islands “only Fernando Po and the Canaries had a native 
population” and on both, several centuries apart, the indigenous islanders “died off”. 
The “Europeans were free to take over the land; all they needed was people to work 
it.” 1  Labour scarcity is an ideological palimpsest of a political economy that 
naturalizes capitalism; its language turns the political decisions, that transformed an 
entire volcanic island into a settler-run mono-agriculture, into the economic necessity 
of recruitment. 2  “The growing sums of capital invested in the island made it 
increasingly necessary, however, for the Spaniards to obtain labour at all costs.” 3 The 
“farmers are glad to get boys no matter how obtained, or within reason, at any cost.”4 
This is the labour market of capitalism in action, innovation in production, creative 
programmes for generating an uninhibited labour supply required for an extractive 
and expanding output. Planters were extraordinarily anxious about their labour supply 
                                                 
1Philip Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 22; Joseph C. Miller, ‘O Atlântico escravista: açúcar, escravos e engenhos,’ Afro-Ásia 19/20 
(1997): 9–36; Michael Craton, ‘The Historical Roots of the Plantation Model’, Slavery & Abolition 5, 3 
(1984): 189–221; Sidney M. Greenfield, ‘Plantations, Sugar Cane and Slavery’, Historical Reflections 
6, 1 (1979): 85–119; Lloyd A. Best, ‘Outlines of a Model of Pure Plantation Economy’, Social and 
Economic Studies 17, 3 (1968): 283–326. 
2A somewhat eurocentric division of the world considers that by the “nineteenth century, this kind of 
labor scarcity was only a problem in the colonial agricultural periphery of an expanding capitalist 
universe”, Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract and Free Labor, 5; where “only” designates a world being 
draped in patchworks and enclaves of export and exploitation that exploded beyond the Caribbean 
heartlands with the formal abolition of slavery. Cooper et al, Confronting Historical Paradigms. 
Economic historians of colonial Africa have placed the Nieboer-Domar hypothesis on the “causes” of 
agricultural slavery and unfree labour into the colonial question of scarcity. Gareth Austin, ‘Factor 
Markets in Nieboer Conditions: Pre-Colonial West Africa, c.1500–c.1900’, Continuity and Change 24, 
1 (2009): 23–53, 25; Austin, Labour, Land, and Capital in Ghana, 170; Erik Green, ‘The Economics of 
Slavery in the Eighteenth-Century Cape Colony: Revising the Nieboer-Domar Hypothesis’, 
International Review of Social History 59, 1 (2014): 39–70. The hypothesis is straightforward enough, 
where land and employers made themselves abundant through colonization—and made labour 
‘scarce’—forms of violence in labour relations predictably followed. Evsey D. Domar, ‘The Causes of 
Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis’, The Journal of Economic History 30, 1 (1970): 18–32. However 
Brass and Bernstein’s assessment seems largely correct: the whole problem of “scarcity” was simply a 
“term” that was “applied by planters not to an absolute unavailability of labour-power (additional 
workers are needed, yet none exist) but to situations where market forces or political consciousness 
permit free workers to act as (and reap the benefits from being) proletarians.” Brass and Bernstein, 
‘Introduction: Proletarianisation and Deproletarianisation on the Colonial Plantation’, 17. 
3Nigerian Secretariat, Lagos, [undated, ~1953] ‘Memorandum’, RHL, 600.18 s. 21/XI (10). 
4British VC (Twigge-Molecey) to Resident, Calabar, 30 November 1938, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194. 
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because they operated with a straightforward labour theory of value: no labour = no 
output; more labourers = more profit.5 It was a simple calculus: “colonization, in its 
economic aspect, demands putting into movement the highest number of brazos to 
contribute to the exploitation of colonial wealth, well agriculture, industry and 
commerce would not be able to exist without these concentrations”.6 Recruitment 
brought in these concentrations from the outside.  
In the second half of the nineteenth century a vanishing Empire had wedged itself into 
an island in the Bight of Biafra. Bent by Portuguese navigators and fastened by the 
slave trade, this corner of the Atlantic became embroiled in the colonial struggle for 
‘manpower’. From the 1860s on, agricultural labourers on Fernando Pó included 
deported Spanish anarchists; exiled Cuban insurgents; hundreds of emancipados or 
captives freed from slave ships in Havana; batches of coolie workers from China sent 
via Cuba in the 1890s; a continuous stream of Kru sailors from the Windward Coast 
contracted into bondage; the majority of the indigenous Bubi of the island that was 
being forced into the plantations by decree in the early twentieth century; ten 
thousand indentured labourers sent by members of the Liberian state from World War 
I on;7 and Fang from Rio Muni, Cameroon and Gabon.8 The “problema of the labour 
                                                 
5For a Spanish version of this Ricardo-Smith building block of political economy, see Álvaro Flórez 
Estrada, Exámen imparcial de las disensiones de la América con la España, de los medios de su 
reconciliación y de la prosperidad de todas las naciones (Cadiz: Manuel Ximenez Carreño, 1812), 
120–30, 263–4. As Banaji has long argued “at the level of individual capitals, it is accumulation or the 
‘drive for surplus-value that defines capitalism, not the presence or absence of ‘free’ labour.” Banaji, 
‘The Fictions of Free Labour’, 81; ‘Modes of Production’, 22–4. 
6Arizcun and Martínez, ‘Memoria sobre los territorios españoles del Golfo de Guinea’, 108, BNE, 
Afr/13541. 
7A movement that came to an ill-famed end in 1930 with the so-called “labour scandal”. Ibrahim 
Sundiata, ‘Prelude to Scandal: Liberia and Fernando Po, 1880–1930’, The Journal of African History, 
15 (1974), 97–112; and his other publications From Slaving to Neoslavery: The Bight of Biafra and 
Fernando Po in the Era of Abolition, 1827–1930 (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 
117–22; Brothers and Strangers: Black Zion, Black Slavery, 1914–1940 (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004) 88–98, 249–250; also Nnamdi Azikiwe’s Liberia in World Politics (Westport, Conn.: 
Negro University Press, 1970), 169–211. 
8The growing labour demands of the “cacao plantations in Fernando Pó and the coffee and logging 
industries in Rio Muni” were briefly met in the early 1930s by Fang from Rio Muni whose “adult male 
population in its totality was being absorbed and submitted to salaried work”. DGMC (Canovas) to GG 
(de Sostoa), 4 June 1932, AGA, C-81/08099, E-15, also in C-81/06415, E-2. The demands were 
respectively 10,000 and 6,000 annual contracts for the cacao plantations Fernando Pó and the coffee 
and logging industries in Rio Muni. In the first census of 1932 for the non-coastal districts in Rio Muni 
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scarcity has produced a flood of decrees and provisions; well, it is of a transcendental 
importance. Except through divine intervention—and this I insist upon this point—we 
will never find a definitive solution. Those in the colony, before 1909 were already 
complaining of the scarcity of brazos when there were only 5000 contract workers, 
today [in 1945] with 27,000 contracts we are still lamenting the lack of brazos.”9 
Already from 1936 on practically all braceros on the island were Nigerian. With 
thousands of new settlers and a spree of corporate-backed plantations rushing in 
during the Francoist period (1936–1968), colonial hopes that labour needs would be 
met were being perpetually thwarted. As the principal chapters of this thesis will 
show, the vast majority of contract labourers in Spanish Guinea, up to three hundred 
thousand of them, were Nigerian. 
On a clear day from the Calabar coastline the silhouette of the volcanic peak of 
Fernando Pó is discernible in the horizon. Writing in 1940, the British Vice Consul on 
the island says that the “Spaniards have, during the last 40 years, recruited labour 
from most parts of the West Coast. Thanks to their methods they have been 
successively obliged to abandon Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Cameroons [as] 
recruiting grounds.” “Now” in 1940 “they have turned the attention of their recruiters 
to South Eastern Nigeria and this venture bids fair to be successful. The dozens of 
recruiters have ample funds at their disposal; the sea journey is short and the rewards 
are considerable.” The “traffic is now well arranged, in Nigeria by the recruiters, and 
in Fernando Po by the Spanish Authorities and employers. The canoes generally sail 
in convoys.”10 These are the broad outlines drawn out by a concise British Vice 
Consul. Only with the archival material laid out in the next two chapters, will we meet 
the motley crew of touts, traders, merchants and fishermen who brought and managed 
to keep labourers on the island. Here is a photograph of them at work on a sandy part 
of Santa Isabel’s port taken by a Vice Consul in 1944. 
                                                                                                                                           
where recruitment was carried out, some 90,000 inhabitants lived in 1300 villages. Perpiñá Grau, De 
colonización, 101.  
9Sebastian Llompart Aulet, Legislación del trabajo de los territorios españoles del Golfo de Guinea 
(Madrid: Dirección General de Marruecos y Colonias, 1946), 15. 




Figure 3 Smugglers arriving in Santa Isabel, 194411 
In order to get a sense of the direction and scale of the Nigerian recruiters’ 
“venture”—which indeed bid “fair to be successful”, I will in this chapter briefly 
draw out in quick strokes the touts who operated before them along the Gulf of 
Guinea. This regional frame also helps highlight the argument that Calabar’s 
recruiters were not only localized sprouts, but emerged out of rearrangements from 
existing larger constellations. 
2.1 First Contracts, First Recruiters, 1850s–1890s 
In the mid-nineteenth century the British naval base and trading station of Clarence in 
Fernando Pó, the eventual Santa Isabel of Spanish Guinea and Malabo of Equatorial 
Guinea, became a staging ground for the colonization of the Niger Delta. The British 
had their license to the island revoked and were forced to hand it over to a Spanish 
naval fleet in 1859, after the latter arrived to reclaim what a 1778 lands-and-seas-
swapping-treaty with the Portuguese had made technically theirs. In Spain, Leopoldo 
O’Donnell, a former Capitán General of Cuba, had started rotating between the 
presidency and the ministry of war and in 1863 he founded the new colonial office, 
the Ministerio de Ultramar, to invade Morocco and to implement the first “Royal 
Decree of Colonization” in Guinea. Many of the officers of the Spanish armada 
                                                 
11British VC (Robertson), 31 May 1944, TNA, CO 554/139/5. 
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dispatched to the new and very modest military outpost on Fernando Pó had started 
granting themselves large land concessions from the 1860s on. 12  The posesiones 
became state property because of state of war had been declared. 13  In this state, 
anything pronounced by the Capitán General or Gobernador on site would institute 
rule. The despot, 14  henceforth, could burn forests, and concede, title, lease and 
expropriate lands, and legally define labour relations.  
Long before slavery was abolished in Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Spanish General of 
this first fleet, and first Gobernador, Carlos de Chacon, signed an order saying no one 
was or could be a slave on the island, initially purely on paper. Chacon converted a 
variety of “domestic servants”, who were mostly underage quasi-slaves, into five-
years “apprenticeships” inscribed in a governmental register of deeds and contracts. 
This very was the first Spanish labour regulation. It was a short one, merely assuring 
“rations” and “rates of pay, monthly, to be given to those over 8 years old.” The 
government also interceded in the relation between master and servant: disputes and 
punishments would be mediated by “the Governor and his advisors.”15 
                                                 
12Presidencia (O’Donnell) to Consejo de Ministros, 9 November 1858, ‘Introducción al Proyecto de 
Real Decreto de Colonización’, AGA, C-81/07050; García Cantús, ‘Fernando Poo’, 370, 567. It does 
not mean they made successful planters. It took a while “until the first Spanish settler with any success 
emerged. This was Francisco Romera an official from the Armada, who came with some experience 
gathered from [the plantations] in Cuba”. 
13‘Decreto’, 12 November 1868, in Ministerio de Ultramar and Adelardo López de Ayala, Memoria 
presentada a las Cortes Constituyentes por el Ministerio de Ultramar (Segovia: Imprenta de la 
Biblioteca Universal Economica, 1869), 101–8. See also Carlos Petit Calvo, ‘Detrimentum rei 
publicae: Constitución de España en Guinea’, in Constitución en España: Orígenes y destinos, ed. José 
María Portillo Valdés and José María Iñurritegui Rodríguez (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y 
Constitucionales, 1998), 425–94. The author has an English and German version of this interesting 
piece of legal history, see bibliography. 
14Despot is of course derived from medieval Latin despota from the Greek despotes: ‘lord, master, 
owner’ or ‘absolute ruler’. By using the term despot, I might cause some confusion, because I mean the 
opposite of the—anyhow much revised image—classic ancient despot who grew into a “military-
industrial complex, in which the balance of forces was the precise opposite of ours, for the profits, 
insofar as that word is applicable, went to the government and its agents.” Moses Finley, The Ancient 
Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 161.  
15García Cantús, ‘Fernando Poo’, 434–6. On abolition see Sundiata, From Slavery to Neoslavery, 54, 
50; Miers and Roberts, ‘The End of Slavery in Africa’, 16. Slavery was abolished in Puerto Rico in 
1873 and in Cuba in 1886. 
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These first naval officers immediately brought in a brigade of condemned Andalusian 
anarchists and dissidents from Malaga to try to work the land. Most of the prisoners 
were worked to death or died even before getting off the boat. The “ten-year 
sentences of residence on Fernando Poo” that were being handed down to Spaniards 
and Spanish imperial subjects were “in lieu of a death sentences”—and were in effect 
a commuted death sentence, a prolonged death by other means. The dying of Spanish 
prisoners en masse “produced an imaginary of the island of Fernando Poo in the 
peninsula as a damned hell”—the same term of non-endearment the island was 
prefixed with in Nigeria even a century later. Several boatloads of Cuban political 
prisoners and a large dose of Aragonese anarchists continued to arrive. Up until 1895 
almost two thousand political prisoners were sent to the island, their arrival peaked 
with every anti-monarchical and anti-colonial revolt in Spain, Cuba and the 
Philippines. From Spain insurgents “with revolutionary sympathies”, “suspect 
teachers imparting revolutionary ideas”, “vagrants from the port towns”, were all put 
to “forced labour on agricultural enterprises” and farmed anything from tobacco to 
chickens. The “state of emergency proclaimed with the arrival of the early exiles was 
not lifted until 1904”.16 
At the same time as the early experiment in penal transportation, in the 1860s the 
Spanish brought over five-hundred emancipados or “those recaptured from slave 
ships” from Havana. The released captives had been offered a tortuous way back to 
the African continent on seven year indentures, after which they were to be “granted 
their unconditional freedom.” The majority died before their contracts expired. Those 
who survived made up an important nucleus of the Fernandinos—who were largely 
made up of “liberated captives” that the British had hired in Sierra Leone and brought 
to the island. 17 For almost a decade after 1827 the port of Clarence (Malabo) was a 
British naval base that was set up to track down European slave traders, set fire to the 
coastal barracoon or slave dens, and sign treaties with monarchs and rulers along the 
                                                 
16Gabriel, ‘Más allá de los exilios politicos’, 211; Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 49–50, 54; 
Curtin, Death by Migration, 110; Foreman, The Philippine Islands, 539. 
17Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 52; Sundiata ‘The Rise and Decline’, 29; García Cantús, 
‘Fernando Poo’, 437, 515; “Emancipado emigration was prohibited in September of 1866.” “In 1869 
there were only 150 emancipados, 120 men and 30 women” left. Liniger-Goumaz ‘La cuestion 
bracera’, 527; Sampedro, ‘Engaging the Atlantic’, 917. 
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Bight of Biafra. The naval station was briefly the site of one of the Mixed 
Commission Courts set up to prosecute the staff on board slave ships—a “‘horde of 
miscreants, the refuse of all nations.’” About a thousand clerks from Freetown and 
“liberated captives” remained on an island. From the beginning, around the emerging 
creole settler population gathering around Clarence there were several hundred 
“transient” Kru workers with their own peri-urban “Kru-Town”. 18 The Kru were an 
agglomerate group of, eventually Liberians, who lived around Maryland and Cape 
Palmes. Cape Palmes was sucked into the very centre of British imperial labour 
recruitment. Kru were described by colonial employers, during the peak of indenture, 
as the “‘the Chinese of West Africa.” Over 50,000 West Africans were recruited to the 
British and French Caribbean in the mid-nineteenth century.19  
A British naval officer on Fernando Pó writing in 1850 observed with dismay that it 
was “cheaper to transport these men” from the Kru coast “nearly two thousand miles 
to perform this work, than it was to employ the liberated Africans residing on the 
Spot”. Fernandinos “had learned to read” and also “hired the Kroomen to work their 
farms for them.”20 As soon as the Spanish colonial authorities arrived on the island in 
1859 they “almost immediately began plans” for an “improved dock” and the like and 
“started to flatten the terrain and build our houses”. They also immediately lamented 
that the indigenous “boobies” were “completely useless for labour and we can expect 
nothing from them if that land is to prosper”. They had to turn to the Kru, the 
“crumanes whom we are forced to go looking for on the coast”. 21 The first 
Gobernador, Chacon, himself went off to Liberia himself and had with him a type of 
                                                 
18Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 22, 31; citing Nichols to Hay, 31 March 1831, TNA, CO 82/4; 
Lynn, Commerce, Christianity and the Origins of the ‘Creoles’ of Fernando Po, 256, 261; Robert T. 
Brown, ‘Fernando Po and the Anti-Sierra Leonean Campaign: 1826–1834’, The International Journal 
of African Historical Studies 6, 2 (1973): 249–64. 
19Martin, ‘Krumen “Down the Coast”’, 402; Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery, 146–7; Clarence-
Smith, ‘Emigration from Western Africa’, 45–8. 
20Henry Vere Huntley, Seven Years’ Service on the Slave Coast of Western Africa (London: T.C. Newby, 
1850), 167; cited in Sundiata, ‘The Rise and Decline of Kru Power’, 28. 
21Presidencia (O’Donnell) to Consejo de Ministros, 9 November 1858, ‘Introducción al Proyecto de 
Real Decreto de Colonización’, AGA, C-81/07060, cited in García Cantús, ‘Fernando Poo’, 370. See 
also Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 51; Clavero, Bioko, 19. 
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published manual, a “guide for commercial transactions” on the West African coast in 
which the Spanish author gives advice on how to handle negotiations with “a good 
dose of diplomacy” and the delicate steps required to recruit Kru labour—which 
dashes for whom, the going rate in different areas and the not so obvious rates of 
equivalence of the “objects of value that represent money” such as gunpowder, rum, 
tobacco, manillas, and linen.22 When the first Spanish naval ships set off to recruit 
labour on the Kru coast in the 1860s, they were advised by the Colonial Office in 
Madrid “not to hand over excessively extravagant commissions to intermediary 
interlopers, in light of the repugnance with which the English are beginning to see the 
matter.”23 Nevertheless, labour migrants in the island were quite ‘free’ in the mid 
nineteenth century.  
Richard Francis Burton—a British colonial officer extraordinaire—achieved renown 
through many things, but being one of the first Consuls on Fernando Pó in the 1860s 
was not one of them. During his short tenure on the island he talked in very resentful 
terms about the Kru there. Even though they were “employed all the day long”, 
Burton describes the scene as “quite the counterpart of a landowner’s existence in the 
Southern States” before the American Civil War. Labour relations, “the curse of free 
labour”, says Burton, looked something like this: “It is true these fellows have no 
overseer, consequently there is no whip; punishment resolves itself into retrenching 
rum and tobacco; moreover, they come and go as they please.”24  There were no 
                                                 
22Joaquín J. Navarro, Apuntes sobre el estado de la costa occidental de Africa y principalmente de las 
posesiones españoles en el Golfo de Guinea (Madrid: Impr. Nacional, 1859), 133–134; García Cantús, 
‘Fernando Poo’, 434, 372; Castro and Calle, Origen de la colonización española en Guinea Ecuatorial, 
209; Clavero, Bioko, 19. 
23Ministro de Estado, Madrid to GG (Montes de Oca y Aceñero), May 1881, AGA, C-81/07123, cited 
in García Cantús, ‘Fernando Poo’, 426. British abolitionists were careful in their assessment. The 
reverend Clarke in a meeting of the Anti-Slavery Society responded to a misunderstanding when he 
explained he witnessed people being “purchased on the Kroo coast” claiming: “I did not say they were 
positively purchased. I said a price was paid for them.” To which Laird, a navy man in the audience 
interceded ironically: “That is a nice distinction.” British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society, 
Proceedings of the General Anti-Slavery Convention, Called by the Committee of the British and 
Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, and Held in London, from Tuesday, June 13th, to Tuesday, June 20th, 
1843 (London: J. Snow, 1843), 261. 




commodity plantations on the island then and so no sign of indentured contracts yet 
and therefore no outgrowth of new type of labour recruiter. 
The benchmark for the island’s contracts was laid only with the arrival of the Spanish, 
and in 1862 they added onto them the duration and conditions borrowed from the 
mould written up for Chinese coolies in Cuba. This Cuban template of indenture was 
given to the Spanish by the British when they effectively arranged the hiring of 
Chinese coolies for them in the 1840s. 25  Even though the Spanish had directly 
transplanted these Atlantic indentured contracts onto the island in the late 1860s, the 
principal African labour force on the island, the Kru, had managed to negotiate with 
Spanish recruiters and bargain down the terms of service from an unworkable official 
ten years—that like for the Spanish convicts would have been effectively a prolonged 
death sentence by other means. The Spanish “colonial government had no choice but 
to assuage the conditions of contract”.  
A recruiter on board a Spanish navy ship in 1864 set a precedent by “contracting 24 
Kruman in Cape Palmes for a stay of only two years at 4 pesos a month”—indeed this 
minimum duration would barely change for exactly the next century, until the 
Nigerian state, under a revised labour treaty, agreed to extend the minimum length of 
service to three and half years. 26 This duration was in the upper limits of the existing 
expectations on the Kru coast, where residents had become used to being “detached 
                                                 
25Sundiata, ‘The Rise and Decline of Kru Power’, 29; García Cantús, ‘Fernando Poo’, 515. In June 
1847 the first culíes landed on in Havana, at a cost of 170 pesos each, 100 of which was subsidized by 
the Junta de Fomento or “Council of Economic Development” and paid over to Zulueta and 
Company—a London based undertaking set up to recruit coolies in the recently conquered British 
treaty port city of Amoy or Xiamen. The man behind the logistics was the brother of the eminent Cuban 
landowner and businessman Julian Zulueta, both “old hands at importing slaves”—indeed Julian has 
been described as the “last great slave trader of Cuba”. Until 1874 some 125,000 Chinese coolies 
landed on the island. Another 100,000 coolies were taken to Peru—the mortality rate on board was 
12%. In the 1872 Cuban census someone counted 58,400 Chinese, many of whom had had their eight-
year indenture prolonged by the criminal justice system. Hu-Dehart ‘La Trata Amarilla’, 167; Hu-
Dehart, ‘Chinese Coolie Labour in Cuba’, 68; Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 15; Hugh Thomas, The Slave 
Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440–1870 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 9.  
26GG (Ayllón) to DGMC, 21 May 1864, ‘Se adjunta nuevo convenio de Contratación’, AGA, C-
81/06941; cited in García Cantús, ‘Fernando Poo’, 439, 442. For the previous horrific ordinance that 
Cantús simply calls the “forced labour” one, see GG (Ayllón), 9 December 1862, ‘Proyecto de 
reglamento para el regimen de los trabajadores que lleguen a esta Isla, bien sean contratados en la 
Costa Vecina, bien procedentes de aprehensiones hechas a los buques negreros por nuestra marina de 
guerra’, AGA, C-81/07124. 
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without force from land and lineage to rotate [usually in intervals of less than one 
year] in and out of European overseas export enclaves under a system with low, fixed 
wages”.27 Already in the late 1860s Fernando Pó was low on their list of preferred 
destinations, though it was someway up from Cuba. Spanish recruiters on board the 
official steamers dispatched to Cape Palmes in the late 1860s were told that the Kru 
were “by nature suspicious and mistrustful” and so they advised “not to joke around 
and especially not to mention the island of Cuba or Havana, well these names are 
odious to them, otherwise they might think that they were being misled”. 28  
The Kru on Fernando Pó were an ever-swelling and diminishing “recalcitrant 400 
man encampment”, and with every passing steamer stopping over in Fernando Pó, a 
considerable number were lost “through desertion.”29 Indeed every time a British ship 
was stationed in port, a few dozen “Kruman would disappear.” The Kru were mostly 
employed by the Spanish colonial government, in any case it seems they “made sure 
to flee from the island whenever opportunities arose.” If “we don’t find an energetic 
remedy” to the “‘flight of the Kruman’”, writes an early Spanish Governor, “it will be 
a stimulus to a series of successive desertions which will leave our Government and 
population without a single worker.” 30  That the primary worries of the Spanish 
Governor lay in desertion is clear from a 1862 Labour Treaty signed with the 
Kingdom of Bimbia on the shores of Mount Cameroon, located within a direct line of 
sight of the island. All five short articles are geared towards “King William I” of 
Bimbia “fulfil and making his subjects fulfil the contracts with Spanish subjects” so 
as “to avoid the frequently arsing problem” of desertion. 31  The colonial labour 
                                                 
27Schuler, ‘Kru Emigration to British and French Guiana’, 180. Kru were exceptional in terms of a 
disposition to enter indenture labour market: “it was difficult to find African societies which would 
participate in labor traffic on such terms, especially when they discovered how erratic repatriation 
could be.” See also Martin, ‘Krumen “Down the Coast”; Frost, Work and Community Among West 
African Migrant Workers, 31–3.  
28‘Real Orden de 28 septiembre 1867, Trabajo Indígena, Contratación krumanes’, Article 8. 
29Sundiata, ‘The Rise and Decline of Kru Power’, 29; Brooks, The Kru Mariner, 25. 
30GG (Gándara) to DGMC, 19 June 1861, AGA, C-81/06941, cited in García Cantús, ‘Fernando Póo’, 
416. 
31GG and King William, 1 February 1862, ‘Convenio con el Rey de Bimbia’.  
41 
 
contract was of course on the very very surface of things opposed to and might have 
even been “intended to act as a deterrent to coercion, but in reality its more practical 
purpose was to alert labourers”, however recruited, “to the penalties for desertion.”32 
Indenture “borrowed from the sailor’s contract” that stipulated “the length and type of 
service required [but], above all, the penalty for desertion.”33 But the Kru had no 
kings, and bounty-hunters or identity cards could not yet track them down, only their 
“headmen” knew who they actually were. These headmen were a mixed bag, though 
often enough they were far from loyal collaborators or overeager contract enforcers.34 
European “steamers” were recruiting as many as 20,000 workers from the Kru Coast 
each year in the late 1860s35 and indeed in the 1870s it became official policy of the 
Spanish—probably because they found it easier to feed off the existing flows of Kru 
mariners—to offer dashes to those who deserted “from the British vessels” to 
Fernando Pó.36 
Several hundred Kru did continue to arrive almost every year on Fernando Pó for the 
next few decades, but their arrival was by no means guaranteed. In 1869 for example, 
the Gobernador dispatched a Spanish ship full of supplies to the Kru coast for the 
“sole purpose of recruiting 300 krumanes”. They stopped to negotiate at over 10 
                                                 
32Anderson, ‘Master and Servant in Colonial Kenya’, 463. 
33Stanziani, ‘Beyond Colonialism’, 71; Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor, 35. 
34Tonkin, ‘Creating Kroomen’, 35; Frost, Work and Community Among West African Migrant Workers, 
40; The “headman” who “for his efforts” “receives the first month’s wages of the persons he supplies 
and pockets thuse.” Johnson et al., Proceedings of the General Anti-Slavery Convention, 260; also Dop 
and Robinson, Travel Sketches from Liberia, 574. 
35Sundiata, Brothers and Strangers, 65. Kru were employed by almost all colonial shipping and public 
works departments in the late nineteenth century, for example the Gold Coast railway in 1901, all over 
the British stations in the Oil Rivers Protectorate in the 1890s, and for the building of the Lagos Port 
and railroad north of Lagos in the early 1900s. “Liberians were poorer than Nigerians and other West 
Africans it seems, and Krumen were willing to work for low wages. To the merchants of Lagos and the 
officials of the Protectorate, they were a bargain, at 1 pound a month or 9d daily.” Martin, ‘Krumen 
“Down the Coast”’, 409. More famously the French also recruited Kru to work on the failed first 
attempt to carve the Panama Canal in 1885 arranged by the same management team that buildt the 
Suez Canal, for which Kru labourers were also recruited, see Frost, Work and Community, 20. Fruther 
on Kru see also Behrens, Les Kroumen de la côte; Renault, Libération de l’esclavage et nouvelle 
servitude. 
36GG (García Tudela), 14 December 1873, ‘Informe demostrando y enardeciendo la necesidad y la 
conveniencia de abandonar dicha colonia y sus dependencias’, AGA, C-81/06939; cited in García 
Cantús, ‘Fernando Poo’, 515.  
42 
 
coastal Kru settlements around Cape Palmes but to no avail, so they headed west to 
Monrovia and turned “to the Liberian Governor and a Dutch merchant, from whom 
they only managed to buy 3 krumanes”. The ship’s captain says, “the rest, a hundred 
or so were lined up and ready to embark but refused once they heard they would end 
in the hands of private employers on Fernando Poo.”37 When a little earlier the British 
Consul, Richard Burton had passed through Cape Palmes in eastern Liberia to enlist 
workers, he “failed in recruiting men. ‘Nanny [Fernando] Po’ was a word of fear to 
the Krumen; they had been made to work in gardens and on the roads.” “Some of 
them had been engaged for one year, not two, and had been kept for three.” Hearing 
Burton’s fellow travellers on the steamer speak “a few words of Spanish” they 
deemed him to be “‘a Panyer,’ [a Spaniard] and resolutely refused, with characteristic 
independence, to accompany” him.38  
Fernando Pó consistently retained this reputation so after the departure of braceros 
after every round of the contracts they always came from somewhere else. As 
Fernando Pó’s reputation headed off on a downwards spiral new Kru labourers had 
stopped coming altogether in the 1890s. In 1900 there were 1000 Liberians, mostly 
non-Kru, working on Fernando Pó. That same year there were over a thousand British 
West African labourers on the island, many from Sierra Leone but also from Nigeria 
(categorized as ‘de los lagos’ and ‘Calabares’—‘the Lagosians’ and ‘Calabarians’ or 
largely Yoruba and Ibibio).39 Next I examine how these arrived. 
                                                 
37Jefe de la Estación Naval (Rafael Alonso) to GG (de Souza), 13 January 1869, AGA, C-81/06941; 
cited in García Cantús, ‘Fernando Poo’, 445. 
38Richard F. Burton, Wanderings in West Africa from Liverpool to Fernando Po, Vol.II (London: 
Bradbury and Evans, 1862), 2; For “Nanny Po” and its meaning, see Davis, Ethnohistorical on the Kru 
Coast, 57. 
39Sundiata, From Slavery to Neoslavery, 130, 129; It is unclear how many were actually Kru, not many, 
most “laborers leaving Liberia were” low caste Vai and Mandinka, and Kpelle. In the 1890s, “one 
plantation alone was employing 200 migrant workers (Kru, Gold Coasters and Sierra Leoneans), and 
by 1901 there were 993 Liberian laborers in all on the island.” Sundiata ‘The Rise and Decline of Kru 
Power’, 35; citing Brooks, The Kru Mariner, 25; Terán, Síntesis Geográfica, 78. 
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2.2 Tout Preludes: Fernandinos and Agudas, 1880s–1910s 
Cacao plantations on Fernando Pó did not kick off until the 1880s, even though 
already during the mid-nineteenth century a Fernandino, William Pratt, with 
experience travelling through the Caribbean, as well as a Spanish agronomist, brought 
over cacao pods to the island after separate trips to São Tomé. The first export of a 
monoculture, yielding 500kg worth of cacao and requiring a significant number of 
braceros was in 1884.40 In the late 1880s, 80% of all plantations (some 630h) were in 
the hands of Fernandinos. These were all situated on the coast, an area of colonial 
encroachment the Bubi had stayed clear off since the height of the transatlantic slave 
trade in the Bight about a century previously. These coastal lands had been acquired 
by Fernandinos through a mix of government concessions, localized armed violence 
and as compensation for unsettled commercial debts of palm oil and alcohol.41 These 
first successful cacao plantation had been single-handedly set up by ambitious 
Fernandinos, such as the Barelycorns, Maximilano Jones, and William Allen Vivour. 
They hailed from Freetown or the various Creole towns around Freetown. Their once 
enslaved parents or grandparents were most likely from Nigeria.42 
                                                 
40 Terán, Síntesis geográfica, 84; Sundiata, Equatorial Guinea, 24; Clarence-Smith, Cocoa and 
Chocolate, 104; Jose Cesar Banciella, ‘Spanisch-Guinea’, Deutsche Kolonial Zeitung, Berlin, May 
1942, BArch, NS 5 VI / 9 27449 B310. 
41In the 1890s a Catholic missionary complained: “The island of Fernando Po above all has been 
captured by the English blacks of Sierra Leone”. “These foreign English blacks have for the most part, 
the better coastal soil.” Fernandez, Misiones y Misioneros en la Guinea Española, 109; cited in 
Sundiata ‘The Rise and Decline’, 36. For earliest account of hesitant Bubi interaction with British 
slavers see, José Varela, 1780, ‘Descripción de la Isla de Fernando Poo’, AGS, Estado, Legajo 7411, 
Documento 26. 
42Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 23, 130. Sundiata notes that the British in Sierra Leone 
estimated in 1821, that 42% slaves leaving Old Calabar were Ibibio, and 56% Igbo. Most recaptured 
slaves sent to Sierra Leone were ‘Nigerian’. The other important early figure was “a São Tomense 
Mulatto, Laureano Dias da Cunha Lisboa, trader, planter and Portuguese consul on the island.” He 
“went to Freetown and personally took back labourers to their estate, then he sent his agent Thomas 





Map 2 Fernandino plantations on the east coast, 190143 
Vivour, a bricklayer by trade, had become a palm-oil agent of the John Holt Company 
on the island in the 1870s and was used to travelling around the Gulf of Guinea and 
Europe too. Vivour himself soon became the largest planter on the island. He had up 
to a hundred labourers at any one point. He was very distrusting of his hired 
subordinates but more often than not he recruited with the help of “two Bassa-people 
stationed on the coast”—Bassa, a Kru coastal group whom a resident German 
scientist on Fernando Pó in the 1880s paradoxically decided to describe as both “very 
lazy, and unsettled and restless, and who assimilate quickly into the ranks of the Poto” 
                                                 
43Balboa, Kenedi, Macfoy, and Vivour had their plantations on the southeast of the island north of 
Riaba or Concepción. Bariobé, Bahu, Bilepa are names of bubi villages uphill and upstream from the 
plantations. Inset of Map: ‘Ile de Fernando Põo’, 1901, BNM. 
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or Fernandinos. 44  To get workers these new generations of creole planters and 
recruiters traversed whatever port towns were connected by steamer, anywhere where 
“free immigrants” or “slaves escaping their servitude” had “flooded” the “coastal 
towns”, including Accra and Loango, but especially Lagos and Freetown both of 
which were becoming a type of “floating” “labour reserve for all of West Africa”.45  
This confluence of labour in the coastal trading towns and the more flexible relations 
that could result “seemed to have blunted somewhat the distinctions between slave, 
indentured servant, pawn and free labourer”; also because especially in the 1890s 
“slaving, brigandage, panyarring and pawnship became fused in disconcerting 
ways”.46 Some of the recruited workers could also turn this fusion into its opposite 
and establish themselves as independent planters after a contract on the island. From 
Freetown, a letter to a newspaper retells how the movement of “the aborigines from 
this country who went to that Island as farm labourers”, involved people “who a few 
years ago [were] worth nothing, [and] are now being enriched.” A letter from a 
Fernandino planter cited in this newspaper expounds the progressive coupling of 
social mobility and class formation: “‘Farming is as paying job here: you will be 
astonished to know what insignificant Mendi, or Limbah or Timni who have now 
become planters make annually, hundreds of pounds.’”47 Indeed it was also through 
                                                 
44 Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery 130; Clarence-Smith, Cocoa and Chocolate, 80; On the 
“fabelhaf reich” Vivour see Oscar Baumann, Eine afrikanische Tropeninsel Fernando Poo und die 
Bube (Wien: Hölzel, 1888), 140, 137–8. “Vivour beschäftigt derzeit grösstenteils Loangomänner, doch 
hat er auch etwa 30 Accra-Arbeiter (darunter Fassbinder, Zimmerleute und Schmiede), einige Cap 
Palmas-Krujungen, mehrere Bassamänner als Zwischenhäındler an den Küstenplätzen und vier Bube in 
seinem Dienste. Vivour hatte früher schon alle möglichen Arbeiter aus verschiedenen Küstentheilen im 
Dienste gehabt, doch geniesst er jetzt überall so einen schlechten Ruf, dass es ihm schwer wird, Leute 
zu engagieren.” Baumann opposed the Bassi with the “Loangos who found the Bubi-life more 
attractive, many have deserted into Boloco village and are today indistinguishable from the Bubi.” 
45Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism, 34; Kristin Mann, Slavery and the Birth of an African City: 
Lagos, 1760-1900 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 234; see also García Cantús, 
‘Fernando Poo’, 567. 
46Gerald M. McSheffrey, ‘Slavery, Indentured Servitude, Legitimate Trade and the Impact of Abolition 
in the Gold Coast, 1874–1901: A Reappraisal’, The Journal of African History 24, 3 (1983): 349–368, 
360; Emmanuel Akyeampong, Between the Sea and the Lagoon: An Eco-Social History of the Anlo of 
Southeastern Ghana, c. 1850 to Recent Times (Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 2001), 70. 




the return of labour migrant labour after a ‘tour’ on Fernando Pó’s early plantations 
with which the cash crop spread into Ghana and the rest of West Africa.48 
While many Fernandinos became landowners and successful agro-capitalists, many 
also became state functionaries and local managers in the rapidly expanding European 
plantations during the 1890s and 1900s—when the Spanish colonial state had started 
dishing out 50h land concessions to any Spanish settler who arrived. Most new 
Spanish settlers arrived from Cuba and Catalonia and were woefully unprepared to 
engage in the delicate and intricate task of informal recruitment on their own account. 
The Fernandino’s knowledge of travel and the entire West coast, and large profits in 
hand, seemed to incite a new breed of “native labour recruiters [who] first made their 
appearance about 1896 [after] the period of headmen came to a close.” This 
distinction between headmen and recruiter is an important one as we have underlined. 
Only in the case of Kru were the advances, labour conditions, payments and 
supervision mediated through Kru headmen.  
A British Vice Consul traced Fernando Pó’s “first” Nigerian labour tout in one Aguda 
man, named Bernadino Jose Reis from Brazil House in Lagos island. In the 1890s 
Reis began “importing Yoruba labour” from Lagos and Ijebu-Ode.49  It would be 
onerous to place Reis at the origin, there were “other persons besides Mr. Reis 
engaged labourers for Fernando Po”. It is unclear who exactly he was except that his 
name was Bernadino Jose Reis, and that he was possibly related to a notable Aguda 
carpenter in Lagos. Reis does embody the new figure of the recruiter whose reign and 
movements into the first half of the twentieth century I will try to follow. This figure 
is the tout, a semi-anonymous stranger with who is semi-anonymous in his 
commercial relation with both capital and labour and delinked from the colonial state. 
At the turn of the century, 450 labourers, most of whom Reis recruited, went on strike. 
After what the Spanish called the ‘uprising of the Lagosians’ the British embargoed 
                                                 
48William G. Clarence-Smith, Cocoa and Chocolate, 1765–1914 (London: Routledge, 2000), 113; For 
the famous case or story of Tetteh Quarshie founding the first cacao farm in Ghana around 1880 with 
cacao seeds he brought from the island, see Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern 
Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism (Münster: LIT Verlag, 1997), 172. 
49British VC (Michie), 28 February 1941, ‘Labour Conditions’, para. 4, TNA, FO 371/26908. 
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labour migration to Spanish Guinea. Though the British had already planned a 
generalized circumscribing of the labour market of British West Africa. In 1897 “as 
large number of men are now being contracted to work in the Panama Canal and the 
Congo estuary, it has been necessary to suspend all shipments of labour from the 
colony [of Sierra Leone] not only to Fernando Poo but also elsewhere”. 50 
Nevertheless Yoruba labour had continued to arrive, and in 1900 they “marched to the 
Governors house in Santa Isabel with machetes in hand and refused to return to the 
plantations”. These striking Yoruba’s, were met “with guards from the navy who 
rushed down from the jetty”. They were beaten and deported without their due pay.51 
Reis himself kept recruiting for decades. In the 1910s, someone accused Reis and a 
new associate, another “Lagos man” by the name of Thompson of going “to Bonny 
and Warri to take little children to sell at Fernando Po. They have sold lots already”. 
Reis and Thompson had a variety of liasons, as they would hire canoes to get to Rio 
del Rey in the German Cameroons “from whence there appears to be no difficulty in 
shipping them to [the] island of the Fernando Po group, where labour is very scare 
and in great demand”.52  
The recruiting scene in the early 1900s is a recurring repeat of the experiences of 
“Ali”, a “native of Lagos.” “Ali complains that he was found by a man called Bruce 
in Accra, who told him that he was taking him to Calabar to work there. He was 
                                                 
50Francis Bertie to Minister of State, London, 29 March 1897, AGA, C-G779, cited in García Cantús, 
‘Fernando Poo’, 576. 
51J.M. Rafel, Santa Isabel to GG (Domínguez Manresa), 3 December 1932, AGA, C-81/08128, E-12. 
Reasons for the strike were related to working conditions. In February 1900, before the strike, 212 of 
Reis’ recruits returned to Lagos only to lodge a complaint at the Education Office in Lagos: “they were 
cruelly treated”, “their rations consisted of only one plantain for breakfast and a small cup of rice for 
dinner”, “they further complained that they had not been paid their wages, but some of them received 
advances either in money or in kind.” Henry Carr, Education Office, Lagos, February 20 1900, ‘Report 
on the Condition and Treatment of Labourers just returned from Fernando Po’, AGA, C-81/07789, E-2. 
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agent for different Merchants of Fernando Po”. 
52Joseph Asaba, Victoria, to Provincial Commissioner, Calabar, 22 October, 1911, TNA, FO 367/254; 
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landed, he says, in Fernando Po and taken before the [Spanish labour officer, the] 
Curador.” He was then “told that if he did not sign a contract for three years he would 
put in gaol. He therefore signed for three years.”53 A recruiter by the name of “Mr. 
Davis” landed on the island with “ten Elmina boys” in 1912. “Davis recruited them in 
Elmina, and promised to take them to Calabar at 1s per day.” When  
“the steamer left the coast and went in a direction they know to be not that of Calabar, they 
questioned Davis where they were going to. He said the steamer was first going to Fernando Po. 
When they arrived here they were made to go ashore, and then taken before the Curador, who 
asked them to make a contract for five years. They said they had been engaged to work cargo, 
and were not to do plantation work. The Curador told [them] that if they did not make a 
contract for five years he would send them to gaol [jail]. They then made a contract for three 
years.”54  
Until the 1930s, the upper echelons of the both the British and the Spanish colonial 
state showed relatively little interest in the details of recruitment. They could feign a 
legal literalism, either sincerely or insincerely. They both agreed that these early 
migrations “cannot be described as ‘forced’”, as “labourers arriving from foreign 
territory in Fernando Po” had to make a “declaration” to “the effect that they are 
doing so out of their own free will.”55 This type of statement was only made by those 
who were distant observers, blinded by having read the legal small-print on contracts 
over and over again. Even when firms, particularly inter-colonial British and German 
                                                 
53British VC (Smallbones) to Curaduría, 10 June 1913, TNA, FO 367/353. Sundiata, From Slaving to 
Neoslavery, 135, citing CO to FO (Gray), 2 September 1912, TNA, FO 367/286 quotes a deposition 
from a Gold Coast labourer on the island in 1912: “I am a native of Amanfru, in Secondee. About 9 
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gave us two cups of rice weekly, and some salted fish. We worked for four months, but no pay was 
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54British VC (Smallbones) to Curaduría, 10 June 1913, TNA, FO 367/353. Or take the case of Momo 
Bokory, from Sierra Leone who arrived in similar circumstances. He was brought to Sekondi, also in 
Ghana, where he was promised by a Mr. Davis that he “would earn 3l a month. When they arrived in 
Secondi, Davis said he was taking him to the Congo and work at that wage.” He arrived in Fernando 
Pó and “wanted one year” as had been promised by Davis, but he was forced to sign on to four, under 
the same threat of gaol. 




firms made their own recruiting arrangements on the coast they could not outgun the 
Spanish state: a British firm on Fernando Pó found itself “under an obligation to see 
that the boys were sent back after that time”—less than one year—to which the 
Curador replied: “that he was the Curador and that he would allow no one to interfere 
with him and he contracted the boys for three years.”56 Those landing on the island 
had to sign on to contracts of variable length, which was essentially a matter of a 
barely negotiation extortion. 
In the early twentieth century, after the strike, the entirety of “the labour markets in 
the French and British West African possessions” became “closed for supplying 
workers to the plantations on this dread island which shelters under the flag of 
Spain.”57 The prohibition was only partially enforced and it became quickly “evident 
that a considerable unchecked traffic in illegally recruited native labourers of British 
nationality destined chiefly for the plantations of Fernando Po” was being carried out 
in various port town in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed some of the principal receiver of 
this illicitly recruited labour in British West Africa were British cocoa exporting 
houses in Santa Isabel, such as the John Holt company, who “pay 5pounds for each 
‘boy’ landed” in order to informally lend or rent these braceros to various smaller 
farmers on the island in exchange for their cocoa. Only colonial settlers and those 
with an emancipados status, an exclusive license granted to only a very small number 
of Fernandinos, could actually formally contract braceros. 58  Regular British and 
German steamers extensively connected Fernando Pó to its regional world; in the 
early decades of the twentieth century palm oil and cacao were still being exported 
primarily to Liverpool and Hamburg, as well as partly Barcelona. 
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From this embargo, Sundiata posits a brief formula: “the labor embargo from British 
West Africa” served only to “increase dependence on increasingly coercive labor 
recruitment elsewhere.” Sundiata has provided an ample and definitive account of 
recruitment on the western edge of the Gulf of Guinea but has assumed—and 
subsequently so have all the others in the field—that the Nigerian connection was 
more or less halted with the deportation of the Yoruba strikers in 1900 only to kick off 
with the Anglo-Spanish Labour Treaty in 1942. Sundiata offers brief empirical details 
into the unintended effects of the boycott which resulted in the continued “inter-
colonial struggle to secure British West African labor for Spanish Guinea”.59 His 
focus is however between World War I and the late 1920s, when the indentured labour 
treaty with the Liberian state displaced the mostly Fernandino and Creole recruiter-
touts who had shuttled back and forth across the West African coast. Reis and his ilk 
did partially subside as they were being made unnecessary by state-run despotic 
recruiting channels in both Liberia and Rio Muni. Sundiata writes, “by the late 1920s 
such an individual operation would have been almost unthinkable.”60 It was a strange 
comeback for such quasi-‘individual operations’ to flourish with a vengeance soon 
after, with methods pioneered by the likes of Vivour and Reis.  
Other recruiters were operating simultaneously or followed in the steps of Vivour and 
Reis, but always in different places. Calabar’s first large scale recruiter in the early 
twentieth century was Ekpenyon John Boko, from the Cobham family in Duke Town, 
who was “suspected of inducing boys to leave Calabar for Fernando Po without either 
obtaining the consent of the head of their House, or entering into a proper contract of 
service.”61 He had been taking advantage of the rising number of deserters and the 
newly autonomous job-seekers generated by the abolition of slavery in Nigeria 1901 
and the subsequent introduction of the House Rule ordinance, under which former 
                                                 
59Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 134; Sundiata, Equatorial Guinea, 43–5. 
60Sundiata, From Slavery to Neoslavery, 140; see Liberia and Spain, 15 August 1915, ‘Convenio entre 
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“slaves” now called servants were obliged to render tributary service labour to their 
Efik masters. The rate of flight was so high that even the “most important Chief[s]” in 
Calabar found it “difficult to secure enough labour for their trade canoes”.62 Dozens 
of letters reached the Governor in Santa Isabel from a demoted Efik aristocracy now 
classified as “chiefs”, such as from Abassi Ita of Duke House, asking about “the 
whereabouts of his runaway boys”. The Spanish Governor happily ignored all of them 
and pointed the finger back “at the slavery being condoned by the English, who 
expect us to return these men who left their region freely”.63 
After the British promulgated the House Rule Ordinance they introduced the “Roads 
and Rivers Proclamation of 1903” which gave “chiefs” the power “to recruit forced 
labour” for public works as well as recourse to the “local police in securing the 
capture of the chiefs’ runaway subjects.” As Walter Ofonogaro says, “both the House 
Rule Ordinance and the government’s forced labour policy created fugitives, many 
escaping to Lagos or Fernando Po, where they threw themselves on the mercy of the 
Spanish authorities of that plantation island.”64 Many hundred “British subjects from 
Southern Nigeria” and particularly from Calabar were “found to be living in a Spanish 
island, in order to avoid the bondage of the House Rule Ordinance [and] fear[ed] to 
return home again lest they become ‘enslaved’ under it.” In 1911 Jabez Linette was 
“anxious to return to his home in the Calabar district, but dare not so because he 
would be arrested [and then] returned to his owner.” The Methodists on Fernando Pó 
“purchased his liberty”; it is unclear whether they kept him on as a hired labourer.65 
                                                 
62 Olatunji Ojo, ‘The Southern Nigeria Native House Rule Ordinance (1901)’, African Economic 
History 40 (2012): 127–36, 133.  
63Solicitor for Chief Marin Braid, Calabar to GG, 18 October 1905, AGA, C-81/07789, E-2; GG to 
DGMC, 31 December 1912, AGA C-81/06945, E-20. 
64Walter I. Ofonagoro, ‘An Aspect of British Colonial Policy in Southern Nigeria: The Problems of 
Forced Labour and Slavery, 1895–1928’, in Studies in Southern Nigerian History, ed. Boniface 
Obichere (London: Frank Cass, 1982), 219–44, 237. The House Rule Ordinance was abolished in 
1912, F.D. Lugard, 20 May 1912, ‘Memorandum on the Native House Rule Ordinance’, TNA, CO 
520/107. On Forced labour in Nigeria see also Okolie, ‘The Transformation of Eastern Nigeria’, 455; 
Afigbo, ‘The Native Revenue Ordinance in the Eastern Provinces’, 71–100; and NAE, OPODIST 
1/1/38. 
65John H. Harris to the Secretary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, cited in ‘The 
House Rule Ordinance’, The Lagos Weekly Record, Lagos, 8 May 1911, 3. This question was also 
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In the first decades of the twentieth century, surrounded by recruiting embargoes 
spanning the entire Gulf of Guinea, Fernando Pó started throwing a new generations 
of informal recruiters at their own problema—a self-generated labour scarcity. They 
unfurled and incited a host of discontinuous labour suppliers across the Gulf of 
Guinea in an attempt to scramble themselves out of the paralyzing labour shortage on 
the island. Where the reputation of the island preceded the recruiters it was either 
misdirection as to the final destination, or call in the guards—which touts did not 
have. Many braceros met with death on the island, very few braceros stayed on the 
island as braceros, most returned because they wanted to or because vagrancy laws 
did not allow them to stay except as braceros. Touts always had to improvise and 
break new ground. Their discontinuous march came at very specific junctures. Their 
rhythm was precipitated and shifted by the consolidation of the imperial state, by 
changing political regimes, various junctions of extreme labour scarcity, and the 
changing composition of the mostly immigrant population. These structural 
conditions were quite volatile in Spanish Guinea and so waves of forms of free and 
unfree labour recruitment were constantly superseding each other at various turns, 
when a cumulative play of forces cut off certain supply-routes and release new ones. 
2.3 Despots Displace Touts in Liberia, 1890s–1920s 
The “change in Kru migration to Fernando Po” Sundiata observed, was a shift to 
despots: it did “not so much involve the breakdown of older patterns and the rise of 
coercion per se as it does the rise of external authority on the Kru Coast itself.” Any 
of the manifold “internal pressure[s] to emigrate from the Kru Coast” were now being 
“increasingly substituted by the coercive machinery of the Liberian state.”66 “Laissez 
faire recruitment was curtailed in the [1890s] when the Liberian government gave 
recruiting rights to a German, August Humplmayr”. Humplmayr was allowed to 
operate along the entirety of southern Liberia and indeed the Liberian state gave him 
                                                                                                                                           
linked to illegal recruitment. “One woman from the island of Fernando Po visited Old Calabar, and was 
taking back with her a domestic servant. The woman was arrested and sentenced to a long term of 
imprisonment, which she is now serving in Old Calabar.” ‘The Labour Ordinance in Northern Nigeria,’ 
The Lagos Weekly Record, Lagos, 24 October 1903. 
66Sundiata, ‘The Rise and Decline of Kru Power’, 30; Sundiata, From Slavery to Neoslavery, 129. 
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“the exclusive right to ship small groups of laborers to all places except Fernando 
Po.”67 A Spanish resident on the island in 1901 lamented these strangulation tactics, 
but in a sympathetic light. In the “same way that in Chinese ports, recruiting 
companies emerged to channel Chinese labour for the Panama Canal, the desert of 
Atacama, and the transandes railways, in Liberia there is one for Krumanes, 
established by a German company, who for a licence fee paid to the Government of 
this Black Republic, has come to monopolize the business exporting its inhabitants.”68 
The large German commercial conglomerate with a steamship line, Woerman and 
Company, took over this license in 1903 and Fernando Pó was put back into the list of 
permitted destinations. In order to “regulate” emigration and cash in or drain parts of 
the wage-profit nexus for themselves, the Liberian state in 1891 “established a Native 
African Shipping Bureau” and charged a very substantial two-dollar “fee”, some of 
which went to “set up a register of all departing workers” in order to keep track “of all 
deaths down the coast as well as a schedule of fees.” The three-month advances that 
the Kru had demanded and come to expect now went into the hands of the “Liberian 
treasury hovering on the edge of bankruptcy.”69 
The Liberian state might have had a registry, but ‘laissez faire recruitment’ 
nevertheless reappeared. Right before the outbreak World War I, the John Holt 
company—that had a cocoa exporting house on Fernando Pó—called on Harold 
Taylor “to assist in the recruitment of labour”. Taylor was a lowly British employee 
residing and working at an import/export ‘factory’ in Monrovia. Taylor says that “the 
best way to get results” was to venture into the “most remote of districts” in the 
“interior”, where ‘Nanny Po’ had not yet acquired a loathsome connotation. Taylor 
proudly retells his linguistic feats. Exaggerating somewhat, he recalls how the 
                                                 
67Sundiata, ‘The Rise and Decline of Kru Power’, 38; By the end of the century labor migration had 
become an important source of revenue for Americo-Liberian officialdom. The Kru became 
increasingly subject to Port of Entry laws, recruitment regulations, and imposts on overseas earnings. 
Martin, ‘Krumen “Down the Coast”’, 409. 
68Gutiérrez Sobral, ‘Guinea Española: la crisis de braceros’, Revista de Geografía Colonial y Mercantil 
2 (1901): 12–15, 14. He continues: “Anyone who wants to contract Liberian labour has to get along 
with this company” which had “prioritized the request of their countrymen in Cameroons.” 
69Martin, ‘Krumen “Down the Coast”’, 416, 409; Clarence-Smith, ‘Cocoa Plantations and Coerced 
Labor in the Gulf of Guinea’, 162. 
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“picture [he] painted [of Fernando Pó] was so glowing with gorgeous colouring, that I 
eventually had all my work cut out to prevent the Chief himself from signing on and 
excluding all others from this golden promised land.” Taylor notes that as soon as he 
crossed into districts where people had already come and gone to Fernando Pó, 
touting became untenable.70 Many other private and informal recruiters who had been 
operating in Liberia were informing the planters on Fernando Pó that the “boys who 
had returned from Fernando Po gave it such a bad name that [they were] unable to 
induce more labourers to come here”. 71  Fernando Pó reputation was being 
continuously cemented and expanded, and so Taylor and his “native gangers” were 
forced to go into “ever more isolated parts of the interior” without laying “too much 
stress on the name Fernando Po […] the very sound of it seemed to have a dampening 
effect on us.” Taylor leaves his reader to imagine the conditions of the mobile 
encampments of recruited labourers: “Within a month we had collected close on eight 
hundred labourers”, but on the trek back down to the coast, over an entire third “just 
vanished into thin air” or “died en route from a variety of unexplained causes” or had 
been “left behind through sickness.” He dispatched the remaining recruits to Fernando 
Pó on German steamers as the “British Captains were very averse to […] what they 
termed slave-running”.72  
                                                 
70Taylor, Jungle Trader, 85.  
71British VC (Smallbones) to FO (Grey), 30 June, 1913, TNA, FO 367/353. 
72Taylor, Jungle Trader, 85. The way Spanish colonialist twisted true details and denied this reality is a 
peculiar case of delirium, which we won’t get into: “The island of Fernando Poo has achieved a good 
reputation along the entirety of the coast, it is known as a place of abundance, an easy life, of richness 
for the black worker, who on his days off has plenty of money to spend, and where all braceros can 
acquire a wife or wives.” Juan Bravo Carbonell, ‘Politica de España en Africa: Los braceros liberianos 




Figure 4 Harold Taylor in Monrovia, 191673 
Taylor does briefly expand on another principal—but less effective—recruiting 
method, which he says involved an “appeal to the cupidity of an impoverished Chief”. 
Taylor offered a “payment of so much per head” to certain chiefs, who would then 
proceed to “round up all the young men” who had incurred real or imaginary debts 
with them—that is principally those young people a chief “suspected of having affairs 
with his many wives” whom he could thereby customarily fine. Those unable to pay 
these fines were “hand[ed] over, body and soul” by the chiefs whom Taylor gave a 
“lavish commission” to. This depended on the person and disposition of a chief. Just 
as often, Taylor says he would encounter someone like “Chief Nasty Chap” who 
refused to allow recruiters to get to work amongst his people. “I have met only two 
with such a mean look in the whole of Africa, and this fellow was both of them.” 
Taylor “wishing to avoid all friction” left the area—the convoy meandered and 
leaked. Almost a third of the convoy deserted, no one was being chained or escorted. 
While coercion can be said to have emerged from localized debt relations, the 
consistency of this release or co-optation only took place via the manoeuvres and 
ruses prepared by touts.  
                                                 
73Taylor, Jungle Trader, 86. Captioned ‘My Garraway Customers’. Photograph taken adjacent to the 
British factory-import-export shop where he worked as a hired salesman. 
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 “Within two or three years [of the 1914 treaty] the recruitment of this type of labour became the 
biggest slave racket of the century in Liberia. Spanish vessels made regular monthly calls and 
the wretched black cargo herded into the holds with the hatch-covers battened down to prevent 
their escape. Spanish Agents aboard these ships would seat themselves at a table on deck and 
pay out seven pounds in English gold for every boy tallied into the holds.” “Government 
officials, and also members of the Senate, used the armed forces of the State to aid them in this 
traffic, and I have often seen soldiers of the Liberian Frontier Force escorting these ‘labourers’ 
to the boats and even going so far as to see them safely aboard.”74  
The labour treaty with Liberia (1914–1927) brought over a total of 7,268 indentured 
labourers. The treaty was revoked by Liberia in 1927 but between 1928 and 
December 1929 a new “private recruiting deal” was made between various Liberian 
statesmen—headed by the Postmaster-General Samuel Ross and the Vice-President 
Allen Yancy—and the Barcelona branch of the planter’s lobby, the Sindicato 
Agricola. This final private recruitment deal brought over 2431 workers. 75  The 
Sindicato’s most important delegate was the notable Fernandino planter Edward 
Barleycorn, a school friend of then President, Charles D.B. King. Ross and Yancy 
were also the superintendents of Sinoe and Maryland Counties in Liberia, where most 
of the labour recruitment was taking place. The well-publicized ILO commission 
interviewed hundreds of people there and brought to light a sequence of extortions, 
unpaid road-building programmes, and shock-tactics all aimed at extracting three 
thousand Liberian braceros for Fernando Pó—and about 10,000 for the Firestone 
Rubber plantations in Liberia that had only just been set up in 1926. The Sindicato 
paid Ross and Yancy $9 “a head”. It also paid for “transportation and a bonus of 
£1,000 for each 1,500 laborers shipped.” While Ross, like Humplmayr and Woerman 
before him, duly “paid $2.50 per head into the Liberian treasury.”76  
                                                 
74Taylor, Jungle Trader, 88. 
75League of Nations, August 1930, ‘Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into the 
Existence of Slavery and Forced Labour in the Republic of Liberia’, LON, C.658.M.272, 36; in French 
Société des Nations, August 1930, ‘Commission internationale d'enqutte sur l'existence de l'esclavage 
et du travail forcé dans la république de Libéria’, AGA, C-81/06416; Sundiata, Brothers and Strangers, 
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As with other constellations of state-led indentured labour, while dispatching its 
citizens with armed guards to a tortuous work regime and an uncertain fate the 
Liberian state did always demand them back; if they came back. A famous African-
American journalist, George Schuyler, remodelled a question and answer session with 
a bracero who had just returned to Liberia: “Q: Boys go Fernando Poo with you they 
come back? A. Most no come back, some do. Lot sleep. Spanish mans kill boy—beat 
him. Other boys come town and tell. Spanish put boys in jail for one year for tell, so 
they no come back with me.” Schuyler also asked him: “Spanish beat much? A. Yes. 
Beat boy too much. Give two, three month jail all time.”77 The jail was the principal 
scene of punishment, and as Nnamdi Azikiwe says it was not only a state-backed 
disciplinary device, but a means to extend the duration of bracero labour on the 
island: “instead of ‘punctual repatriation’ Spain devised a subterfuge to prefer a 
criminal charge against laborers whose contracts are nearing termination, and by 
imprisoning them, it derives an unjust benefit from free convict labor.”78  
2.4 Touts and Despot Supplant Each Other in Rio Muni, 1900–1930s 
Spanish Guinea, including Rio Muni, was about a quarter the size of Cuba, or the 
surface area of Rwanda, Haiti, Wales or the Spanish province of Galicia. Rio Muni 
had fallen into Spanish hands only at the very beginning of the twentieth century. The 
1901 Paris-Treaty—a minor addendum to the Berlin Africa conference—attached its 
fate to Fernando Pó. As a colonial scientist observed in 1901: “there exists on the 
coast of Africa a small territory that is now totally the property of Spain. There lives a 
race called the pamues [Fang], who can substitute those who come from Sierra Leone 
and Liberia. Let’s take care of that tribe called pamue and bring them to Fernando 
Poo, before others benefit from their labour at our expense.”79 For the first three 
                                                 
77George Schuyler, ‘Wide “Slavery” Persisting in Liberia, Post Reveals’, 29 June 1931, New York 
Evening Post, 1–2. The dialogue continues: “Q. What work boys do in jail? A. Same work as other 
boys.” 
78Ben N. Azikiwe, ‘In Defense of Liberia’, The Journal of Negro History 17, 1 (1932): 30–50. The 
Liberian state also dispatched consuls who “were also to assure the fair treatment of the workers and 
their safe return.” They assured their return by having the bulk of their wages paid out to them only 
when the braceros disembarked in Cape Palmes. 
79Gutiérrez, ‘Guinea Española’, 14. 
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decades of Spanish rule “in the providential design of colonial policy” Rio Muni was 
thought of as a “zone that should produce brazos; an appendix to the island.”80 
 
Map 3 Composite of Rio Muni and south-west Cameroon, early 20th century81 
 
                                                 
80 Curaduría (Lasierra), 1930, ‘Memoria sobre este servicio’, AGA, C-81/07720, L-2; Curaduría 
(Romain Ordoño) to GG (Domínguez Manresa), 16 July 1931, AGA, C-81/8125, E-2. 
81Map sources from top left to bottom right. ‘Admiralty Chart 1357: River Benin to River Cameroons 
including the Mouths of the River Kwara or Niger’, 1901, TNA, CO 1O47/243; ‘Sketch map of 
Spanish Guinea’, in Great Britain, Spanish Guinea, 61; DGMC, ‘Guinea Continental Española’, 1916, 
AGA, C-81/06444. Photograph captioned ‘The island of Fernando Po, where the work of this District 
began, photographed from the shore at Victoria, British Cameroons’, in Kingdom Overseas (magazine 
of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society), 2 (1953), 183. 
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At the turn of the twentieth century, all other European empires had explicitly 
prohibited recruitment and even labour migration to the sole remnant of equatorial 
Spanish colonialism. When the international labour boycotts started making a dent in 
the island’s labour supply after 1904, when “braceros stopped coming from Liberia 
and other African colonies” the planters were “left with our sole continental territory 
in Rio Muni. It is turning into a breeding ground from where we can extract indígenas 
to bring to the island” says the Gobernador, Ramos-Izquierdo, the same one who 
imposed the most brutal round of forced contracts on the island’s now almost 
decimated Bubi population in 1907.82 There was a surge in recruitment in 1908 when 
of the 5600 workers on Fernando Pó, the majority came from Bata and Elobey in 
southern Rio Muni. This was to fall again; the 1912 census registers only 3000 people 
from Rio Muni residing on the island.83 Nevertheless this was still the largest group of 
labour. In 1925, there were 3,200 Fang braceros on the island who were “divided 
among 59 employers”—about as many as there were Liberians. 84 The specific origin 
of the braceros was correlated only to the onward march and intensity of activity 
around the string of border outposts and detachments of an occupying colonial force 
in Rio Muni.85  
                                                 
82Ramos-Izquierdo and Navarro, Descripción geográfica, 257, 260. In the early twentieth century 
“forced recruitment on the island” was a “disaster”, the Bubis rebelled and were devastated. Their 
numbers had started to plummet after a smallpox epidemic in 1892 and fell to an all-time low of 2200 
in 1920—from at least 35,000 souls little more than half a century previously. The quasi-genocidal 
catastrophe was marked by Spanish Claretian missionaries and has been unambiguously portrayed in 
the Spanish-language historiography. Sanz Casas, ‘Política colonial y organización del trabajo’, 224; 
Sanz Casas, ‘Los finqueros y el uso del trabajo forzado’; García Cantús, ‘El trabajo forzado bubi’; 
Clavero, ‘Bioko’. For the demographic decimation of the Bubi see, García Cantús, ‘Fernando Poo’, 
585; Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 117. See demographic graph in the Appendix. A 
missionary says: “we still remember [Spain’s] criminal record of how the Bubi were treated and as a 
consequences of the inhuman treatment, they were decimated.” Vicariato Apostolico de Fernando Poo 
(Padre Ramon Jutgler) to GG (Núñez de Prado), 10 April 1928, AGA, C-81/06418. 
83 Sanz Casas, ‘Problemas de una agricultura colonial’, 298; Ramos-Izquierdo and Navarro, 
Descripción geográfica, 317.  
84Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 123; Terán, Síntesis geográfica, 67. 
85Oyono Sa Abegue, ‘L’évolution des structures productives’, 480–1. In a PhD from the 1985, Valentin 
Oyono writes how, quite distinctively, for the first three decades of the twentieth century, with spurts of 
conquest activity, “as ‘pacification’ unfolded” the state simply brought to the island braceros in 
whichever way they could. These “consisted of captives (mainly captured Binzima warriors), hostage 
and, above all, the population in areas under control of the Guardia Colonial who were being 
conscripted each year to the plantation on the island of Fernando Poo.” Binzama were what Balandier 
calls “warrior associations”. Balandier, The Sociology of Black Africa, 133; Fernandez, Bwiti, 54. For 
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It was only a generalized policy of forced labour or prestación in the late 1920s that 
kicked off an unprecedented wave of recruitment in Rio Muni. In 1923 the Cámara 
Agricola, the sole planters lobby on the island, was still imploring Governor Barrera 
to organize “the complete and rational occupation, of the 26,000 square kilometres of 
Guinea Continental, with which we will undoubtedly achieve a solution, even if 
partial one, of the problema bracero.”86 Planters on Fernando Pó were keen because 
the costs of Liberian braceros had become “onerous”, principally because the treaty 
stipulated expensively imported food rations, such as Spanish rice and stockfish from 
the North sea. In addition, as for Liberians half of their wages were to be paid in 
pound sterling, their labour had become about three times as expensive as that of 
Spanish subjects.87 “As a result of their protests the first measures were taken” by the 
Government to centralize recruitment through despotic channel in Rio Muni.88 When 
the Spanish expanded their military presence and reached the border areas with full 
force in the late 1920s, they were repeating what the German and French regimes had 
done to the Fang but with a twist; the economic demands of Fernando Pó were the 
ends of every means. With a twist and a particular intensity, in 1926 there were some 
770 members of the Guardia Colonial in Rio Muni—85 Spaniards, with 2 captains, 
11 lieutenants, 51 “cabos”, 685 African soldiers (mostly from Senegal, Ghana and 
Cameroon) out of whom 24 were “cabos”—while in 1900 the entire German 
“Schutztruppe in Cameroon”, comprised “40 German officers, 53 NCOs and 900 
African mercenaries,” from the “Gold Coast and Togoland”.89 
                                                                                                                                           
the whole series of revolts and pillaging that required the “constant strengthening of suppression with 
Tirallieurs” see Xavier Cadet, Histoire Des Fang, Peuple Gabonais (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009), 901. 
For details on binzama in and around Nsork see, Nerín, La soberanía española en el Muni, 39. 
86Sanz Casas, ‘Política colonial y organización del trabajo’, 224, citing Cámara, 1923, ‘Memoria 
Delegación Camara Fernando Poo’, ANC [I could not find the original at the ANC]. 
87Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 142. 
88Cámara (Estrada) to GG (Núñez de Prado), 28 January 1928, AGA, C-81/08096, E-28. 
89Nerín, La ùltima selva de España, 196; see AGA, C-81/08204, ‘Sobre delimitación de fronteras en la 
Guinea Española continental y la frontera Kamerun.’ In 1905 the corresponding figures for the 
Schutztruppe were 60, 70 and 1150, Stoecker, ‘Cameroon 1880–1906’, 79. 
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The steps of full conquest—full disarmament, total relocation of the entire population 
onto roads and extensive road-building programmes themselves—were only initiated 
after a new Gobernador Miguel Núñez de Prado came to power with a mandate to 
respond with force to a brief interruption in the Liberian labour supply on the western 
edge of the Gulf of Guinea.90 In the autumn months of 1926, some 4,500 braceros and 
1,181 accompanying and working women were sent to the island from Rio Muni 
through the direct intervention and for the immediate profit of members of the 
Guardia Colonial.91 The braceros recruited by the military went only to members of 
the Cámara. The planters who were not well connected to the completely absent 
monopoly granted to the Cámara in 1928, relied on an influx of reclutadores (private 
recruiters) who started traversing the entirety of Rio Muni and beyond. The Cámara 
even bombarded the Gobernador with “demands that he should force the recruiters 
[to] allocate to us at least thirty percent of their acquired braceros”.92 The Cámara 
had become used to feeding off the workings of the Liberian and the Spanish colonial 
state, while other planters not linked to them had started sending off their reclutadores 
to Rio Muni, Cameroon and Gabon. A petition from over a dozen chiefs—both Fang 
and Ndowe—explain the situation in their own terms: “Ever since Spain took 
possession of these lands, we have had or seen nothing that brings betterment to this 
colony. That there is a law established in Brussels by international pathways 
prohibiting the sale of slaves puzzles us Chiefs, because from the moment that 
braceros from Liberia stopped coming the Spanish nation has taken up the everyday 
selling of Spanish subjects, selling us without mercy.”93 
                                                 
90DGMC, 1930, ‘Memoria de la historia de Fernando Poo’, AGA, C-81/06843, E-5. 
91These women worked unwaged as cooks and cultivated food plots near plantations. GG (Nùñez de 
Prado) to DGMC (Jordana), 12 October 1926, AGA, C-81/07646. For indictments against the entire 
colonial institutional apparatus, see Nerín, La última selva de España, 225. 
92Cámara (Ligero) to GG (Núñez de Prado), 3 June 1927, AGA, C-81/06415, E-13; Nerín, La última 
selva de España, 210. 
93Jefes de Bata to GG (Domínguez Manresa), 8 September 1931, AGA, C-81/08028, E-2. “People are 
resentful that the Republic has kept the rulers that perpetrated injustice in the recent past.” The writer 
of this petition, an educated person form the mission who had possibly been to Spain, related their new 
set of demands close to the heart of the new Republican regime: “no schools have been built to benefit 
the younglings, also there is no distinction between the European whether they are planters or 
reclutadores they are all governing without respect of the state.” The reference to “Brussels” 
prohibiting slavery is likely the Brussels Act of 1890 convened by hopeful colonial states where “it was 
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Planters were not only complaining about the rising prices set by the Liberian state, 
but also that the reclutadores in Rio Muni had become “too expensive”. The Cámara 
attributed this to the fact that “during the previous years, the liberty to recruit has been 
absolute, causing a competition and an exaggerated rise in prices paid for braceros.”94 
In the late 1920s the recruits were being “escorted by the Guardia Colonial so these 
would not be taken by other [private] reclutadores”. Continuous “struggles between 
recruiters”, between touts and despots, had begun to emerge, the former “would steal” 
future braceros with offers of higher advances—“and with ploys that everyone 
knows: the phrases ‘don’t go with these guys, they’ll treat you badly and pay you 
worse’ and others in that style.” Despots did indeed keep the price down, “the 
arrangements carried out by Sr. Buiza” the head of the Guardia Colonial, “helped to 
keep the costs of recruitment to 100 or 150 pesetas” in contrast to the “bill of 250 or 
300 pesetas issued by the reclutadores.”95 One Spanish missionary who was himself 
involved in la recluta—in the capacity of tout “acting merely as a transmitting 
station” by “offering a series of goods” beforehand—“passed by a gathering of 
reclutados [those recruited] in Mikomeseng whose fate was to be sent to the campos 
[fields] of Fernando Poo. The guards kept saying they were free, that they were only 
keeping an eye over them,” so no other recruiters “could snap them away.” He 
lamented the consequences for private reclutadores: “some braceros had already 
agreed to contracts with other employers, but fearing reprisals of the Guardia 
Colonial they could say nothing.” Many of those escorted escaped “and signed 
contracts for companies they were not destined to,” these were the employers who 
brandished ever higher regalos or advances. 96 
                                                                                                                                           
specifically imposed as a duty on the European powers” to “stamp out the evils of slavery and slave-
trading in West Africa.” Fage, ‘Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Context of West African History’, 
393. 
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When the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera fell in early 1930, a handful of staffers at 
the Spanish Colonial Office sent someone to investigate the widely circulating 
rumour, that the “recluta de braceros in our colony has become a market, with an 800 
peseta price tag for the unit HUMAN”. The aims of Julian La Sierra, the chief 
investigator of the Información encaminada a averiguar la forma en que se efectua la 
recluta de braceros en la Guinea Española—was to determine the extent of the 
involvement and corruption of members of the Guardia Colonial and the 
administration. He interviewed practically every European resident in Rio Muni, and 
a handful of African teachers and chiefs, producing a dossier of over 500 investigative 
pages. La Sierra was shocked by his own conclusion: “pretty much everyone was 
involved”, “absolutely everyone has been gripped by this fever”. He was only “half-
joking [when he said] that la recluta has become a deranged desire, as it has even 
come to take over the activities of the missionaries of the Sagrado Corazon de 
Maria”. After “perusing the case files” he gathered, La Sierra writes: it is “clear” that 
the “this activity is not monopolized by anyone. Exactly the opposite is the case, la 
recluta is in the hands of approximately a hundred trotamundos”, globetrotters who 
“recorren libremente el bosque con todo el bagaje de sus habilidades y artilugios”—
“freely traverse the forest only with the baggage of their know-how and 
contraptions”.97 
Writing in the 1931, another observer on site noted that while “there are some 
‘monrovias’ left”, “today the entirety of the human resources working on the island 
are being imported from the continente [Rio Muni], the immense majority of the 
braceros on the island’s plantations are ‘pamues’ [Fang].”98 By the early 1930s they 
had almost all been brought by a “body of recruiters, technically clandestine but 
                                                 
97 Julian La Sierra Luis, 30 August 1930, in DGMC, September 1930, ‘Información’, AGA, C-
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Cuadernos de Cultura, 1932), 33. 
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perfectly known, who replaced the rulers of Liberia, and turned Cameroun and Gabon 
into their field of operations.”99 A type of frontier capitalist, the reclutadores were 
“taking advantage of the scarcity crisis of their product” the braceros; they “made a 
business out of speculating” with labour before it produced any cocoa.100 The cacao 
planters had been shovelling about half of their profits back into enlisting a new round 
of braceros. Writing in 1937 after the peak of la recluta in Rio Muni, a Francoist 
official writes that some “15.000 workers [had] been recruited in the last seven years, 
with the commission averaging 400 pesetas, a sum of at least 6 million pesetas has 
been paid out in the slaving industry of the reclutadores.” 101  This is an 
underestimation, as already in 1930 some 5000 bracero contracts were made in Bata, 
4000 of them with the island as their destination.102 Almost all of them were misled 
outright by for example being “promised work in the plantations of Cunha Lisboa” an 
extremely large and notable Fernandino from São Tomé who was “famed for the good 
treatment of his labourers” They of course always ending up elsewhere.103 The first 
contract was always uncertain, recruits could never be sure they would end up where 
promised, and even then an apparent destination matching description could be 
tenuous and reversible, as was the case with Ebosogo Esono, who was underage and 
therefore signed up to “housework duties but [was] instead met by a master 
[Francisco Perez] who turned me from a servant into a bracero.”104 
It was only because of this contractual bind that the speculation and bidding wars for 
braceros could take hold. The commission paid by the cacao planters in Fernando Pó 
to the reclutadores rose from 50 pesetas in 1926 to up to 500 to 800 in the early 
                                                 
99GG (Sánchez Guerra) to DGMC (Alvarez-Buylla), 28 December 1935, AGA, C-81/06867, E-5. 
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1930s.105 As a reclutador was overheard saying in a beach bar in Bata, “there is no 
labour scarcity, the only thing one needs if one wants braceros are pesetas.” 106 
Considering that the average income for Europeans was 500 pesetas a month, that 
“margin of profit actively sustain[ed] a large army of intermediaries, direct and 
indirect, who by all possible means made sure they directed the workers to ensure the 
best agricultural interests of the island.”107 Scandalized contemporaries thought it was 
important to note that the “guerrilla of reclutadores and ganchos, [had] jacked up the 
prices to such exaggerated heights, that we are no longer talking about a 
compensation for the ordinary costs of recluta but of the PRICE FOR THE SALE OF 
A MERCHANDISE CALLED ‘MAN’.”108 
The commissions caused a generalized backlash against reclutadores from the side of 
the administration and even the planters: “when all this talk of immorality is heard, 
what is alluded to tacitly is only this high price”. To a more cynical Republican labour 
officer, it was “the fact that the recruiters have jacked up the price of cacao production 
which lays behind the uproar”.109 From on high, in the almost wholly uninvolved 
Republican Colonial Office in Madrid, the recruiters were viewed as “slave-traders, 
they are completely demoralizing the place, by both mistreating the indígenas and 
exploiting the employers. They are all undesirables, who in addition dedicate 
themselves to contraband, the sale of alcohol, and all sorts of disgraceful trades.”110 
The reclutadores “laden with brandy, whisky, cloths and Virginia tobacco” always had 
“at least two or three ganchos, African subcontractors from the coast, who 
strategically camp out in the border villages.”111 Ganchos tended to settle and move 
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around “along the border in the towns that have a direct communication to the French 
side, because it is very much easier to recruit there”. Innocently, a Portuguese gancho, 
a true tout, Juan Ferreira, who spoke Fang, says he “only offered work in Bata to 
anybody he saw”, “convincing them that [ALENA a forestry company on the coast] 
will always treats its people well”—an outright deception, as they were almost all 
brought to the island. “Those who sign up I give them some presents in goods and 
organize their meals until I deliver them.”112 
French officials spoke from across the border of “Spanish employers, using methods 
of the slave-trade rather than ‘recruitment’”. However, accompanying this “plague” of 
reclutadores was not so much the mute violence of fairs or caravans, but a risky and 
negotiated range of transactions with varying outcomes. In the early 1930s the French 
started “expanding their surveillance of clandestine recruiters who have installed 
themselves on our border”—recruiters “of doubtful moral character, who are well 
known amongst all the chiefs of the Ambam subdivision.”113  A Spanish recruiter 
crossed into Cameroon “looking for 350 people, so he set up a campaign all along the 
border with an entire team of rabatteurs”—touts or stalkers. However, possibly 
because of his reputation, he “didn’t manage to recruit anyone [and] lost his onerous 
baits, the pricey lures, the advances deposited with his agents” or ganchos.114 Maurice 
Mveng noted that already in 1927, 4000 Cameroonians left for Fernando Pó over the 
land border to Rio Muni. In almost a single year, between 1929 and 1930, the 
circunscripción of Kribi in south-western Cameroon lost 25% of its population, 
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principally to Spanish Guinea.115 Figures are hard to come by, as the “movement was 
clandestine”, but it was estimating that in the early 1930s the Woleu-Ntem province 
“lost in just a few years many thousands of individuals at the prime of their life.” 
Sautter observes that goods were 75% cheaper in Bata than in Gabon, and “all 
pressure, all deception aside, the [reduced prices] in the Spanish territories exerted an 
attraction on a people for whom the system of bride wealth absorbs large quantity of 
goods and money.”116 
To their credit, the Republicans did actually put a halt—if provisional and belated—to 
prestación (between 1931 and 1934) as well as to la recluta in 1935 through a series 
of very radical and sweeping reforms. They began by “sanctioning the reclutadores 
who deploy illegal means and deceit to force the indígena to sign a contract”—and by 
“giving jail sentences to ganchos.”117 By 1934 the Republicans came up with various 
schemes to try to import indentured labour from Cameroon under a treaty in order to 
“eliminate the reclutadores altogether,” hoping that “this would lead to the 
automatically disappearance of this social class, that stain, the reclutador, that has 
been an insurmountable obstacle to our colonization.”118 Insurmountable because, as 
another functionary confirms in 1936: “La recluta has been the most repugnant 
undertaking of Europeans here in Africa, almost the entirety of the whites here in 
Guinea have been.”119  
The Republican Gobernador in 1935, Ángel Manzaneque prepared a reformist peak 
on a logarithmic scale and set out to change this “status quo in our colony, which has 
always been run under a total state of exception”. Manzaneque disbanded the 
recruiters and organized instead bolsas de trabajo housed in government buildings 
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which anyone could ‘freely’ approach without regalos or recruiters. The Governor 
proudly reported back to his superiors: “I have had to battle hard for this new regime 
of labour, everyone one was opposed, well they saw in it the death of la recluta, and 
of misrule, but I have managed to come out triumphant […] they now recognize the 
need to live within the law.”120 This Republican experiment was withdrawn, as “free 
labour [was] to be established, always and only if and when it does not cause a loss to 
our Treasury”.121 The bolsas that might have directed people for Fernando Pó lay 
abandoned; the “bolsas cannot furnish an intense yield, unless they are surrounded by 
a number of elements that serve as links between the [employers] and the unemployed 
indígenas—those who can be turned into braceros.” 122  The linkages needed to 
connect the bracero were disarticulated—ganchos had been jailed, and the 
commissions and advances had been stamped out with extraordinary fines of 
thousands of pesetas.123 Also as most reclutadores had been staunch Republicans they 
were executed or fled Rio Muni for Cameroon in 1936 at the beginning of the Spanish 
Civil War.124 
The Republicans could foresee that the “completely ineffective system” of bolsas was 
“bound to degenerate into a more or less manifest recluta with even more vices taking 
hold because la recluta is being pushed underground, plunging us back into our recent 
history.”125 Yet the Republicans were steadfast in their decision to have abolished and 
supressed la recluta. As the last Republican labour officer says in his final report on 
the matter, “to allow la recluta again is so monstrously immoral and counter-
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productive for our colonizing action that we shouldn’t consider it even for one 
second.”126 This report was stored away in a box when the Francoist took over—the 
box was eventually shipped off to Spain and has remained unindexed and opened only 
once ever since. 
During the Civil War years, the planters on Fernando Pó started to panic, they were 
“feeling profoundly the falta de brazos.” “Once they [Fang braceros] finish their 
contracts practically all of them return to their country, and no new recruits are taking 
their place.”127 Already in 1936 the planters in Fernando Pó had quickly shifted to 
rely on an almost entirely new set of recruiters. As an undercover Nigerian police 
officer on Fernando Pó says in 1936: “Boys are very difficult to get over here for the 
Spanish Subjects at Bata had completely refused to come over here at Santa Isabel 
[so] now the Spanish Farmers being in difficulty to get boys did all they could and so 
seduced the Nigerian traders especially the Calabarians to begin to recruit boys”; on 
familiar terms “for each boy recruited the Spanish Farmer pays the sum of three 
hundred pesetas”.128 By 1939 the planters on Fernando Pó had become “convinced 
that the only rapid and viable solution is an intense work of propaganda in Nigeria, 
which unlike us, has been spared an anxious lack of labour, and therefore we shall not 
fear that our efforts will be frustrated.”129 As the Curador in Santa Isabel told the 
logging lobby in 1940: “if the current arrangement” with Nigerian recruiters 
“continues (and we expect that it will) we will be able to send you [the employers in 
Rio Muni] 400 to 500 braceros a month, and if this doesn’t resolve the problema 
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absolutely, well it’s pretty damn close.” 130  Francoist Governors were resolute 
partisans of what the Spanish liked to call the “external” or the “Nigerian solution”.131 
2.5 Figures in West and Southern African Colonial History  
During the three decades of colonial rule by Francoist Spain, Fernando Pó became 
draped in a patchwork of ever-larger plantations. “Two thirds of the surface” 
cascading down West Africa’s largest island, which Livingstone had called an 
“unpolished jewel”, had been studded with an agro-capitalist crown, “transformed 
into an immense square”, its shape on older maps, “where every square meter has 
been put to use.”132 Cacao exports were being lavishly subsidized by an “autarkic 
system beloved of fascist ideologues”—since the 1920s all planters and commercial 
houses had been assured a buyout at almost thrice and latter twice the global market 
rate.133 From just a few hundred—largely Fernandino—planters at the turn of the 
century, by the final decade of colonial rule there were about 2000 planters. The 
“number of plantations and farms is unclear, there are a few thousand for sure. These 
are very diverse, form the 10,000 hectares of INASA [a Spanish corporate plantation 
with numerous patios] to ones with only 3 or 4 hectares belonging to [African] 
farmers.” By the final years of colonial rule some 90,000 hectares had been planted 
with coffee and cacao—97% of the island’s arable flat surface. With “approximately 
60 to 80 braceros required for every 100 hectares” there were necessarily at least 50 
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to 70,000 thousand contract workers.134 Before independence in 1968, the island had a 
population of 100,000 souls, plantation “agriculture in Fernando Poo employed 82%” 
of the “active labour force”, “out of which 90%” were Nigerian immigrants “under 
peonaje contracts”.135 Even during the final years of colonial rule when there were 
about 70,000 Nigerians in Spanish Guinea the planters still had not achieved their 
goals: “the total solution of the problema will never be found. Alas, we will need to 
find partial solutions by further intensifying out work of captación de braceros”, the 
capturing or recruitment of braceros.136 
The number of Nigerian contract labourers on Fernando Pó during the beginning of 
World War II, some 25,000, was equivalent to over ten per cent of Nigeria’s entire 
wage-employed population—and practically all had arrived in the late 1930s through 
the clandestine channels set up by touts operating out of Calabar. The island had 
about half the number of those employed in the entire Nigerian civil service—by far 
the biggest employer in British West Africa. 137  “It might strike one as odd that 
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Fernando Po should have played such an important role in the history of the economic 
life of Nigeria.”138 Even in the 1950s, more Nigerians were working Spanish Guinea 
than the whole of Nigeria’s medium to large-scale “Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing” 
sector which employed 42,680 people.139  
On a clear day the distant peak of Fernando Pó can be seen from the island of 
Príncipe. On the same Gulf, at São Tomé between 1902 and 1928 almost exactly 
100,000 serviçais or contract workers went to São Tomé—under varying conditions 
of recruitment—from Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde. Between 1928 and 1958 
another 85,000 serviçais arrived. In 1909 there were some 35,544 serviçais on about 
200 roças or plantations, the year São Tomé became the world’s largest producer of 
cocoa (18%) only for the well-known boycott to kick in.140 Fernando Pó had about the 
same number of braceros as those privately employed with contracts in the whole of 
French West Africa in 1935. In 1945 European agricultural properties in AOF—
mainly the coffee, cocoa, palm and banana planters in Ivory Coast and Guinea—only 
amounted to some 75,000 hectares, about 15,000 less than the total surface area under 
cultivation in Fernando Pó in the 1960s.141 
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Adjacent to Fernando Pó’s shores, a little more than a few dozen kilometres across the 
Bight of Biafra, the large mostly German plantations on the slopes of Mount 
Cameroon had less hectares planted than Fernando Pó and between 25,000 and 
40,000 workers in the late 1930s. About 3000 of them were Nigerian, mostly Igbo. As 
the next chapter shows, they were brought by the same recruiters as Fernando Pó. 
Within a decade Igbos’ made up the majority of the plantation workforce in 
Cameroon.142 The workers in these plantations “were not contract labourers per se, if 
they don’t show up to work they don’t get paid.” In early 1950s salaries in the 
Cameroon were a little higher than the official ones in Fernando Pó. After the war, 
British managers also handed out a “monthly bonus” of 6 shillings, about 10 percent 
of the wage, that was paid out only if workers “work over a minimum of 24 days a 
month.”143 The annual turnover on these plantations was 60 to 70%. Workers were not 
given advances. Indeed prospective workers themselves had to ‘dash’ recruiting 
agents to get a placement: “trying to get work on the plantations [involves] the 
exorbitant bribery which is nowadays practised to an almost unbelievable extent, […] 
                                                                                                                                           
employed without contract 117,803. There is a certain dearth of literature on plantation in AOF, but see 
also A. I. Asiwaju, ‘Migrations as Revolt: The Example of the Ivory Coast and the Upper Volta before 
1945’, The Journal of African History 17, 4 (1976): 577–94; On redefinitions of kinship under 
conditions of cash-crop production, see Cati Coe, ‘How Debt Became Care: Child Pawning and Its 
Transformations in Akuapem, the Gold Coast, 1874–1929’, Africa 82, 2 (2012): 287–311; On Yoruba 
debt peons in West African ‘peasant’ plantations, see E. Adeniyi Oroge, ‘Iwofa: An Historical Survey 
of the Yoruba Institution of Indenture’, African Economic History 14 (1985): 75–106; B. A. Agiri, ‘The 
Development of Wage Labour in Agriculture in Southern Yorubaland 1900—1940’, Journal of the 
Historical Society of Nigeria 12, 1/2 (1983): 95–107; see also Austin ‘Cash Crops and Freedom’. 
142Graf zu Trauttmansdorf, 1942, ‘Denkschriften über Arbeits und Sozialrecht, Arbeitseinsatz und 
Lohnfragen im Britischen und französischen Mandatsgebiet Kamerun und Vorschläge für die 
Neugestalltung’, BArch, R2/4989. 
143Minutes, 26 August 1953, ‘Minutes of the talks about the revision of the Labour Treaty’, AGA, C-
81/12373, E-392. The labour officer in the minutes says that “the best employment a native of Nigerian 
can find as a bracero” in Nigeria, “are in the banana, rubber and palm oil plantations, where the 
monthly salary can reach £3-10-4” or some 70 shillings, where at least 3 to 10 shillings would go to 
their own food costs. Contemporary studies say there was no desertion; if workers were abused they 
simply did not show up any more, but this did not involve ‘breaking’ contracts. Ardener et al, 
Plantation and Village in the Cameroons, 221. This is different of course from the violent and long-
contracts of the German period, Ardener and Ardener, Kingdom on Mount Cameroon, 151–62; Though 
there were minor credit-arrangements for stabilization, see Nigeria, ‘Report on the Administration of 
the Cameroons under British Cameroons for the year 1938’, TNA, CO 583/239/5, para. 187–88. 
“Wages are at daily rates but in order to discourage employees from leaving without adequate notice it 
is customary to pay them monthly.” And since they were not paid it became “general practice” to have 
workers ‘paid’ provisionally “in the form of credit notes on the plantation’s own store.” Indeed on 
some plantations “it is compulsory for employees to take part of their wages in credit notes,” usually 
about “50%, is paid in this form”. See also zu Trauttmansdorf, ‘Denkschriften über Arbeits und 
Sozialrecht’, 1942, BArch, R. 2/4989, “Anlage V”. 
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any labourers will be required to pay 30s or £2 to the foreman as a preliminary to 
being engaged”. And without a continuous show of “occasional ‘dashes’” to the 
foreman, he “will throw [the labourer] out of the gang and engage another labourer on 
similar terms.”144 This was the opposite of Fernando Pó, where even the Republicans 
did not and “could not allow contracts to be terminated prematurely, unless the 
employer and bracero mutually agree; well otherwise very few braceros would fulfil 
their entire contract, as the regalos [advances] employers hand out to new recruits 
would lead the braceros to constantly change employer implying a grave danger for 
the operation of the island’s plantations”.145 
In relation to South Africa, Fernando Pó is of course tiny, but not as tiny as one might 
think. Apparently, exactly 152,184 indentured labourers from the Bay of Bengal were 
brought to the sugar plantations in Natal over a fifty-year period until 1911—on 384 
ships from Madras and Calcutta. Over about half the same time-period the total 
numbers of Nigerians who arrived on Fernando Pó on ‘official British indenture’ 
through the bi-monthly steamer of the labour treaty—and excluding the numbers of 
wholesale canoe-smugglers—was significantly more. Exactly 63,695 Chinese coolies 
were brought on three-year contracts to the Witwatersrand gold mines between 1904 
and 1907.146 At any one point in time in the early twentieth century there were at least 
175,000 people employed across the South African mines and related activities. In 
1905 over 100,000 new contract per year were being made, mostly by the WNLA, the 
monopoly recruitment branch of Chamber of Mines that operated outside the 
Transvaal.147 Before the Union or the unification of the British South African colonies 
in 1910, two thirds of labour force in the Transvaal colony’s mining industry were 
from Mozambique—recruited largely channelled through the logistics of ‘touts’ as I 
will review in the next chapter. Though already in the late 1910s the miners started 
                                                 
144LO Buea (Nwokedi) to Commissioner of Labour Lagos, 5 April 1948, BNA, Qd/a (1947)1; Konings, 
Labour Resistance in Cameroon, 61. 
145Curaduría (Guillen) to GG (Lluesma), 28 April 1934, AGA, C-81/08126, E-19. 
146Meer, Documents of Indentured Labour: Natal, 29; Vahed, ‘Power and Resistance: Indentured 
Labour in Colonial Natal, 1860–1911’, 106; Richardson, Chinese Mine Labour in the Transvaal, 204; 
Kynoch, ‘Controlling the Coolies: Chinese Mineworkers and the Struggle for Labor in South Africa’. 
147MacDonald, ‘Colonial Trespassers’, 248. 
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depending on a more closely regulated channels both closer and further afield, 
particularly from the Xhosa-speaking Ciskei, Transkei as well as Lesotho. Under the 
1928 ‘Mozambique convention’ the WNLA was allowed to recruit between 80,000 
and 100,000 Mozambicans per year. The Portuguese authorities received a “capitation 
fee” of almost £5 for providing indenture-like channels that prolonged the contract to 
12–18 months, reduced their total wages and paid out half of them only on their return 
to thereby assure their subsequent—and obligatory—‘repatriation’ or deportation.148 
With the comparative and numerical dimensions of Fernando Pó in mind, I will turn 
now to the archive and to those who made these extraordinary numbers possible. 
                                                 
148Coquery-Vidrovitch, ‘The Colonial Economy of the former French, Belgian and Portuguese Zones’, 
464; Wilson, Labour in the South African Gold Mines, 70–1; Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South Africa’s 
Mining Economy, 10. 
76 
 
3. Touts and Despots Combine: Panya or the Bonding of 
Labour with Language  
Today, in Nigeria across various languages, panya (páɲà) is the colloquial name for 
Bioko, formerly Fernando Pó. In West Africa, during the nineteenth century, the noun 
‘Panyer’ meant ‘a Spaniard’, from the pidgin rendering of España. In Igbo areas, Ugo 
Nwokeji says, “up to today, the word panya in Igbo folklore refers to forceful removal 
to the unknown.” The same is true in Ibibio, though I would add the important 
qualification that “force” in panya stresses a series of social and physical forces that 
keep someone from coming back rather than the act of violent “seizure” which along 
most of the West Africa in the pre-colonial period was referred to as being 
panyarred.1 Panya and panyarring have different etymologies but there was a mutual 
layering and transformation of both terms in twentieth century eastern Nigeria, when 
the meaning of panyarring—the “seizing” of free people “by force or fraud” as used 
by “both Whites and Blacks” in precolonial Calabar2—was reinterpreted in light of 
new experiences with the colonial labour market of Fernando Pó. In Southern Nigeria 
by the early twentieth century panya became a term to refer to various goings-on, and 
particularly to a range of relationships linking a class of illicit commercial 
intermediaries with a host of impoverished job-seekers from specific regions in 
Nigeria. On the Cross River delta in the mid twentieth century, panya was “a term 
usually used only by smugglers”; it was also a term used to refer to them, connoting 
                                                 
1Nwokeji, The Slave Trade and Culture in the Bight of Biafra, 127, 131; Nwojeki says that “to panya” 
is the Igbo verb form of panyarring and links it to “child-stealing” practice of the Aro (personal 
communication, December 2014). Panyarring has its own pidgin etymology, most likely from the 
Portuguese word apanhar “to grab” or to “seize”, but the term also had a broad valency, as it referred 
to possession and theft in different contexts, such as spirit possession and ‘man-stealing’ or anonymous 
kidnapping. Hans Christian Monrad, Two Views from Christiansborg Castle: A Description of the 
Guinea Coast and Its Inhabitants (Legon: Sub-Saharan Pub, 2009), 57, 220. Panya was by the 
twentieth century totally delinked from the most common definition of panyarring, or the slaving 
practice, present up until the late nineteenth century in various parts of West Africa, of debt-collection 
or communal retribution that resulted from the break-down of pawnship and the repayment of credit. 
Olatunji Ojo, ‘“Èmú” (Àmúyá): The Yoruba Institution of Panyarring or Seizure for Debt’, African 
Economic History 35 (2007): 31–58; Lovejoy, ‘Pawnship, Debt, and “Freedom” in Atlantic Africa’, 78, 
59.  
2John Ranby, Observations on the Evidence Given Before the Committees of the Privy Council and 
House of Commons in Support of the Bill for Abolishing the Slave Trade (London: John Stockdale, 
1791), 83.  
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“mischievous” “hustlers”. In Igbo areas its meaning was linked to ahia panya or 
“panya trade” meaning smuggling but also faulty and unsound commodity exchange. 3 
The toponym Panya, in addition to being an actual buying and selling hub for canoe-
deploying smugglers, was also a popular conceptual plateau, because “no one receives 
news directly from anyone who goes to [work in] Fernando Po. Rumours of death, 
imprisonment and ill-treatment are current.”4 It was a figurative but “hard” place to 
where “misfits”, and troublesome children and subordinates “feared” being sent off to, 
threats made by superiors usually in a facetious manner. But many people did in fact 
disappear to panya, and if they came back at all, they returned many years later, more 
often than not “empty handed” with “nothing to show” in terms of “achievements” 
and gains—the meaning of the expression “having come back from panya”.5 Panya 
was a layered and localized reflection of the violence and language of capitalism in an 
imperial labour market in West Africa—of the experiences of commodified mobilities 
and the opaque commercial mediators of those mobilities. This chapter is an 
exploration of panya labour recruitment techniques or the informally arranged cross-
border migration of Nigerians to Fernando Pó.  
An account of the pattern and effectivity of its trajectories is important not only 
because this migration is one of the largest in colonial African history. If in 1938 the 
“influx of Nigerian boys into Fernando Po” was “undoubtedly on the increase”, a year 
later recruiters operating out of the eastern Nigeria had brought over an 
unprecedented and never again surpassed “12000 Nigerian labourers and all of them 
were smuggled in canoes across the sea”.6 Illegal migration peaked during the rough 
                                                 
3‘Smuggling – Nigeria’s curse’, Drum, Lagos, January 1961; Donald C. Simmons, ‘Analysis of the 
Reflection of Culture in Efik Folktales’ (PhD Thesis, Yale University, 1957), 26; Datguru, ‘Where Is 
PANYA In Nigeria?’, ₦airaland Forum, 1 July 2014, <http://www.nairaland.com/1794650/where-
panya-nigeria>; E. Nolue Emenanjo, ‘Slangs and Colloquialisms in Modern Igbo: A Preliminary Socio-
Linguistic Study’, Ikenga: Journal of African Studies 4, 2 (1980): 49–65, 52. 
4Governor of Nigeria, Lagos to British Consul-General, Duala, 16 January 1945, NAE, CALPROF 
17/1/277. 
5Felix K. Ekechi, Pioneer, Patriot, and Nigerian Nationalist: A Biography of the Reverend M.D. 
Opara, 1915-1965 (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 60, 261. 
6British VC (Twigge-Molecey) to Resident, Calabar, 30 November 1938, NAE, CALPROF, 5/1/194; 
Supt. of Police, Calabar to Commissioner of Police, Lagos, 30 December 1938, NAE, CALPROF 
5/1/194; ‘Fernando Po Labour Conditions’, The Nigerian Daily Times, Lagos, 13 July 1939. 
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war-decade, spanning the Spanish Civil War and World War II, during these years 
contemporaries spoke of workers being “virtually ‘press-ganged’ for Fernando Po”.7 
As David Pratten has observed, “fears” of a “revival of the slave trade” developed “on 
a new axis during the 1930s with the dramatic increase in migration of Nigerian 
workers [to] Fernando Po off the coast of Calabar.”8 The idea of “revival” is relayed 
not only allegorically and polemically in the only two existing empirical academic 
works, both Henderson Tapela and Akinjide Osuntokun speak of a twentieth century 
“Nigeria-Fernando Po ‘middle passage’”.9 Early in 1939 Okon Archibong, a future 
anti-colonial political activist, let the chief provincial administrator at Calabar know 
of the “unrest that is existing in your Province” due to the revival of “a slavish act 
[that] had been absent from this Province for many years”.10 British district officers 
throughout the Eastern Provinces had been receiving many “complaints asking for 
information as to absent relatives in the island and alleging ‘slave dealing’”. To the 
families and clan chiefs it seemed obvious where to point fingers, the “recruiting of 
labour is largely carried out by the Efiks and people living in the area of the Cross 
River estuary”.11 Recruiters were a small group of emerging professional traders. An 
undercover Nigerian police officer in Fernando Pó, S. Muyiwa, writing in 1936 was 
appalled by “the inducement that the Spanish Farmers offered these recruiters,” which 
had caused a few “Ibo and Calabarian traders”—journeying and trading legitimately 
on the steamers to Fernando Pó throughout the early 1930s—to “totally abandon their 
good trade of local food-stuffs and this cling to shipping of human cargos into 
Fernando Poo”—“these dealers in slavery now believe or this take this traffic to be 
the means of living.”12 
                                                 
7‘Nigeria over the Water’, West Africa, London, 1 January 1958. 
8David Pratten, The Man-Leopard Murders: History and Society in Colonial Nigeria (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 165. 
9Henderson M. Tapela, ‘Nigerian Labour for Fernando Po’, The Calabar Historical Journal 3, 1 
(1985): 36–56, 51; Osuntokun, Equatorial Guinea Nigerian Relations, 40. 
10O. Archibong to Resident, Calabar, 23 January 1939, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194. 
11DO Uyo to Resident, Calabar, 11 January 1939, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194. 
12S. Muyiwa to Commissioner of Police, Calabar, 24 May 1936, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194. 
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Panya labour smuggling was portrayed differently by those who experienced it on the 
one hand, and on the other, by their family members, by literate members of vocal 
public, and by the British colonial administration. For the latter the “traffic of labour 
to the Spanish Guinea falls little short of ‘blackbirding’.”13  In the early 1950s a 
British Vice Consul on the island says “for the last fifteen years and even before that” 
Fernando Pó was seen “as a source of income by [those] who enriched themselves by 
shangaing unsuspecting Eastern Nigerians over here and selling them as labourers”.14 
“Blackbirding” and “shanghaiing” were terms for a modality of recruitment in the 
nineteenth century colonial Atlantic and Pacific that meant kidnapping for remote off-
shore indentures on board ships or in plantation islands and enclaves. This modality 
usually operated outside affidavit-generating courts and controlled contract-making 
bodies in ‘home’ countries, instead contracts were almost always forced onto people 
at the final destination, and the destination itself was usually unclear, or when it was 
known, recruits were “seriously misled by unscrupulous recruiters” about their 
“duties, and compensation”.15 In the 1930s Major Orde-Browne, a prolific advisor on 
African labour matters to the British colonial secretary, says the principal feature of 
recruitment for Fernando Pó’s was characterized by “native touts who deceive” 
migrant workers “as to the nature and conditions of the work”. Uncertain as to what 
these tangles of (mis)information would mean for the character of this movement, he 
concluded that the “decoying of labourers out of [Nigeria] may well be little short of 
slavery.” In light of the numbers of Nigerians going to Fernando Pó, Orde-Browne 
ended up assuming that the “majority of people seeking work are probably doing so 
voluntarily”, because of the fact that practically no one who went to panya, 
considered themselves a slave or enslaved at the point of recruitment. His hesitation 
                                                 
13Minister of Economic Warfare, Special Operations Executive (Simpson), to Commissioner of Labour, 
Lagos, 20 December 1942, ‘Final Report on Fernando Po and Spanish Guinea, 1942–1943’, TNA, HS 
3/77. 
14British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 2 April 1952, ‘Annual Report 
covering the period 1st of April, 1951 - 31st March, 1952’, TNA, 371/96714. 
15Northrup, Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 6. 
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on both fronts—“little short” and “probably”—is symptomatic of the double bind of 
this ‘free and unfree’ labour movement.16 
In the wider literature on unfree labour the “duplicitous inducements of indentured 
servitude” is sometimes analytically placed uneasily alongside imperial naval 
impressment surges and even the panyarring techniques of the West African slave 
trade.17 Marina Carter puts indenture somewhere in the middle of the spectrum but 
closer to one end; she argues that recruitment in the Bay of Bengal for Mauritius was 
“closer to white indentured servitude than to the system of slavery which had 
immediately preceded it”. Mauritius has the title of being the “largest recipient of 
indentured labour [within] the British Empire.” “Almost half a million Indians” were 
brought to this island in the Indian Ocean from the 1840s on.18 Carter makes the 
analogy to “white indentured servitude”, because it is assumed that in both 
constellations the British state stamped contracts before departure and that it had a 
hand in supervising contracts, as well as orchestrating the passages and preparing 
specialized ships. In the port towns of the Bay of Bengal this was often the case, in 
the “early attempts at indenture, private companies were given almost complete 
freedom to recruit in India, required only to take potential migrants before a local 
magistrate who would assure that they were departing voluntarily.”19 If the destination 
was known and consented to then it would seem that indentured labour can lean on 
the freer side of the spectrum. But how did those recruited experience this procedure? 
The routes to Trinidad, Guyana, Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana and Assam were largely 
paved by private Bengali recruiters, the arkatis who “worked in bazaar towns and 
                                                 
16Orde-Browne, Labour Conditions in West Africa, 47, 71. 
17 Niklas Frykman, ‘Impressment, Kidnapping, and Panyarring’, in The Princeton Companion to 
Atlantic History, ed. Joseph C. Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 240–42, 242; 
Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the 
Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (New York: Verso, 2000), 133. 
18 Carter, ‘Strategies of Labour Mobilisation’, 243; Marina Carter, ‘The Transition from Slave to 
Indentured Labour in Mauritius’, in The Wages of Slavery: From Chattel Slavery to Wage Labour in 
Africa, the Carribbean, and England, ed. Michael Twaddle (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 115–36, 117; 
Allen, Slaves, Freedmen and Indentured Laborers in Colonial Mauritius, 59. 
19McKeown, Melancholy Order, 72. 
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pilgrimage centres, attracting individuals who were in transit [or] looking for work.”20 
Arkatis developed a particularly unsavoury reputation. In the folkloric songs forged 
and recited by coolies in the Assam tea plantations in the late nineteenth century, 
arkatis are transposed and named as a trickster; Shyam/Jaduram. As Nitin Varma says 
of the narrative, it is the recruiters who carves the “path to the sites of ‘oppression’”, 
who through “deception (Phanki”) “lured them to contract (Paka khata) and 
facilitated their passage to Assam”. The song goes: “Putting my name down in the 
(Contract) Oh nasty Shyam” “You deceived me to Assam” “Oh Jaduram You 
deceived us to Assam”. “We saw the sky in Hooghly and thought we were going to 
Assam to pull pankhas but instead we were given spades by the sahibs to work.” 
“Alas crafty Jaduram, you have deceived me and sent me to Assam by false 
promise.”21 These professional contractors were seen as purely commercial agents 
“who traded in labour for profit, thereby approximating ‘traffic’ in persons”. They 
were the “dominant mode of labour mobilization in the 1860s” and were eventually 
accompanied by a formalization with “increasingly elaborate state regulation and 
corporate recruiting” schemes and monopolies.22 
An earlier generation of “white indentured servants” had similar experiences. 
Historians of “white indentured servants” in the early modern British empire have 
empirically revised the classic accounts and imaginaries of the so-called “free-
willers”—of restless freedom and greener pastures—to show how the “majority of 
                                                 
20Oddvar Hollup, ‘Kinship and Marriage in the Construction of Identity and Group Boundaries among 
Indians in Mauritius’, in Culture, Creation, and Procreation: Concepts of Kinship in South Asian 
Practice, ed. Monika Böck and Aparna Rao (Berghahn Books, 2000), 219–43, 229; John D. Kelly, 
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Peasant Studies 19, 3–4 (1992): 246–67. 
21Soumen Sen, Khasi-Jaintia Folklore: Context, Discourse, and History (Chennai: National Folklore 
Support Centre, 2004), 10; Varma, ‘Producing Tea Coolies?’, 125–6; see his footnote in page 313 for 
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Committee in the Recruiting and Labour Districts, Vol. I (Evidence) (Calcutta, Government Priner, 
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Control of Indian Seamen: Calcutta, 1880–1935’, International Journal of Maritime History 9, 1 
(1997): 1–18; Samita Sen, ‘Questions of Consent: Women’s Recruitment for Assam Tea Gardens, 
1859–1900’, Studies in History 18, 2 (2002): 231–60. 
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indentured servants recruited in London were recruited illicitly, although they were 
mainly trepanned by the spirits rather than kidnapped by force”.23 The old and new 
literature on indenture has provided abundant examples of the creative and fiercely 
“consistent” ways in which those forced or inclined to sell their labour in a labour 
market would be “deliberately deceived about their real destination”.24 I think one 
should understand “destination” not only as geographic direction, but also as a place 
in the division of labour, because those who were promised acceptable jobs such as 
agricultural work in Nigeria, or desirable placements as trading assistants, clerks and 
drivers whether in Nigeria or Fernando Pó ended up in a type of indentured plantation 
labour that was alien in Nigeria. 
The British colonization of Nigeria was overtly justified not only “to suppress the 
slave trade” but also “to prevent its revival under the guise of contract labour”.25 
Monica Schuler writes of “the slave trade” continuing “in the guise of indentured 
labour in areas where slavery had been abolished”, being carried out by a class of 
“agents” who “emerged after the slave-trade” and “who brought colonial indentured 
labourers, into the same or new plantation zones.” Schuler notes that while of course 
“Europeans recruited some voluntary indentured workers in Africa, most recruits were 
involuntary, and their acquisition involved deliberate violence, restraint, fraud and 
purchase.” She says that such labour recruitment in Sierra Leone in the 1840s for 
indentures in British and French Guiana “combined the recruiting techniques of the 
African slave trade with the old European bond servant traffic”.26 The Fernando Pó-
Nigeria connection during the first half of the twentieth century is quite peculiar 
because both African recruiters in Nigeria and the Spanish imperial state and a mix of 
both African and European employers on the island were immune to the 
interventionism of British humanitarian imperialism. Panya does not fold neatly into 
                                                 
23John Wareing, “‘Violently Taken Away or Cheatingly Duckoyed”: The Illicit Recruitment in London 
of Indentured Servants for the American Colonies, 1645–1718’, The London Journal 26, 2 (2001): 1-
22, 4, 6. 
24Allen, ‘European Slave Trading, Abolitionism, and “New Systems of Slavery”’, 2. 
25Robert Smith, ‘The Lagos Consulate, 1851–1861: An Outline’, The Journal of African History 15, 3 
(1974): 393–416, 415. 
26Schuler, ‘The Recruitment of African Indentured Labourers’, 127. 
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the British, French or Portuguese empire based “under the guise of contracts” 
literature, a term used in African history especially in relation to state-sanctioned 
indentures, apprenticeships or engage schemes in the post-abolition mid nineteenth 
century, when many tens of thousands of freed captives or new slaves were signed up 
after arriving at various port towns in West, Central and East Africa through former 
slave supply routes.27 Fernando Pó was in no way analogous to São Tomé, where up 
until the early twentieth century, those enslaved in the Bié plateau in Angola 
“continued to be imported, bought, and sold under the guise of contract labour” and 
kept in perpetuity on the plantations.28 Nor is the relationship between Fernando Pó 
and Nigeria akin to the one set up between Fernando Pó and Liberia between 1914 
and 1930, when about 10,000 “indigenous peoples were impressed as contract labour” 
by a small group of senators who did not need to ‘deceive’ anyone. Instead they 
deployed the armed forces of the state during recruitment—and assured their return—
after two years of work in “Fernando Po under the guise of contract labor”.29  
Even though panya recruitment was a slaving genre of “kidnapping and smuggling” 
that continued in colonial Nigeria along the old supply networks, it cannot be thought 
of as the result of an inertia from the immediately precolonial period, subsisting only 
where “old elites” preserving an “old older” “survived”.30 Fernando Pó’s recruiters 
                                                 
27Schuler, ‘Kru Emigration to British and French Guiana’; Clarence-Smith, ‘Emigration from Western 
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1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Miers, ‘Slavery to Freedom in Sub-Saharan 
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were initially drawn from groups who had previously had a hand in organizing (and 
abolishing) the Atlantic and internal slave trade in West Africa such as Aguda or Afro-
Brazilians and Sierra Leonean Creoles. The majority of recruiters were Efik from 
Calabar Province, particularly those from Henshaw Town settlements in Oron, and so-
called “Cross River Igbo”: Abam, Abriba and Aro “resident stranger” merchants with 
links to Calabar and other smaller waterside trading towns throughout the Eastern 
Province.31 But decades after abolition and with imperial rule quite well cemented in 
Nigeria, a new generation of recruiters regrouped under the new structural templates 
provided by Spanish imperial rule and improvised a radical discontinuity in their 
technique. The Fernando Pó labour traffic was a spike of a defunct repertoire of the 
earlier Atlantic world, and of the post-abolition Indian and Pacific worlds, an 
admixture reaching back and forth across continents rather than unfolding along some 
anachronistic niche or trait perduring into the colonial period.  
Tout’s sole area of operation was the ‘field’—to constantly bring in batches of new 
recruits. They were heterogeneous, discontinuous and unrelated. Their viability and 
strategy relied to a high degree on individual histories and capacities to deploy 
promises within wider structural asymmetries. There were never more than two 
hundred recruiters at any one time, even during the crescendo in the late 1930s; who 
their grandparents were or how the census grouped them had only a very loose 
bearing. Those involved in the recruiting bloom were not a coherent group 
reproducing an existing status nor did they form a class. They were not headmen, 
                                                                                                                                           
Africa’, 237–64. For the foundational thesis of the resilience of old elites, see Ralph A. Austen, ‘The 
Abolition of the Overseas Slave Trade a Distorted Theme in West African History’, Journal of the 
Historical Society of Nigeria 5, 2 (1970): 257–274. 
31Most Igbo recruiters operated in and out of Bende, but they lived elsewhere, For example Michael 
Ikeocha, from Oloko, in Bende division, a town whose women instigated the Ogu Umunwanyi or 
Women's War of 1929, and likely because of that found himself “now living a Calabar” in the 
compound of Chief Udo Edem. Ikeocha made “his journeys” from Creek Town. British VC (Michie), 
28 February 1941, ‘Labour Conditions in Spanish Guinea, Appendix C: List of Recruiters and 
Canoemen’, TNA, FO 371/26908. Warren T. Morrill, ‘Two Urban Cultures of Calabar, Nigeria’, (PhD 
Thesis, University of Chicago, 1961), 269, notes from his field site, 1950s Calabar, that “all Igbo 
migrants in Calabar” assured him that the “shrewdest and most successful Ibo traders are those from 
Abiriba.” A reputation carried on into more recent times too, as a blogpost on Nairaland says: “The 
Abiriba man loves and follows the whiff of money to wherever it takes him, and no matter the risk 
involved,” having “responded to changing economic opportunities” in the colonial period by 
“developing a strong trade in smuggled gin from Fernando Po.” Ebere Ahanihu, ‘Abiriba And Ohafia: 
Two Of A Kind’, 30 April 2011, http://www.nairaland.com/657067/abiriba-ohafia-two-kind. 
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“boss-boys” or “gangmasters” who supervised contracted labourers throughout their 
journey and at the worksite itself.32  They were rarely long-term employees; they 
worked on commission. They were provisionally delegated agents, preparing the 
tracks who were only loosely affiliated to certain planters or the cacao exporting 
houses on the island. They were not “friends and relatives”, as emphasized in much 
recent literature on indenture and post-indenture labour migrations. The odd and 
variable presence of an uncle, friend or community leader, weather as helpful guide 
and sponsor or as a receiver of commissions, does not get the debate beyond the 
dichotomy of free and unfree labour very far because it was still others, mostly touts 
and whoever they distributed shares of their commissions to, who were organizing the 
logistics of movements; and others still, more often than not state actors, who set the 
parameters for the conditions of exploitation on arrival.33 The frames of ethnicity and 
kinship in the study of indenture is the gesture of an impasse, a non-confrontation 
with the paradox of agency, a bypassing of the contradictions and mutuality 
constituting the relationship between force and choice, placed and constituted by the 
unravelling of structures, many causes and other forces. 
There was no direct continuity with the recruitment techniques of the slave trade, the 
‘blur’ suggested by William Gervase Clarence-Smith is true but it needs to be 
stretched, inverted and specified: “even more akin to a slave trade was the clandestine 
                                                 
32Such headmen were integral to Kru (1830s-1890s) labor migrations; see above p. 38. In the “post-
indenture” Bay of Bengal and South East Asia Elsewhere such recruitment through “boss-boys” was 
known as the kangani (“overseer” in Tamil) and chu tsai thau (“head of piglets”). Headmen tended to 
be already previously associated with labourers—and with planters. Ramasamy distils the essence of 
the kangani, who were often also foreman on the plantations: they were not so much “mediators 
between capital and labour” but rather “agents of capital”, there to “subject labour to rigorous 
discipline”. Palanisamy Ramasamy, ‘Labour Control and Labour Resistance in the Plantations of 
Colonial Malaya’, Journal of Peasant Studies 19, 3/4 (1992): 87–105, 92. 
33McKeown, ‘Global Migration’, 167. For a critique of the “separation between contractor and sardari 
recruitment”, where the latter, the sardar was “perceived to be an ‘insider’ recruiting within a 
proximate community and thus less likely to use force and deception in recruitment”, see Sen, 
‘Commercial Recruiting and Informal Intermediation’, 5; Prabhu Mohapatra, ‘Eurocentrism, Forced 
Labour, and Global Migration: A Critical Assessment’, International Review of Social History 52,1 
(2007): 110–15, 113. For a wonderful analysis of the complex social networks in recruitment see 
especially, Ravi Ahuja, ‘Networks of Subordination–Networks of the Subordinated: The Ordered 
Spaces of South Asian Maritime Labour in an Age of Imperialism (c1890–1947)’, in The Limits of 
British Colonial Control in South Asia: Spaces of Disorder in the Indian Ocean Region, ed. Ashwini 
Tambe and Harald Fischer-Tine (London: Routledge, 2009), 13–48. For a contemporary critique of 
“social networks” see Fred Krissman, ‘Sin Coyote Ni Patrón: Why the “Migrant Network” Fails to 
Explain International Migration’, International Migration Review 39, 1 (2005): 4–44. 
86 
 
importation of labour from southeastern Nigeria from about 1900, organized by 
African canoe owners”.34 Contemporary humanitarians observed how labourers for 
the “large European-owned estates” were secured on the “mainland, often by methods 
reminiscent of old slave days.” 35  Henderson Tapela says that illegal recruitment 
“began to take the character of the slave raiding of former days. Unwary travellers 
were kidnapped and canoe-paddled from the ports of Eket, Oron and Calabar”.36 
There seemed to be a “reminiscence”, but there was always a slight doubt, a “really” 
with a question mark: “What really looks like indirect resuscitation of the old slave 
trade thought to have been completely stamped out, is being persistently and 
diligently pursued in this district [Calabar] in the form of organized labour recruiting 
to the Spanish island of Fernando Po by some individuals.”37 I think the argument can 
nevertheless be made, that if the fifteenth century island and river based trading 
network in the Gulf of Guinea witnessed the clear beginning of a commercialized 
system geared towards importing enslaved Africans onto colonial worksites38, it was 
on Fernando Pó that this system met its unnoticed and confused end in the twentieth 
century; but not in any linear way, to the contrary it happened through a layering and 
fission, in bursts and quick reversals. 
Between the 1910s and early 1930s most braceros were either recruited by the 
Liberian state or by the Spanish state and recruiters in Rio Muni, Cameroon and 
Gabon through separate, usually much more violent, recruiting assemblages. However 
already by 1935, the majority of “the braceros who arrive in our colony [were] all 
coming from Calabar”, and indeed from this point on the majority of the islands 
                                                 
34Clarence-Smith, ‘Cocoa Plantations and Coerced Labor in the Gulf of Guinea’, 160. 
35Wieschhoff, Colonial Policies in Africa, 32. 
36Henderson M. Tapela, ‘The Cross River Basin: Colonial Labour Policies and Practices’, in A History 
of the Cross River Region of Nigeria, ed. Monday B. Abasiattai, (Calabar: University of Calabar Press, 
1990), 198–214, 210. 
37‘The Nigerian Easter Mail Alleges Slavery in Oron’, The West African Pilot, Lagos, January 21 1939. 
38Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1740-1830 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 115–6; Arlindo Manuel Caldeira, ‘Learning the Ropes 
in the Tropics: Slavery and the Plantation System on the Island of São Tomé’, African Economic 
History 39 (2011): 35–71. 
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inhabitants (including the large immigrant community of traders, smugglers, skilled 
and self-employed workers and their families) were Nigerian.39 “By far the greater 
number of Cross River people who migrated to seek employment” abroad ended up 
Spanish Guinea. Yet “an Igbo saying has it that ‘no one who was comfortable at home 
ever opted for Fernando Po’”.40  
Large migration to the towns in Eastern Nigeria were kick started in the late 1920s 
when the British introduced the poll tax. People moved to “escape tax”, “definitely to 
escape tax” says a district officer of eastern Nigeria in 1930. The sudden tax 
obligation of 7 shillings was often paid out in bulk to district commissioners by 
appointed chiefs who were paid for their bureaucratic duties in pounds, so this was 
easy. For those who suddenly found themselves debtors, interests quickly 
accumulated to up to 3£, and they would be “summoned for this amount and they 
place[d] themselves in bondage” to creditors and chiefs who “take all our money” 
says a resident in Aba in 1930. “On account of the tax and various other matters 
people have pawned themselves.”41 In the 1930s like generations earlier, many of 
those entering a labour market were escaping others forms of unfree labour generated 
under colonial rule. In the districts of Owerri, Aba and Bende where a majority of 
migrants were from in the 1940s, the selling and pledging of land became unusually 
common. In the “hope of gathering the first installment to pay for a bicycle or a [palm 
oil] press”, land pledges were being accepted as a “security for a debt”. Land could be 
seized by creditors for failing to pay back loans and high interests rates, something 
which had “driven many away from farming to seek their fortunes abroad”.42  
                                                 
39 GG (Sánchez Guerra) to DGMC, 28 December 1935, AGA, C-81/06867, E-5; British Consul, 
Yaounde, 4 May 1961, ‘Despatch No.46’, TNA, CO 554/2502. 
40Tapela, ‘The Cross River Basin’, 210, 212; Ejituwu, ‘Anglo-Spanish Employment Agency’, 50. 
41Nigeria and Aba Commission of Inquiry, Notes of Evidence Taken by the Commission of Inquiry 
Appointed to Inquire into the Disturbance in the Calabar and Owerri Provinces, December, 1929 
(Lagos: Government Printer, 1930), para. 18675, 18570; Obadare, ‘Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea 
Relations since 1927’, 575–589, 577; Okolie, ‘The Transformation of Eastern Nigeria’, 461, 463. 
42A. F. B. Bridges, June 1938, ‘Report of Oil Palm Survey, Ibo, Ibibio and Cross River Areas’, RHL, 
Mss. Afr. S. 697 (1), para. 3; see also also Chima Korieh, The Land has Changed: History, Society and 
Gender in Colonial Eastern Nigeria (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2010), 260.  
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The wages and conditions in Fernando Pó made the island attractive only to the 
“miserly situated labour” in Nigeria, most migrants arrived “completely destitute and 
penniless”, many “had never worked before” in the imperial sense. They were drawn 
from the ranks of those who various reasons could not find work in Nigeria, including 
absent social and kin relations that facilitated money making opportunities and the 
sums of money needed to pay the initial dashes that would secure placements, training 
and apprenticeships in Nigeria itself. Some also had their own reason for “a hasty exit 
from Nigeria, e.g. debts, taxes unpaid, family disputes”.43 The “evil” reputation of 
Fernando Pó almost always preceded the spread the “illegal recruiters in the widely 
scattered areas of recruitment”.44 Fernando Pó and its recruiters quickly “gained a 
very unsavoury reputation” after “cases of kidnapping were brought to light” but 
colonial officials assumed they met with quite “some success”, “partly because the 
very dense population in Onitsha and Owerri Provinces had created a class of landless 
peasants, who were compelled to turn to wage earning for a livelihood”.45 But on 
closer investigation it was clear to those doing the investigative groundwork that only 
“through such agencies as may exist in Calabar”, that is “through the instrumentality 
of a ‘recruiting agent’” that anyone found their way into the island’s plantation 
contracts.46 
 
                                                 
43British LO (Evans) to British Consul General, Douala, 31 August 1945 ‘August Labour Report 
No.18’, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278; British VC and LO (Bradley), 4 July 1956, ‘Quarterly Report’, 
TNA, CO 554/1346; Chief Secretary Office, Lagos to GG (Manresa), 7 July 1930, AGA, C-81/08146 
E-1. 
44British LO (Lewis), Calabar to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 6 December 1943, NAE, CALPROF 
5/1/193. 
45Nigerian Secretariat, Lagos, [undated, ~1953], ‘Memorandum’ RHL, 600.18 s. 21/XI (10). 
46 DO Itu to Resident, Calabar, 11 January 1939, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194; Commissioner of 




Map 4 Social groupings in south-eastern Nigeria, boundaries approximate47 
 
                                                 




Map 5 Cross River in 1842 with old and new place-names superimposed48 
3.1 Economies of Deception 
A clear moment of uprooting violence on land was absent, people wanted to or needed 
to be on the move, just not necessarily towards the places and under the conditions 
they ended up in. Recruiters were not armed, they did not purchase or redeem 
‘existing’ slaves or raid for new ones, “as it is as it is unthinkable that nations like 
France and England, from whose colonies our labour power arrives, would have 
allowed us to employ procedures that require violence and coercion”—says a Spanish 
diplomat at a meeting of the ILO in 1935.49 A Spanish petty functionary on the island 
                                                 
48Becroft and King, ‘Details of Explorations of the Old Calabar River, in 1841 and 1842’, 283. 
49El Consejero Tecnico a la XIX Conferencia Internacional de Trabajo (Cavestany Anduaga), 22 May 
1935, AGA, C-81/12422. 
91 
 
explains that the modus operandi: “deceitful methods operate in la recluta 
[recruitment] and this is well known by all, well if it wasn’t for the manipulation of 
appearances, the indigenas [natives] would not come to work for us.”50  Another 
settler said that while it was “not always necessary to employ cunning and trickery 
and other despicable procedures, at least half” were set up this way.51 It is a good 
estimate, as various surveys confirm that at least half of Nigerian recruits in this 
period “claimed ignorance of knowing that they were being taken to work in the 
Spanish Cocoa plantations”.52 
The fact that most braceros did not really want to be there even if they came quite 
voluntarily following expectations is revealed in one extremely symptomatic incident 
in 1940. A “rumour had spread” among “the Nigerian indígenas resident on the 
island” that a British navy ship was waiting at the harbour in Santa Isabel to 
“repatriate all British subjects on the island”. Braceros started “abandoning their place 
of work en masse”; descending from the “plantations on the hills”, they “started to fill 
the Plaza de España”, the central square of the capital by the harbour. They were 
“gathering on the docks too, and all were carrying their heavy luggage with them.” 
Planters were of course “very alarmed, they thought they would lose all their 
braceros, as you know, the indígenas of Nigeria make up over ninety percent of all 
the braceros of this island.” 53  The Guardia Colonial returned everyone to the 
plantations. “Imagine the damage to our agriculture and our colony, if the only source 
of labour that is available to us now [Nigerians] would meet with any sudden 
interruption.”54 
                                                 
50Babiloni Navarro, ‘Los territorios españoles’, AGA, C-81/12427. 
51Guillermo Cabanellas, La selva siempre triunfa: novela del África española (Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Ayacucho, 1944), 35. 
52Ejituwu, ‘Anglo-Spanish Employment Agency’, 47. 
53Secretario General, Santa Isabel to GG (Fontán), 9 July 1940, AGA, C-81/08806, E-‘Información con 
caracter reservado sobre incidente occurrido en Santa Isabel con un Buque de Guerra Ingles’.  
54Cámara (Carbonell) to GG (Bonelli), 17 June 1947, AGA, C-81/08179, E-5. 
92 
 
Farley Smith, a special investigator sent to the island in the summer of 1939 rounded 
down his own estimate of 50% of those “taken” to Fernando Pó who were not 
“willing to go there”, to “possibly 15%”. These “15%”, he says were apparently “for 
the most part, credulous youths lured there under false pretenses.”55 Farley Smith had 
rounded down this figure because he like other colonial officials fancied themselves 
to be amateur barristers, cross-examiners, able to “detect carefully prepared lies”56 
and discern “carefully crafted stories”57  from sight and sound alone—imputing a 
calculating shrewdness to the recruits that was simultaneously denied to them. 
Playing judge and mercilessly excluding supplicants, whom he did not see as 
unwitting dupes, but as cunning and manipulative, Farley Smith says he “arrived at 
this figure”, 15%, after “listening to complaints and making inquiries on the Island” 
and excluding those “for whom it is natural that having gone willingly and finding 
they do not like the conditions make as good a story as possible in their efforts to 
return to Nigeria before completing their contracts.”58 “On arriving at the farms they 
find the work hard and the hours long” and “no doubt”, says a British Consul, “their 
contract and forced stay of two years appear to be insufferable, hence their pitiable 
appeals for assistance.”59 An undercover Nigerian policeman reports that “they are all 
now in the Spanish Plantations serving their term regretfully […] really suffering a lot 
and many of them had died - death occasioned by brutal and hard treatment 
unaccustomed to from the time of their Birth.”60 
                                                 
55Farley Smith, 21 September 1939, ‘Report’, TNA, FO 371/23171. “The usual procedure is to bring 
the recruits at night down to some small village on the coast or creeks of Calabar province and tell 
them that in order to get to their destination they have to cross a wide river. [...] The recruits then 
embark in the canoes and next morning they are well out at sea and it is too late for them to be able to 
take any action to get away from the recruiter.” 
56Britich VC (Smallbones) to FO (Grey), 13 October 1913, TNA, FO 367/353. 
57British LO (Evans) to British Consul General, Douala, 31 January 1945, TNA, FO 371/49598. 
58Governor’s Deputy, Lagos to Sec. of State for the Colonies (MacDonald), London, 23 August 1939, 
TNA, FO 371/23171. 
59British VC (May) to Resident, Calabar, 13 September 1934, TNA, FO 458/126; also in NAE, 
CALPROF 5/1/192. 
60S. Muyiwa to Commissioner of Police, Calabar, 24 May 1936, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194. 
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David Northrup (an early historian of the Igbo and the pre-colonial economies of the 
Cross River) in his book Indentured Labour in the Age of Imperialism, surveyed the 
case of Chinese coolies in Cuba, and expressed his incredulity at the fact that 80% if 
not 90%—anyhow, he says, an “improbably high” number—of the tens of thousands 
of Chinese coolie labourers in Cuba interviewed by a Qing Dynasty Commission of 
inquiry in 1874, reported that they had been “kidnapped or decoyed” by the 
“barbarians” in Macao who had sent out “vicious Chinese” as recruiters.61 Coolie 
petitioners explained carefully and clearly how in “recent decades, China is doing 
business with foreigners”, who were “colluding [with] Chinese gangsters whose job is 
to abduct people. This practice originated in [the British treaty port of] Xiamen and 
prospers in Macao.” From small time beginnings in the 1850s these “vicious Chinese” 
had “cast their nets in every harbor and their schemes block every road. No matter the 
wise or the fool, we are all trapped.” “Some people used up thousands of gold pieces 
and were ashamed to go back to their hometowns. Some people were very poor and 
looked for a job alone. They met friends on their way. Some of these friends were 
heart-less. These wicked people pointed falsely at a gold mountain and promised to 
show the way. [They] grew a lotus under their tongues but hid a sharp blade in their 
stomachs. They deceived people into traps in order to make a profit. They lured 
people to a foreign land and didn’t care about family loss and lineage. I didn’t realize 
that I was tricked until the ship sailed to the middle of the river.”62 Nevertheless, 
Northup interjects: they “gave the answer they though most likely to obtain their 
release”, he says, and approvingly cites the Qing Commission’s conclusions that 
labourers tended to be “‘bad characters’” emigrating “to escape the results of 
gambling and crime” or otherwise were “‘stupid fellows’” easily “ensnared by 
crimps”.  
                                                 
61Northrup, Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 57; China and Cuba Commission, The Cuba 
Commission Report: A Hidden History of the Chinese in Cuba: The Original English-Language Text of 
1876 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 36. Under related circumstances: 
“Kidnapping was no mere sideline for the bandits that plagued South China during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, it was their primary modus operandi”. James L. Watson, ‘Transactions in 
People: The Chinese Market in Slaves, Servants and Heirs’, in Asian and African Systems of Slavery, 
ed. James L Watson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 223–51, 233. 
62Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 245, 96. 
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Northrup ends by saying that “the line between voluntary and involuntary is further 
blurred by the fact that the migrants desperation and ignorance made them easy to 
cheat and deceive.” This was the same line that colonial officers took in Macau, who 
talked of these promoters of “false pretenses” who could find “easy prey” and “trick” 
people to “willingly accompany the[m] to Macao”. It is not decisive whether some 
were under the impression that they “would be working in Macao”, while others, as 
Northrup speculates, after hearing “of the good fortune of clansmen or other villagers 
in California, undoubtedly offered themselves for employment, not knowing the 
difference between Peru and California.” The key to the whole ensemble is what 
happened on board ships, as a coolie from Xiamen in 1852 says: “They were beguiled 
on board the barbarian ship as contract laborers by emigration agents and confined in 
the hold. After the ship sailed, the said barbarians gave each man in the hold a 
contract of servitude. If he did not accept he was flogged.” The ‘barbarian’s practice’ 
was not about middlemen and their snake-like hisses, but about despotic stamps and 
structures of confinement that could nullify a series of communicative encounters.63 
Touts armed themselves with varying degrees of deception, creativity, theatrics, and 
the most intimate of illicit relations, double-dealing and betrayal. Their peaceful 
‘linguistic’ technique were made up of important omissions and plenty of 
embellishments, and were used to solicit an initially affirmative response in the other. 
Unlicensed and unregulated labour recruiting in Nigeria was banned, not because it 
was restrictive or necessarily unfree but because it was considered ‘too free’ and 
disinhibited, beyond the laws of exchange in the lands of the excesses of thefts and 
gifts. While British district officers were generally pleased to see the “acceleration of 
the drift”, as they called the emergence of a “pool of surplus labour” or the “tendency 
of young men to drift to centers of semi industrial employment”, they worried about 
the “drain of labour to foreign possessions” because this “drift” was imagined to come 
                                                 
63Northrup, Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 57, 56, 58; Robert L. Irick, Chʼing Policy 
toward the Coolie Trade, 1847–1878 (Taipei: Chinese Materials Center, 1982) 95, 205, 33; See also 
Meagher, The Coolie Trade, 126. As late “as 1904, the Attorney-General for Hong-Kong, prosecuting 
in a kidnapping case, indicated that kidnapping was rife.” Pember Reeves, ‘Foreword’ of Campbell, 
Chinese Coolie Emigration, xiv. 
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from both the ‘avarice’ of recruiters and the ‘promiscuous’ expectations of “the 
uneducated young man, in search of easy money.”64  
The recruiters used “lies, deceit, and stealth to get labour from Nigeria”, says a 
journalist in the Nigerian Eastern Mail during the outpouring of the reading and 
writing public in 1939.65 Scholars who have seen the sources say that “recruiters 
resorted to deception to entice young men to leave their homes” . Recruiters “were in 
the habit of making exaggerated promises [and] of hiding the fact that the labourers 
were going to Fernando Po”. The “sweet-tongued recruiter convinced his victims that 
Fernando Po was a haven of wealth easily extracted from apprenticeships, shop-
assistantships and domestic stewardships”.66 The recruit was “stuffed with sufficient 
falsehoods to induce him to accompany the recruiter to Fernando Poo or sufficiently 
far on the journey as to make it impossible for him to turn back when he finds out the 
truth.”67 Touts could operate with a manipulative indifference and a mild kind of 
sadism, but they wielded no weapons, they could not even be being too pesky or they 
would fester, they simply latched on to people who were already on the move, 
redirecting the desire of migrant labourers and often leading them to thwarted hopes 
and an unwilling fate on Fernando Pó’s plantations. They laid pictures over traps and 
seemed to be able to do in the quintessential tout’s pose, with their own hands 
casually folded behind their own back. 
Dandeson Green, a Krio or Saro and “veteran Calabar reporter” with pro-colonial 
credentials, writes that while “many Nigerian labourers went to Fernando Po of their 
own accord”, a “very considerable number are taken, either by force or with the 
                                                 
64DO Opobo to Resident, Calabar, 10 June 1947, NAE, CALPROF 3/1/1447; Resettlement Office, Uyo 
to Resident, Calabar, 1 July 1947, NAE CALPROF 3/1/1447. 
65‘The Fernando Po Slave Traffic’, The Nigerian Eastern Mail, Calabar, 25 February 1939. 
66Pratten, The Man-Leopard Murders, 166; Osuntokun, Equatorial Guinea Nigerian Relations, 27; 
Tapela, ‘Nigerian Labour for Fernando Po’, 48. 
67Timothy Farley Smith and Nigeria, Report on employment of Nigerian labour in Fernando Poo 
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promise of ‘Utopia’, by ruthless smugglers and illegal native recruiters.” 68 A trader 
from Lagos says that he came across a group of recruiters who disembarked with a 
group of unwitting recruits whom they had brought “under the pretext” of being 
trading assistants who were hired to carry trade goods in and out of the island: “boys 
whom they have impressed with the notion of FERNANDO PO being an El Dorado 
for the unemployed and depression in Nigeria and upon their arrival there are made 
over to some farmers for some inducive amounts of money”.69 Ruthless peddlers of 
‘utopia’, proponents of ‘El Dorado’: the “chief trouble is caused by the army of 
recruiters who entice young people away, their story of Fernando Po being a land 
‘flowing with milk and honey’ is, however, true”.70  
There was indeed a lot of accumulated and concentrated wealth circulating in 
Fernando Pó. Spanish Guinea accounted for 1% of total exports from Africa in 1960, 
ten times its weight or size. 71 A British missionary in observed in 1938 that Fernando 
Pó was “so different form anywhere else in West Africa [...] it is an amazingly 
wealthy little island”.72 Much of the money to be made went to those who “import 
foreign men to suck dry its honey”.73 For the mix of official and underhand pay-outs 
from the Spanish labour officer and individual planters, the recruiters were “prepared 
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British VC and LO (Bradley), ‘Fernando Poo, Report No.3/1952’, 31 September 1952, TNA, FO 
371/96714. 
69Olatunji Sapara, n.d. [1934?] contained in Commissioner of Police, Buea, Cameroons, to Resident, 
Calabar, 31 January 1934, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/192. 
70Special Correspondent, ‘Fernando Po Labour Conditions’, The Nigerian Daily Times, Lagos, 13 July 
1939. 
71Pélissier, Los territorios españoles de Africa, 44, 62; DGMC, 1960, ‘Repercusiones en la Regional 
Ecuatorial española, de la situación general en africa’, AGA, C-81/11852, E-4. Spanish Guinea only 
had about 0.1% of Africa’s land and population. Correspondingly GDP per capita was 135$, in contrast 
to for example Nigeria where it was 12$. GDP in Fernando Pó in the 1960s was 14737 pesetas, higher 
than 29 Spanish provinces, that is, almost all of them; Ballano, Aquel, 548.  
72Dodds, July 1939, ‘Notes on Visit to West African District, February to June 1939’, SOAS, MMS, 
MMS/Special Series/Notes and Transcripts/FBN 1 (fiche 15–17). 
73 ‘Writer vehemently condemns idea of Labour Recruiting to Fascist Territory’, Eastern Nigeria 
Guardian, Port Harcourt, 1 March 1945. 
97 
 
to shangai, trick or, by any method open to them to persuade their country men to 
come over here, provided that they themselves make a handsome profit out of the 
deal.”74 The “recruiters at certain seasons asks and gets as much as £15 per head 
[with] no questions asked”, a sum higher that the wages for two years contract and 
about the same as the annual average income in the Eastern Provinces.75 Indeed it was 
the “lucrative commissions” which Fernando Pó’s recruiters could command that 
gave their activities, in the eyes of scandalized colonial contemporaries, “the character 
of a slave trade.” These commissions were seen by British colonial officials across the 
empire as “‘a reward for extra cunning in inducing coolies [or even as a] 
compensation for the risk run in unlawfully inducing or compelling them to go.’” It 
“was risk-money, an incentive to ‘iniquity’ or outright crime.”76 On Fernando Pó, for 
new recruits “planters would not only pay for their transport costs, but for taxes, 
passports, the wage-advances that aren’t usually deduced from the wages, etc. This 
etcetera, is actually the lions share, and includes expenses which it would be prudent 
of us not to declare”—the “lions share” was always the recruiters commission.77 The 
total cut that these brokers received was always formally illegalized. It was set by the 
recruiters themselves and out of regulatory reach. 
Touts offered a “free ride”, no one paid for their canoe passage to Fernando Pó, there 
were no tickets, only arrangements and their errant potentials. This made the barrier to 
emigration non-existent, but recruits wound up paying for their own displacement. 
This was more clearly the case in the early 1930s when Nigerian recruiters first came 
on steamers. A ticket to Santa Isabel, even from nearby Nigeria, was expensive, 
almost half a pound, several months’ wages of a bracero. The recruiters paid for 
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tickets, bribes, the necessary counterfeit paperwork, and other travel expenses, but 
those recruited were “made to sign an I.O.U. acknowledging that should they fail to 
take up contract on the island they would owe three pounds to the recruiter”. 78 By the 
mid 1930s hundreds of new Nigerian recruits were arriving every month on the 
steamers, “their passages” had been paid “by a recruiter against an IOU”, but only “if 
they do not contract to work in Fernando Po will the IOU be enforced.” Meaning that 
once a “labourer is here he is more or less forced to contract although he may not like 
the conditions on closer acquaintance.”79  This type of debt ticket system did not 
operate on the canoes, though the promise of an advance often did. Being underpaid 
during the first contract meant that new recruits were essentially paying for their own 
transport, retroactively while working off the first contract. 
The substantial wage advances that was sometimes promised to them went straight 
into the hands of the recruiters who dropped them off at the Curaduría in Santa 
Isabel. Almost no one ever saw this advance money or dash the first time around, 
instead they were met with irrevocable contract lasting a minimum of two years, with 
formal wages equivalent of the sale-price of 3 large yams a month. The “recruits are 
taken before the Curador Colonial or one of his staff and told that they are going to 
contract to Señor [Mr. so and so] for two years at five dollars a month; before this 
statement has sunk in they are outside the office and their contract books are being 
filled in. They have been contracted and it is too late for them to ‘change their minds’ 
as some of those who have persisted stating that they did not wish to contract are 
accused of doing.” 80 British labour officers in Fernando Pó and elsewhere worried 
endlessly on the precise explicative moments of this contract signing, because more 
often than not “the contracts were so ill-explained that the effect upon the illiterate” 
hired worked “was the same as if they had been deliberately cheated.”81 The Vice 
                                                 
78British Consul-General (Yapp), Monrovia, 17 September 1936, ‘Report On Employment of British 
Coloured Labour in Fernando Po, as the Result of a Visit made August 29th-September 1st, 1936’ 
TNA, CO 554/105/3. 
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Consul said that “boys are ignorant of the condition of plantation labour here, and 
agree to everything that is put to them in accordance with the suggestions of the 
recruiters.” 82 “The recruiters assist in this procedure as much as they can (and they 
can do a great deal) in order that there shall be no argument over the fee that they 
have already agreed to accept from the prospective employer.” It goes without saying 
that recruiters would invariably “fail to mention that employment conditions were 
unlike Nigeria in that the workers would be bound for two years, with very little 
chance of changing employer and no chance to visit home.”83 
On arrival “the police department takes charge of them and see that they all get 
employment”. Arrangements for commissions were made by “unlawful recruiters 
mostly” and some “old hands who return with boys to his Master”. These mediators 
“name the Farms or masters with whom they will work. These claimants sign for 
them and the [braceros] are taken to the Curaduria” to receive a copy of their 
contract. According to J.W. Kicks-Dadzie, an investigative journalist from the 
Nigerian Daily Times it was this commission “which most of the labourers resent 
when they happen to hear of it.”84 For “new arrivals”, the extent and amount of dashes 
and commissions handed over to recruiters was often “completed over their heads”, 
they were “not aware that the tout had made capital out of the recruitment and that the 
employer has had to pay far more than may appear”.85  Canoe passengers “found 
themselves to their dismay, being disembarked at Santa Isabel (Malabo) and 
                                                                                                                                           
trade too, while the recruiter of course would say that each one of the Chinese emigrants had signed an 
agreement written in Chinese and Spanish that they were indentured for a period of eight years in 
Cuba, the “truth of these statements is doubtful because it was unlikely that any of the emigrants could 
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auctioned to waiting plantation owners.” 86  The often delayed realization of the 
exchange of the commission is why a single blow did not need to be thrown by any 
middleman to consider oneself temporarily enslaved; workers were bound on site and 
considered themselves to be effectively working almost for free. Touts did probably 
often offer workers the vision of a long-term choice, sometimes the only choice they 
had, and workers might have followed suit as an expression of agency, with the 
expectation that savings of pounds in double digits could be made, enough to cover 
the cost of setting up an independent business, buy land or cover bridewealth, but 
only after a further contract. 
3.2 Voices from the Archives 
The recruiters appropriated subjectivity and labour through receiving their 
commission, a process experienced as kind of avarice of accumulation at the expense 
of others. As Ekpe Eyo, a Christian convert from Uyo, who managed to get a letter 
through to his father through the Methodists mission in Fernando Pó, says about his 
recruiter: “greet Etim Asibong warmly for me for he brought me here to stay here, and 
went back in peace and earner his money and ate things and live and let me die and 
suffer.”87 An anonymous letter from a labourer contracted in Fernando Pó does not 
explain how he has was recruited, and irrespective of whether he was deceived as to 
the destination, he says that “an eket man has brought me here to sell for 7£, if god 
keeps me alive until it reaches the years for which he sold me, i shall come home”.88 
An Ibibio petitioner on the island representing a group of imprisoned workers 
denounced the “traders bringing the people to this country in awfully way” because 
they were “saying that we were going to Tico or Victoria”, on an offer to work in the 
large British and German plantations in British Cameroons, many of which were 
“accessibly only by water”. There, the labourers were increasingly from Nigeria who 
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were “for the most part recruited by Efik contractors belonging to Calabar” and were 
brought “by canoe from Oron.”89  
 
Figure 5 Ekpe Eyo’s letter, 2 September 1938 
For the petitioner the art of deception was of secondary correlate order, the realization 
of what panya meant, took place only when contracting took place and commissions 
had been exchanged. The petition ends with a startling thesis: “I am telling you fact 
and clearly that [the] canoe-men [are] total selling person to those people [planters] by 
a great lot of money. Thats why slave is better than us in thousand upon thousand 
way.” 90 The recruiters carved out for themselves an extraordinary slice of profits 
gained through the labour market they were themselves generating. The recruiters’ 
commission was well beyond the costs surrounding their labour of logistics which 
covered the ensemble of brokers, paddlers, bribes, and the arrangers upstream and 
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downstream, including chiefs and false friends and sub-touts on the island itself. 
Because of this, “judged solely on the question of motive”—the “thought of nothing 
else but the prospect of earning the promised commission on the transaction”—
recruiters were considered by one newspaper columnist after another “to stand on 
practically the same footing as the local slave dealers of the early days”.91 
Tapela makes the distinction between outright abduction and misinformation. The 
former forms part of the topos of the slave trade and is usually referred to as such in 
the sources. Such instances seemed to be subdivide into two: the kidnappings of 
children on the one hand, and the other of literate and educated adults, often 
professionals. There “was evidence that children were being stolen and sold to the 
island of Fernando Po in a manner similar to the kidnappings of the precolonial 
period”, and some of the evidence suggest that such children accompanied some of 
the better placed migrant labourers, to work in their households.92 On the other hand, 
it was quite common that the victims who were “shanghaied from Calabar”, and 
“taken to Fernando Po against their will and arrangement” were actually ordinary 
passengers and “teachers, traders etc. going on buisness boarding canoes” which daily 
would left “Oron or Calabar by night”. 93  Rumours of kidnapping saturated 
anonymous transportation hubs, but people still needed to be on the move, obligatory 
transit points became infused with insecurity, alarm, caution and suspicion. If they 
could avoid it people did not travel alone or night.94 
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Victims were accused of being heedless and unmindful, but succumbing to subterfuge 
is a very nuanced process. Even in areas far from Oron where people felt less 
vulnerable, people could be kidnapped on the open water, such as Peter Udo who 
reported, that as he was “on his way home from a Cameroons plantation” he was told 
by the canoe-man “to change canoes” only to be “transported to Fernando Po” with 
five others.95 The same canoes carried both the misled and the outright kidnapped, for 
example in July 1944 on the same canoe was one “schoolboy from Calabar” who 
boarded it having been promised a job as a trading assistant on the island, “deceived 
by the canoman whom he knew”. Also on it was “a soldier who had been up country 
to visit his relations” making the “trip from Oron to Calabar.” Both woke up the “next 
morning on the Island, and [were] sold and contracted.” Important and key British 
officials managed to turn the way to panya into the failing of “simple minded natives” 
who “have been induced to join the canoes in the expectation of being given a lift 
downstream, only to find themselves landed in Santa Isabel.”96 
District Officers throughout the Eastern Provinces pithily summarized the spate of 
inquiries submitted by “relatives worrying over the whereabouts” of their family 
members who had been “taken away by strangers to work at Calabar”. But not having 
“been traced” their “relatives fear that they have been shipped to Fernando Po.” 
Recruiters were shifting further north and west, and everywhere they had been seen 
“prevailing on youths by specious promises and glowing accounts of conditions 
obtaining in the plantations near Calabar and in the Cameroons, to accompany them” 
only to end up being “taken to Santa Isabel”. 97 But it was not that simple; colonial 
authorities fixated on the narrative that the broker could get away with tricks because 
of the “gullible” and “ignorant peasants from the Ibo and Ibibio areas” who were 
being brought over to Fernando by “unscrupulous native ‘black-birders’ who earned a 
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lucrative livelihood by kidnapping” them”.98 It is as if they were displacing blame 
onto the absence of an internalized corporate-liberal concepts of ‘due diligence’ prior 
to a transaction, a being that is not yet twisted within a political economy—paranoiac, 
pre-emptive, never at ease, shrewd from the outset, gliding across space only through 
sovereign movements. 
The fine-grained archival material—hundreds of depositions, letters home, voices 
from police and press reports—reveal that each recruitment case or scenario had its 
own iteration of creative opacity and varying degrees of misinformation rendering 
‘informed’ consent technically null and void. Experiences varied, for example: Affiat 
and a group of his friends were recruited by “one lady in Henshaw-Square at Calabar 
named Ne Edak” who was “making a great craftiness before she” brought them to a 
plantation belonging to a Spanish lawyer, Estrada, “the worst farm in the Fernando 
Poo”;99 someone, Denis Ama from Owerri, in contrast was completely unfazed by 
recruiters and did not raise issue regarding working conditions. He says he went “to 
Calabar to search for work” and had worked as “a labourer” at a British colonial 
“palm factory”, an Efik owned plantation at Adiabo and then at Fernando Pó, where 
workers’ “duty is general clearance and cocoa seed plantation - we dig holes and lots 
of grass clearing”100; someone, Ekpenyong Etim a trader from Calabar who on the 
island saw “boys came out in quantum” and “was sad when seeing them, because 
[they] come and die”, brought by “those tradders [who] make tradding of boys, [not] 
only the tradding of goods” and “signed the boys with bad amount of 10/- [wage] in 
bad farm they died away hopeless, Nigeria’s boys simple die like fowls”;101 someone, 
Akpan Okono, who accompanied his brother who was going anyway to Fernando Pó 
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because he had heard “there was much money and that it would be easy to save up”; 
someone; Okpay Awa from a village in Bende who “followed his friend Kalu Ukay 
who told him he was going to work in Victoria” but Kalu “brought him to Oron and 
handed him over to the canoe-man Sambo Ekpa”;102 someone, one Bronwson Edem 
Ekong of Eket, who had started to trade but “lost his money and became stranded” on 
the island and contracted himself to a plantation where “tobacco, snuff and free 
medical treatment” was provided, and who subsequently embarked on a short career 
as a recruiter until he was arrested in 1938;103 someone, Anele Nwosu of Owerri and 
Elijah Chiolu of Ohoada, who were “at Nwaniba, Uyo, as part-time labourers to 
U.A.C. [United Africa Company] and at other time as petty traders” when “One 
Abriba man advised us to accompany him to Victoria as traders. The two of us 
conjointly bought 100 yams (£5), two bags crayfish (£1.16/-) and two tins of palm oil 
(18/-). We all embarked on a canoe at Nwaniba. To our surprise the Abriba man (Eni) 
clandestinely brought us to Fernando Poo and contracted us to work for Aselope at 
Bispa”; 104 someone, Wilson Bassey, a “probationary Teacher” who in 1944 “resigned 
due to my aim of joining the army”, but on his way to Calabar the “junior clerk in 
John Holt Office called Utche deceived me not to join the army” by promising him a 
clerical job “in the shop” of a merchant in Fernando Pó. In a moment of indecision 
that he came to regret and remembering his anxiety during his job search, he confides 
to the British Consul whom he petitioned: “as you know an applicants heart is always 
in a circulation and not steady”. Wilson had been in panya, he realized that once 
under contract there was no going back, “a matter of no help as I am under contract, I 
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am serving as a labourer in the plantation of Finca el Pino. It is a great pity to me as I 
am such a great suffering”.105  
 
Figure 6 Aerial view looking south from Calabar; Oron top right, July 2012106 
For recruitment to oscillate this way an entire field was required, not only a technique, 
not only the “exceptional and peculiar gifts of the able recruiter”.107 The head-hunter 
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or human resources specialist in order to get deliver results and get their commissions, 
more often than not, transformed themselves into what were known in Nigeria as 
“confidence men” or wayoman.108  The irregularity and opacity of these recruiters 
should not be taken as “explanations for the inequities and exploitation surrounding 
migration”, rather their techniques and infrastructure and resulting suffering are put 
into play and funded by structural links to the imperial laws that enabled the demand 
and the conditions of exploitation.109 
3.3 Touts and the State, Nigeria 
Before I go on to argue how the contract itself generated the intensity of recruitment, I 
will show one more quite typical case of panya recruitment, in fine detail. Late in 
1938, the DO of Eket went on tour of his division and at Okopedi, the last town on the 
road to Oron from Aba, his translator, out on a late evening stroll, “Mr. J.I. Peter, met 
a party of 19 Ibo men” marching “on foot to Oron”. This party was quiet, they “had 
removed [their] boots for the night march,” but “he overheard [them] grumbling to 
each other that they could not see why they should be made to travel at night”. They 
had “started out from Aba in a lorry” that morning and at Okopedi they stopped to 
meet the paddling crew, to plan a rendezvous in “one of the little creeks near Okopedi 
where canoes will be waiting.” Startled and after some commotion, the party was led 
to the nearby rest house where the DO was staying the night. The DO tried to arrest 
the only non-Igbo among them, while remembering being quietly impressed with 
“George Matthew Offiong, alias Asuquo Bassey” whom he described as a “literate, 
rather smooth-tongued person.” Under interrogation “Offiong insisted that he had 
been sent by ‘Mr.H.G. Brown Manager of the Adiabo Plantation’”, a U.A.C. rubber 
plantation east of the Cross River near Calabar, “to recruit labour, but he had no 
document to prove this.” Offiong had “represented to the men” the same story, and by 
“his own statement” recounts how he had “secured introductions” to “a chief (whose 
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name, the men say, is Abang Chibwu) and by means of those persons recruited 19 
men.” Before they left Aba, “the men demanded that the conditions of service be 
given to them in writing”; insisting that they “would not have gone unless they had 
the conditions in writing.”  
Offiong did produce a document, it was indispensable and incriminating, its strength 
and weakness was that it could be deployed with brazen confidence and meticulously 
inspected. It was a sheet of paper with the header—typo and all—“‘Robber (sic) 
Plantation Adiabo.’” This was a felicitous spelling mistake, both because it is what 
caught the DO’s eye and confirmed his suspicion, and because Offiong, while not a 
‘robber’ was a con-artist, almost fully literate, and able to produce or source forged 
documents. While the DO was “convinced, he was trying to carry [them] away to 
Fernando Po” he “had no charge against Offiong”. There had been no “offence in the 
nature of deprivation of liberty” as there was “nothing in the Criminal Code to 
prevent a person inducing another to accompany him under false verbal promises.” 
The DO called it a night and “advised the men” to “keep an eye on” Offiong, and this 
“they did, and when Offiong tried to go away during the night, they stopped him.” 
The “next morning” Offiong changed his story and tried to persuade the DO that “in 
fact he was recruiting labour, not for the United Africa Company, but for ‘his father’s 
plantation at Akpabuyo near Calabar’”.110 Michael Offiong was sent to Eket prison—
not for beguiling or controlling representations in the minds of others but for “forgery 
and uttering false documents.” It is not clear how long he was in prison—not long for 
sure—the DO was unaware that he had stumbled on one of the main recruiters, 
operating since the mid-1930s with a network of proxies, a delivery crew and a 
handful of large Spanish planters as regular clients.111  Within a few years of the 
incident at Okopedi, Michael Offiong alias Asuquo Bassey was back in Santa Isabel. 
He was the biggest recruiters based out of Calabar, with five canoes at his disposal, 
sixty rowers at his command. With a trail of forgeries and bribed officials in his wake, 
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in a single day in December 1942 he passed on a hundred labourers to the 
police/labour office/planter ‘combine’ at Santa Isabel.112 
For the British, the tout, was almost unanimously seen as a “modern successor of the 
slaver”, capable of “any sort of roguery or deceit to cajole his victims”. Even for the 
Franco-fascist colonial Spaniards “veritable slave-traders had been resurging in the 
twentieth century”.113  The transference of this label left the British authorities in 
quandary, because they could not intervene through legal means. Touts treaded on fine 
lines and legal grey areas, they only became liable to punishment and penalties when 
they crossed a border out of Nigeria. Even when the British revamped their 
investigative surveillance and patrols with a directive to pursue and repress, the 
border state unfolding beyond the customs wharf and check-point outposts was being 
consistently outmanoeuvred. Fernando Pó’s touts concealed many things but not 
themselves, as they were doing nothing illegal yet and so they could tout undisturbed 
at riverside markets and junctions, on one of the many thousands of canoes that 
travelled the many waterways that fed the Cross River.  
While British officials said they were keeping a “strict watch” and “all illegal 
recruiters against whom evidence exists are prosecuted”, they also papered over their 
own inadequacy by claiming that touts were “skilled in the art of evasion and arrests 
are rare.”114 Up until the 1938 the British “had a motor launch which was used to 
pursue” these “smugglers of human souls”, but due to budget cuts this “service was 
stopped” for over half a decade, and so, as David Aworawo says, “the illegal 
traffickers had a field day”.115 During this key spike in the canoe traffic, the “water 
police” forces were themselves only being “equipped with canoes”. In 1939 there 
                                                 
112AT Santa Isabel, 8 December 1942, ‘Relacion de los reclutadores que salen para Calabar’, AGA, C-
81/15865, E-12; Michie, ‘Labour Conditions in Spanish Guinea, Appendix C’. 
113Orde-Browne, The African Labourer, 50, 54; Angel Yglesias de La Riva, Politica indígena en 
Guinea (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1947), 219. 
114 Nigeria, Annual Report on the Department of Labour, Nigeria, for the Year 1943 (Lagos: 
Government Printers, 1945), 11.  
115‘The Fernando Po Slave Traffic’, The Nigerian Eastern Mail, Calabar, 25 February 1939; David 
Aworawo, ‘Foreign Policy and the Travails of Nigerian Migrants in Equatorial Guinea, 1930-1980’, 
Nigerian Journal of International Affairs 25, 2 (1999): 24–35, 26. 
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were at least sixty canoes going to Fernando Pó on a regular basis. These canoes 
“generally sailed in convoys,” “large convoys of canoes up to 20 in number” that 
gathered off-shore in this formation so that they could disperse in all directions if 
pursued by the “water police” who “proved to slow to intercept some large sea-going 
canoes which were said to have shown a clean set of flashing-paddles to the launch as 
they escaped.”116 By the end of World War II the British tossed a small sea launch into 
the Cross River Delta, but should it “call upon the canoes to stop” practically all 
“escaped”. The British considered the consequences of their inaction: “until a regular 
twenty-four hour patrol can be maintained it is likely that the flourishing illegal canoe 
traffic will persist.”117 Even district officers watched on as some of the “great canoes 
of the Niger and Cross River deltas” that could be up to “seventy feet long” and carry 
up to hundred people including “pull-a-boys, or paddlers” “put out to open sea and 
make the coasts of Fernando Po, at its nearest ninety miles away.”118 
Colonial authorities struggled to follow and understand the organization of people 
smuggling, unless they caught someone red-handed on canoes near Fernando Pó they 
met with little success when implementing criminalization as policy. British justice 
found that “illegal recruitment” was “extremely difficult to prove”.119 Leads sent in by 
family members who received letters from relatives in Fernando Pó did not result in 
convictions until the entire instrumentarium and theatres of proof could be mobilized 
in the local courts. In a case of fifty labourers from Ogoni and Eket working in 
Fernando Pó in 1935, not a single person could come back to court and the magistrate 
did “not accept SWORN STATEMENT” as there would have been no opportunity 
“for cross-examination.”120 Nevertheless the six prosecutions for illegal recruitment to 
                                                 
116Supt. of Police, Calabar to Commissioner of Police, Lagos, 30 December 1938, NAE, CALPROF 
5/1/194. 
117 British LO (Evans), Calabar to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 23 September 1943, NAE, 
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118M. D. W. Jeffreys, ‘Review of Water Transport. Origins and Early Evolution’, African Studies 8, 2 
(1949): 104–6, 106. 
119Labour Officer (Lewis), Calabar to The Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 6 December 1943, NAE, 
CALPROF 5/1/193. 
120Commissioner of Police, Calabar to Resident, Calabar, 8 August 1935, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/192. 
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Fernando Pó in the district courts of Calabar, Aba, Owerri, Ikot Ekpene and Opobo 
courts in 1938 rose to over a hundred in 1941, and even more in 1943.121 This sum in 
one year was more than double the total number of convicted cases of “child 
kidnapping” in Nigeria during the decade of the 1930s.122 Kingsley Mbadiwe, from 
the inner circle of Azikiwe political party, the NCNC, says: “In the early forties one of 
the commonest crimes in the Eastern Region was illegal recruiting: the Region was 
infested with people who by specious promises, induced other people to seek 
employment in Fernando Po”. Nevertheless, the various laws that “deal with slave 
dealers” proved to be “ineffective as a deterrent” as there were “always others ready 
to take their place because the traffic was very profitable”; 123  “the canoe men 
undoubtedly are seeing that they can get £20 for each labourers they can contract”.124 
Touts could be arrested or change profession; but they were an open category, 
constantly supplanted by various members of a local commercial elite, by local 
fisherman, by traders from Dahomey, and even by former contract workers 
themselves. They only stopped operating once the planters got their labour in other 
places or through different means. 
Kicks-Dadzie standing over the infamous landing cove in Santa Isabel, observed that 
“the canoe traffic goes on in great number, and if any one sees the number of canoes 
at Fernando Poo Bly-Beach, it will appear as if our Police Department are not doing 
anything to stop it.” It “seemed […] that the arrests and heavy fines are of no avail to 
the canoe people.”125 
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Figure 7 Aerial view of Santa Isabel with arrows to sites126 
 
                                                                                                                                           
1780s during War War II: “Desde la ensenada de Sn. Carlos se va a la Costa con seguridad y en muy 
poco tiempo; mediante lo qual no seria dificil entablar en ella un comercio seguido, y obligar a los 
habitantes á que vinieren á Fernando Pó a vender sus esclavos en las grandes Canoas ó Piraguas de que 
usan.” José Varela, 1780, ‘Descripción de la Isla de Fernando Poo’, AGS, Estado, Legajo 7411, 
Documento 26. 




Figure 8 Oron Town, beyond the edge of the colonial pier127 
Further complicating matters was the fact that the state was leaking heavily. The 
extent and complicity of the Nigerian police is not clear. S. Muyiwa an undercover 
policeman with a heart of steel shone a light on some of his colleagues, who he says 
had “decided that BRIBERY is the best means of living today at a laudable manner”. 
The “inducement made the irresponsible recruiters to corrupt many a faithful servant 
of the Nigerian Government for many [had] been so degenerated that some of them 
serve as instruments to the Recruiters.” 128 The tout’s central nodal point was the 
colonial boom town of Oron, though they did require the appropriately inaccessible 
delta island of Atabong, just upstream from Oron, to serve as “the port of embarkation 
and return of canoes that do the smuggling” with Fernando Pó.129 
                                                 
127Undated; likely early twentieth century, from SOAS, MMS, West Africa, Photographs, Box 1195B. 
128 S. Muyiwa to The Commissioner of Police, Calabar, 24 May 1936, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194.  
129British VC (Lewis) to Supt. of Police, Calabar, 25 November 1944, NAE, CALPROF, 17/1/277. 
Oron’s commercial boom in the early twentieth century sprang forth when direct links to the “cargo 
boats from Liverpool” were, literally, cemented—through the mass requisitioning of forced labour to 
prepare the gravel for ports and drain the creeks after which “the merchants of Oron stated that trade 
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3.4 Language and Violence, Fernando Pó 
The sudden boom of the “canoe traffic and its inhuman circumstances” triggered the 
“most serious phase of the Fernando Poo labour question”—explains J.W. Kicks-
Dadzie, the first journalist to enter the island after it fell to the Francoists. Kicks-
Dadzie even interviewed the new Spanish Jefe de Policia, the police chief, Miguel 
Llompart Aulet, and implored him to “chase the wicked canoe traffickers out of the 
Island”, to which Llompart flatly replied that he could “not possibly put a stop to it”, 
as otherwise “they will not get labourers at all”. If recruiters were con-artists then in 
Nigeria small sections of the colonially aligned voices of intellectuals, missionaries 
and officials were “pro-artists”. Even Kicks-Dadzie praised the “highly scientific 
farming” of Fernando Pó large settler plantations as well as the Spanish colonial penal 
system and its “full” employment policy, as this allowed “no room for idlers, 
vagabonds and thieves”.130  
The resident Methodist reverend, Ewart Shepherd also went out of his way to publicly 
praise the plantations, and their food rations and access to minimal health care. 
Shepherd praised the plantations as he watched as the “wholesale system of 
smuggling across in canoes” became “in vogue”. “Dozens of these canoes land their 
human cargoes in a little haven close to Santa Isabel. They come out of the creeks 
between Calabar and Victoria and the Nigerian Government is powerless to prevent 
them.”131 The chief Methodist in the region Frederick Dodds visited the island and 
was impressed by the façade of a fascist colony that in one stroke imprisoned 
“vagrants” en masse. During “the whole” of his month long trip in the spring of 1939, 
he “did not see a single ill-nourished” or “ill-clad” person. The Igbo and Ibibio 
                                                                                                                                           
grew by leaps and bounds till” it “had risen to about three times that of Calabar”. Percy Talbot, Life in 
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130Kicks-Dadzie to Resident, Calabar, September 1939, ‘Confidential Report: Labour in Fernando 
Poo’, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/195; Special Correspondent [Kicks-Dadzie], ‘Fernando Po Labour 
Conditions’, The Nigerian Daily Times, Lagos, 13 July 1939. 
131 Rev. Ewart Shepherd, ‘Nigerian Labourers in Fernando Po. Dr. Haden Guest Misinformed? 
Allegations of Slavery Cannot be Substantiated’, West Africa, London, 13 May 1939; see also Leslie 




speaking Dodds did however find the courage to “condemn” the means by which 
“much of the labour for the island is now being recruited. There is a constant stream 
of canoes filled with Nigerians, many of whom have been lured into taking the 
passage under promise of being taken elsewhere.”132 
Putting the middlemen in the crossfire, indulging projections of unwholesome and 
always suspect ‘middlemen’ central to a Euro-Christian worldview, displaced and 
mystified the actual lines of solidity making up recruiting assemblages, the range of 
institutionalized imperial templates and legal grey areas that gave recruiting 
techniques their consistency and reach. In Fernando Pó, amongst planters “the feeling 
[was] very strong against these middlemen recruiters”, because their commissions 
were out of regulatory reach. 133  Some key British officials in the 1930s—the 
Governor in Lagos, Bourdillon, and the British Consul, Twigge Molecey for 
example—foregrounded not only a vocabulary designed to demonize mediators but 
also one that accused the victims themselves of backtracking or “changing their 
minds”: On hearing the stories of those “falling into the hands of the slave-dealers”, 
they would say that “the ‘slave dealers’ have little or no difficulty in obtaining persons 
who are willing to go with them to Fernando Po, but the latter after 6 months try to 
abscond as they naturally miss their freedom and are unaccustomed to hard work.”134 
Some kidnapped workers too blamed themselves, as Ekpe Eyo said: “it was I who 
looked for money hence let this happen to me”.135 But asking any of the labourers on 
Fernando Pó, they would have told you that there is a world of difference between a 
peddler and an enforcer. 
                                                 
132Dodds, July 1939, ‘Notes on Visit to West African District, February to June 1939’, SOAS, MMS, 
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Labourers in Fernando Po’, West Africa, London, 24 June 1939. 
133 Comissioner of Police, Calabar to Inspector General of Police, Lagos, 22 May 1936, NAE, 
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135Ekpe Eyo, Santa Isabel to Eyo Ubon, Afaha Atai, Uyo Division, Calabar Province, 2 September 
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Actual coercion and violence resided in the ends not the means, subsisting in the 
structure of imperial contract law. Deception, to set up a ruse, is eminently grounded 
in communication. But as Walter Benjamin says in his essay, the Critique of Violence, 
“verbal arrangements fundamentally exclude violence”. 136  To beguile is to steal 
through language, but on arrival one is at a loss only if one is stopped from leaving 
again. If they could have left relatively unscathed, panya would have simply been 
dismissed as a waste of time. The future braceros were at no point accosted or 
assaulted up until the point and no sooner than when they refused to sign a contract at 
the Curaduría.  
Though the drift of violence could certainly start on the canoe when communication 
stopped. The “recruiters did not always stop at promises of work” as “all too often a 
man who had to make a journey along the coast” would find “that the canoe was 
putting to sea: if he asked where it was going, he would be told that it was bound for 
Fernando Po, and that if he didn’t want to go there he could jump overboard”. On a 
canoe there would be barely sufficient reason for an accusation of false imprisonment, 
a violation of habeas corpus; though definitely of reckless endangerment, as the 
canoes, several a year, “from being overcrowded often upset, with the loss of 
everybody in them.”137 Kicks-Dadzie even met and even photographed “a batch of 
kidnapped labourers who were conveyed by canoe just a few weeks before” who told 
him: “‘Do all you can to stop the canoe traffic for majority of us had perished in the 
Sea’.”  
                                                 
136Evidenced by “the impunity of the lie” that was exempted “from punishment in Roman and ancient 
Germanic law” and for that matter Nigerian colonial law. Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, 245. 




Figure 9 “The Kidnapped labourers referred to in my Report at Livani Farm”138 
After describing the distressing daylong passage on the ocean-going canoe, Ekpe Eyo 
relates how on firm ground in Santa Isabel’s Curaduría he “argued that I will not stay, 
but they said that I would be sent to prison until after two years then we go.”139 
Anyone “lured to the Island [had] little chance of avoiding entering into a contract 
once they are there.”140 The contract on the island was still mostly what Orde-Browne 
called of the “old type” or a “legal trap for the unwary native.” 141 The order of 
contracts was not very elaborate nor did it provide much room for manoeuvre, it was 
simply an obligation to ‘obey’ it as law.  
On Fernando Pó it was not only that varying degrees of corporal punishment were 
permitted and used by both employers and the Spanish police or that there elaborate 
penal sanctions for breaking or refusing a contract—these were in full force until 
independence in 1968—but that ‘transgression’ was a default. Arriving on the island 
without appropriate paperwork or connections, landed one a bracero contract, with a 
                                                 
138Kicks-Dadzie to Resident, Calabar, September 1939, ‘Confidential Report: Labour in Fernando 
Poo’, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/195; This image and his series of unique photographs from his report are 
available in his report.  
139Ekpe Eyo, Santa Isabel to Eyo Ubon, Afaha Atai, Uyo Division, Calabar Province, 2 September 
1938, NAE CALPROF 5/1/194; [original in Ibibio in NAE CALPROF 5/1/195]. 
140Governor’s Deputy, Lagos to Sec. of State for the Colonies (MacDonald), London, 23 August 1939, 
TNA, FO 371/23171. 
141Orde-Browne, The African Labourer, 70. 
118 
 
forced signature on site. If “a labourer declined to accept the contract placed before 
him he can be treated under the existing Spanish laws, as a rogue and a vagabond”, 
meaning jail-time with penal labour until forcibly contracted.142  
The Spanish policy of having “anyone who arrives in this port, as soon as they 
disembark present themselves at the Curaduría”, and of “forcing vagos without 
employers” to be put up “for contract in the Curaduría” had existed since 1910. This 
forced employment had obviously been “directed to the benefit of la agricultura in 
these lands, in light of the scarcity of brazos”.143 These penal sanctions guaranteeing 
forced employment were the structural precondition of the extension of the 
recruitment space of Fernando Pó’s plantations as they waddled around the Gulf of 
Guinea summoning and beckoning in its wake. No other medium or presupposition 
sustained and underpinned these panya recruitment operations and techniques. There 
were no labour mobility without recruiters or contracts, or to put it generally, there 
was no circulation without meditation and inscription. 
3.5 Conclusion  
The word crimp has the same etymology as ‘crook’, whose specialty was not only 
deviating from the regulations they were generated by, but also to deploy 
manipulative capacities to fold someone into line by twisting wills. Crimps were 
called upon or generated whenever military or commercial front lines in unpopular 
destinations needed replenishments in periods of acute labour scarcity. But their 
linguistic techniques were effective only in bursts. In the early modern British 
Empire, spirits’ modus operandi were popularly imagined to consist of “diabolic 
cunning and assiduity”; “hordes” of “monsters” and “demons” “infest the 
metropolis”, “deceiving” through “persuasion with ‘allurements and deluding 
falsities’”. “‘Men-stealers, termed otherwise Spirits or Kidnappers, whose whole 
employ is to collogue and seduce indigent, ignorant Souls [by] making Golden 
                                                 
142British VC (Michie), 28 February 1941, ‘Labour Conditions’, TNA, FO 371/26908; Osuntokun, 
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promises of things never likely to come to pass’”. 144  Their techniques and the 
imaginary used to describe such techniques are very consistent over the centuries. 
Spirits, even if they become known or are dispelled reappear elsewhere in different 
guises, their presence and abilities unfolding with new faces and accents. Labour touts 
were the afterlives of spirits, whose technique were refined before the abolition of the 
slave trade and before the establishment of the Manichean legal apparatus of imperial 
European powers that polarized divisions between ‘free’ and ‘unfree’. Instead of 
establishing time-line of abolitions and transitions or engaging in the matching or 
dispelling of orders of similitude along a temporal axis, a completely different 
pictures emerges within a spatial and global frame. 
Abduction could be experienced as a beam of shock and removal to the unknown, but 
also the displaced result of encounters plagued by an awry two-facedness of snares 
and lures. This range was considered by many British abolitionist officials in an 
imperial world to be a “species of slavery or kidnapping”. 145  Those naming the 
practice sprinkled their terms with important prefixes generating a parallel whose gap 
or degree of similitude was uncertain. This uncertainty, along with the intensely 
localized nature of the practice, is one of the reasons why such recruiting techniques 
generated so many ambiguous and slang terms to designate itself: shanghaiing, 
blackbirding, to be barbadosed, trepanned, phuslaoed or spirited by agents, 
middlemen, contractors, brokers, enticers, sea-pimps, land-sharks, spirits or crimps in 
the British Empire, arkatis in Bengal,146 snakes and chu chay tao or pig brokers in 
southern China,147 the blackbirder of the South Pacific,148 enganchadores in Latin 
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America,149 headmen in colonial British West Africa150, or runners in South Africa;151 
an “erratic” labour market whose most widespread and consistent feature was 
“knavery”, being “cajoled by plausible touts”.152 
Panya shares specific junctions with a global labour history, where the same pattern 
of recruitment is found, lasting also for one to several decades, and containing the 
same constant spatial shift; whether in the 1760s between Rhineland and 
Pennsylvania; between London and Barbados or Virginia in the 1640s, during the 
Napoleonic Wars across the United Kingdom and parts of Europe in the 1790s; across 
the early nineteenth century American seaboard, first east then west; in the 1840s 
around many places, including the Windward coast, the port towns in the Bay of 
Bengal and Xiamen and Macau, late nineteenth century Oceania, between Vanuatu, 
Solomon Islands or New Guinea and Queensland, Fiji and Peru. The medium-term 
persistence of touts has been amply demonstrated for early twentieth century Southern 
Africa, shifting at the “junctions” between Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, and the 
Transvaal. There the creative process of “fraud and misrepresentation” by unlicensed 
“‘rapacious labour touts and criminal gangs’”, who made “promises which they did 
not intend to keep”, were spoken of by local administrators and academics as having 
“degenerated into ‘nothing more or less than a sort of slave trade’”. 153  These 
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“unlicensed freelancers reaped huge profits”, in part because they “used all sorts of 
tricks and ploys to ensnare unwary Africans and to smuggle this precious human 
cargo across the Limpopo.”  
Murray draws an intriguing portrait of an Afrikaans man, a former soldier, Cecil 
Barnard—local alias “Bvekenya” or “the drunk”, “the one who swaggers as he 
walks”—who he says became “Africa’s leading illegal recruiter”. “Barnard and his 
companions practically monopolised the labour recruitment of Shangaans” living in 
southern Zimbabwe. In “1917 alone, Barnard’s best year, he single handedly recruited 
3,250 Africans illegally and ‘safely smuggled them past Portuguese and Transvaal 
police alike’”. While Barnard was an imposing figure, Fernando Pó recruiters 
operating out of Calabar were close on his heels, smuggling up to 10,000 people a 
year into the island—though Calabar’s touts were markedly less violent and less 
white. While gun-toting predatory recruiters do make an alarming appearance on the 
South African frontier—as Barnard and a dozen others “resorted to ambushing and 
hijacking labour from careless rivals”—an official South African WNLA labour 
recruiter in Southern Rhodesia observed that “‘no force is used and these Shangaans 
so far from objecting are very willing to go with Barnard’ […] ‘They go to the Rand 
Mines with absolute regularity. Of course this is illegal but the natives don’t 
object’.”154 
In the African history of colonial labour regimes—for very good reasons, but 
inadequate ones in the last instance—recruiters figure as callous and hazy agents. The 
details of delicate, multi-layered, contradictory and plainly brutal processes are often 
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lost within the condemnatory caricatures with which recruiters are painted with in 
labour history. Summarizing the labour history literature on Southern Africa, 
Frederick Cooper posits a tripartite form of labour mobilization, a kind of ‘the good, 
the bad and the ugly’: a free labour saddled with needs but unencumbered by 
encounters except with employers; a plainly forced, state-led uprooting of indigenous 
people; and the suspect enticing violence of recruiters spread out along extensive 
junctions and thousands of kilometres. In “the gold mines of Southern Rhodesia”, an 
early “period of highly coercive recruitment” orchestrated by uniformed colonial 
officers, gave “way by the early 1920s to a situation where Africans came themselves 
to the mines, while recruiters devoted their dubious attention to getting labour for 
white farmers.” The “dubious” recruiters supplanted official agents by seemingly 
reverting to a kind of slave trade by deploying “methods [that] were sometimes closer 
to kidnapping.”155  
“Officials knew that the fraud and misrepresentation which inevitably accompanied 
competitive recruiting frequently caused disturbances in the countryside, to the 
eventual detriment of the overall supply,” so in their own South African districts they 
tried to “eliminate some of the cruder forms of exploitation and fraud which had 
prevailed in the 1890s.” However, “north of the Union’s borders, no such controls 
operated at all.” And in this sense the planters of Fernando Pó can be compared to the 
Witwatersrand’s ‘Randlords’ and the inter-colonial pattern of labour recruitment they 
both came to heavily rely on for half a century. Between the 1890s and the 1920s and 
even into the 1940s “recruiting for the gold mines from beyond the Limpopo became 
an elaborate, highly organised business. For most of this period it belonged to 
unlicensed touts, and their black ‘runners.’” “Although economically weak compared 
to the mining groups, these independents were able to dictate the terms on which 
labour was recruited for many years.” Even when this ‘phase’ had supposedly been 
displaced though a bilateral and regulated arrangement with the Portuguese in 
                                                 
155Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 44; For coercive state-led recruitment see, Vail and 
White, Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique; David Johnson ‘Settler farmers and coerced 
African Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1936–46’, The Journal of African History 33 (1992): 111–28. 
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Mozambique, the miners in the Rand “routinely consorted with the unlicensed 
independents in their endless search for reliable supplies” of labour.156 
The economy of deception in the recruitment of indentured labour is usually attached 
to “force” by its analysts: blackbirding was “dishonest and violent”, spiriting was 
“fraudulent and coercive”, it meant being “violently taken away or cheatingly 
duckoyed”, “either through deception or direct violence”, “victims were kidnapped, 
tricked by offers of good jobs”; “all forms of persuasion and coercion were 
employed” by recruiters who painted “a rosy picture” and the “poor workers often fell 
prey to these ploys”, finding themselves becoming “victims of empty promises”, all in 
all, a kind of “enticement/kidnapping”.157 The different segments of a recruitment 
trajectory are often collapsed in the category of crimping: the use “persuasion, 
swindling, or coercion”. The same range of conflationary vocabulary is used in 
twenty first century definition of “trafficking in persons”.158 Indeed already in 1925 
the Anti-Slavery and Aboriginal Protection Society decided on a “broad principle” 
when deciding “what practices may be said to-day to amount to modern slavery”, 
namely “any system in which force or fraud are exercised to secure control over the 
labourer for private ends”.159 This double bind of language and violence is connoted 
in panya, but logically they occur apart, in place and in time.  
                                                 
156Jeeves, ‘Over-Reach’, 395, 401, 410. “The old ways died hard. In 1947, a syndicate of blackbirders 
was caught in the Waterberg, impersonating police and waiting in hideouts along the Crocodile River.” 
MacDonald, ‘Colonial Trespassers’, 271, 287. 
157Martin A. Klein, Historical Dictionary of Slavery and Abolition (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2002), 
76; Wareing, ‘“Violently Taken Away or Cheatingly Duckoyed”’, 1; Brown, ‘“A Most Irregular 
Traffic’”, 194; Miers and Roberts, ‘The End of Slavery in Africa’, 21; Ravi Raman, Global Capital and 
Peripheral Labour: The History and Political Economy of Plantation Workers in India (London: 
Routledge, 2010), 100. 
158http://www.dictionary.com/browse/crimp; 45. See esp. conclusion of McKeown, Melancholy Order, 
349–69. 
159Joel Quirk, ‘Defining Slavery in All Its Forms: Historical Inquiry as Contemporary Instruction’, in 
The Legal Understanding of Slavery, ed. J. Allain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 253–78, 
257, citing Temporary Slavery Commission, 28 May 1925, ‘Communication of May 20th, 1925 from 




The pattern of the technique is clear, first the trick then the force, first the farce, then 
the tragedy. The first segment is referred to with endless synonyms for deception, that 
in comparison to “force”, borders on the obscenely light-hearted, almost playful, 
infantilizing and incredulous—to trick. However, the ‘trick’ as vector of instrumental 
language for the commodification of the desire, is an axiomatic, consistent and 
creative capitalist praxis, present also in the grease that wheeled imperial labour 
recruitment. Touts were one of the symptoms of the expansion of the internal limits of 
capitalism and its arenas of operation, every day commercial dealings with opaque 
others, containing hazards and seductions. Out of the imperial establishment of port 
towns and transport junctions, the global depression that caused palm oil prices to 
crash, colonial tax hikes and the localized monetization of social life, came the 
crushing promise of a lift held out by the outside world and the need to draw on it. 
The medium for drawing out desire and representation, its imaginaries and routes, 
were touts.  
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4. Touts vs. Despots: Dash or the Contradiction of 
Bonding Labour with Money 
Dash in Fernando Pó’s pichinglis, as in many of the pidgins spoken across West 
Africa, meant simply the gift as an ancillary component to an exchange. What 
happened to the dash when it was welded onto the indentured labour contracts on 
Fernando Po? It became something like a wage advance. In the literature on colonial 
and post-colonial unfree labour, the dash or the wage advance are seen as the essential 
ingredient to create the conditions of peonage1 and debt bondage.2 Instead of being 
drip-fed, wages in capitalist unfree wage labour are said to come in lumps in order to 
“immobilize” or “deproletarianise”3 workers, in effect to pay them much less than if 
they would have been hired continuously as free labour. The dash-wage-advance was 
not formally, in the eyes of colonial contract makers, an advance on wages but an 
excess that created an ideological imaginary and material effect: a sum of money to be 
paid off in labour, which is to say it created the fiction of a “debt”. The depiction of 
“wages as loans, is simply a device to control labour in conditions where the 
competition for labour is likely to drive up the bargaining power and wages of 
                                                 
1In the non-revisionist Latin American historiography debt peonage appears as the core of non-slave 
labour control. The canvas is discontinuous and takes place in specific pockets until wherever popular 
twentieth century revolutions put a halt to it, from southern Mexico (especially Yucatán, Tabasco and 
Chiapas), the coastal plantations of Peru in the 1860s to the Peruvian Amazon during the rubber boom 
of the 1890s. This work really begins with Silvio Zavala, ‘Origenes Coloniales Del Peonaje En 
Mexico’, El Trimestre Económico 10, 40 (4) (1944): 711–48. For Peru, see, Peter Blanchard, 
‘Recruitment of Workers in the Peruvian Sierra at the Turn of the Century-Enganche System’, Inter-
American Economic Affairs 33, 3 (1979): 63–83; Scott, ‘Peasants, Proletarianization and the 
Articulation of Modes of Production: The Case of Sugar Cane Cutters in Northern Peru, 1940–69’. On 
the use of debt to trap free labourers in Belize and Guatemala see Bolland, ‘Systems of Domination 
after Slavery’. 
2“Advances lead to bondage when they capture a labourer into a debt trap, are accompanied by harsh 
labour conditions and exploitative wages, are buttressed by violence and coercion, and curtail a 
worker’s bargaining power and ability to access alternative employment. Even if voluntarily entered, 
debt can lead to forms of bondage that remove workers’ control over their own labour and tie them into 
bonds they can no longer escape.” Carswell and De Neve, ‘From Field to Factory’, 433. See Brass, 
Towards a Comparative Political Economy of Unfree Labour, 14, 244–56. 
3Yann Moulier Boutang, De l’esclavage au salariat: économie historique du salariat bridé (Paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1998); Brass and Bernstein, ‘Introduction: Proletarianisation and 
Deproletarianisation on the Colonial Plantation’, 17. Indeed, debt was a reason for limiting mobility 
even for the non-braceros on Fernando Pó who could not leave the island if they were indebted to the 
treasury for taxes and unpaid fines. 
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workers. It is a legal or pseudo-legal fiction used by employers to manoeuvre workers 
into a system of forced labour (which is still wage-labour) or contain their mobility”.4 
The literature on debt bondage has widely and consistently argued and theorized that 
excess wage advances or large sign-on bonuses that do not get deducted from the 
official wage, are a way for capitalist employers to mask and justify the further 
exploitation of labour through the language of conditional gifts and credit-and-debt. 
The academic literature does not obfuscate this relationship, they, like the workers 
consider a wage to be what you get paid for work, irrespective of how it is 
ideologically differentiated by employers. The dash was not a ‘gift’ or a ‘bonus’ of 
incentive and paternalist reward, able to be thought of as its own category. This is 
almost the only idea that the leading conceptual scholars of unfree labour, Jairus 
Banaji and Tom Brass agree on. Any other subdivision or differentiation using the 
emic categories of employers are rooted in an ideology that serves to obfuscate the 
labour-capitalist relationship particularly when it takes an ‘unfree’ form. 
Scholars have looked through this obfuscation in order to ascertain what benefits 
accrue to the employers who frame their wage-payments in ideological terms of 
debts; first, of all it enables employers to make the moral arguments of outstanding 
debt in order to extend contracts in a situation of labour scarcity; second, if money is 
bulked or injected at the outset it becomes effectively a ‘credit-wage’ or a type of 
debt-slavery: that is, workers are obliged to pay back that money through labour. 
When employers gave a dash they did not think of it as an unconditional gift nor did 
they want workers to pay them back their ‘gift’ in cash, because this would annul the 
ongoing labour relationship or bond, and eliminate the possibility of extending the 
time workers are subjected to paying this back through labour: this is the elementary 
operation of debt bondage. 
In Fernando Pó the dash engendered but also contradicted this arrangement of debt 
peonage. The dash was demanded outright by reengaging workers and relayed by a 
set of unruly resident touts and they turned it from the pervasive lynchpin of most 
historical constellations of indentured labour and debt peonage into the key that 
                                                 
4Banaji, ‘The Fictions of Free Labour’, 87.  
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incited a dispersed counter-movement of escalations and desertions that threatened 
the colonial order of planter power with collapse in the 1950s. The place of the dash 
outside the contract, the timing of its payments and its outright negotiation, carried 
with its own distinctive gifty code that generated both new forms of exploitation and 
resistance. It was the conditions of this very bondage, the attempts at “attachment” by 
competitive employers vying for scarce labour—an overriding principle in the history 
of modern imperial capitalism—that allowed a distinctive and radical form of 
workers’ resistance to unfold. 
Contracted braceros had their official wages withheld until the very last day of a 
contract to ward off desertions and make the accounting of deductions easier. But for 
those signing onto a second contract there was also a supplementary unregistered 
payment at the outset—immediately preceding a further uninterrupted and irrevocable 
two-year bind. This bind could be doubled and extended, “because the system of 
wage advances over and above the salary means that the workers are frequently 
indebted”. This gave the planters in the “always present conditions of labour scarcity 
and reticence a way to oblige braceros to work off their debts” by signing on to a 
“further contract”. 5 However, the “casually authoritative way” this Spanish colonial 
economist refers to the device of debt in Fernando Pó’s hiring arrangements should 
cause a pause, not only because it skims over the many moments of actual violence 
within the “deceptively transparent” relation of peonage, but because it papers over 
the history of resistance generated by those who demanded the advance. 6  
Why did tens of thousands of labour migrants indenture themselves to the planters in 
Fernando Pó in the decades after the Spanish Civil War? H. Rylands, a British 
colonial officer stationed in Owerri, where the mostly Igbo braceros were from, says 
he had “heard all about the ‘evil’ conditions of Nigerian labourers in Fernando Poo 
from those who [had] previously been” there. In 1947 he was dispatched to the island 
as Vice Consul and concluded that the “illiterate candidate for the Fernando Poo 
                                                 
5Velarde Fuentes, ‘Problemas de Empleo’, 174. 
6Taussig, Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man, 62. 
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labour market knows more or less what to expect”. 7 The “candidates” could expect 
openly practised police torture and overseers committing manslaughter with impunity: 
so why did the majority stay on for a second and sometimes a third contract, but 
almost never a fourth? And why were the informal modes of payment of these 
subsequent contracts a remarkable instance of a vast counter-movement that brought 
the order of planter power to its knees? The answer to all three is dash. 
The “peculiarity of the process of contracting labour” writes a Spanish planter in the 
1940s, “is the age-old custom of giving advances to the braceros the moment a 
contract is effected”.8 The Spanish called this advance regalo or prima—a present or 
bonus at the outset—while the Nigerian labour migrants on Fernando Pó, most of 
whom learned to speak Pidgin on the island, called it dash. In a first instance, the dash 
of dash-peonage was simply the advance made possible by long-term bondage 
contracts. In principle and as a matter of policy indentured labour contracts tended to 
enshrine “bondage in exchange for advance payment”.9 The braceros who demanded 
and invariably received this “very substantial inducement to recontract” found 
themselves between contracts already on the island.10 The dash was not reducible to 
something else—to an extension of credit used to uproot or to cover initial transport 
costs. The dash, an axiom of West African commercial life, had its own autonomous 
trajectory and political meaning. The dash was not contained by a debt deployed to 
involuntarily retain and direct migrant labour. The dash was not “anchored”, as Jane 
Guyer would say, to commercial exchange even though it was generated by and 
constituted from the same materials. As the dash became inextricably part of the 
peonage contracts on Fernando Pó it produced its own sociality and space of 
renegotiation that riddled the plantations with a contradiction that came to destroy 
their viability. Recruitment techniques involving debt generated a two-way 
movement, a mobile form of submission and subversion, a friction that both enabled 
                                                 
7British VC and LO (Rylands) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 8 January 1947, NAE, CALPROF 
17/1/278. 
8Cámara (de Sola Galvez) to Curaduría (Llompart Aulet), 17 October 1949, AGA, C-81/08130, E-3. 
9Stanziani, ‘Beyond Colonialism’, 71 
10British VC (Lewis), to British Embassy, Barcelona, 5 July 1946, ‘Labour Conditions in Fernando 
Poo’, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278. 
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and undermined imperial plantation economics. Without credit-wages, the ancillary 
dispensing of lump sums, the plantations on Fernando Pó would have fallen apart; 
none of the Nigerian braceros would have stayed on the island. At the same time, 
plantations repeatedly almost fell apart because of these same braceros continuing to 
sign contracts under informally renegotiated advances. 
Rather than being a predictable fold in the interplay of domination and subordination, 
the dash was a slippery and unwavering trigger, heralding an ‘unstable’ promise of 
“plenitude” and producing a plethora of tactics for “unsanctioned” wealth. 11 As I will 
go on to detail, with every contract came a higher dash, whether braceros acquired it 
after deserting or not. This double excess—the inherently inflationary, the incitement 
to escalation—is the principal social dynamic in Marcel Mauss’s The Gift. This 
fundamental instability and potential for reversibility is an underestimated 
counterforce in studies of debt bondage. The notion that wage advances are a sort of 
poison of entrapment lingers within scholarly and popular conceptual frames—Das 
Gift, after all, means poison in German. 12  This is, as I will be trying to argue, 
misleading, because the dash wielded by the bonded braceros was a show of their 
creative and collective power. 
Historians and anthropologists continuously underline the ubiquity of debt in the 
creation of bonded labour. The entire premise and effectivity of the wage-veiled-as-
credit, for example the “girmit (agreement) money” in the tea plantations of colonial 
Assam, was that it was so high that it become an unpayable debt, leaving workers 
unable to walk away. 13  The economic argument made in the literature is that, 
paradoxically, the initial ability to choose employers in the context of a labour 
scarcity allowed mobile workers to demand high advances which subsequently led 
                                                 
11 Guyer, Marginal Gains, 16; Berry, ‘Stable Prices, Unstable Values’, 308; Roitman, Fiscal 
Disobedience, 83–4. For advances in a framework of credit and consumption see Deborah James and 
Dinah Rajak, ‘Credit Apartheid, Migrants, Mines and Money’, African Studies 73, 3 (2014): 455–76, 
462; Isabelle Guérin, ‘Bonded Labour, Agrarian Changes and Capitalism: Emerging Patterns in South 
India’, Journal of Agrarian Change 13, 3 (2013): 405–23. 
12Mauss, The Gift, 81; Derrida, Given Time, 12. 
13Behal, ‘Power Structure, Discipline and Labour in Assam’, 164; De Neve, ‘Asking for and Giving 
Baki’, 387; Prakash, Bonded Histories, 169, 142. 
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them to become “attached” unfree labourers. Also somewhat paradoxically, is that 
advances benefitted employers in so much as they wound up paying bonded labourers 
much less in total wages than if they had hired them at ‘free’ or “normal market 
clearing rates”.14  Wage advances have also been thought to index a modicum of 
worker “bargaining power” as well as various degrees of patronage and 
dependency—arguments made especially in the so-called “revisionist” Latin 
American literature on debt peonage.15 The braceros on Fernando Pó, as elsewhere, 
were the “initiators of habilitación”—the cash advance—they “activated” it and so 
they were clearly “far from the passive victims of domineering patrones [employers] 
in need of cheap labour”. 16 Rebecca Scott writes that the Cuban planters in late 
nineteenth century Santa Clara, complained that they “could not find workers” unless 
they “extended advances” to emancipated slaves or Chinese coolies who had finished 
their indenture. She takes this to mean that “workers sometimes turned credit to their 
own advantage”, because it “meant an effective increase in wages”—while being 
“risky business, since it could lead to [a] lasting debt” of peonage.17 However, these 
“activations” were more explosive than they are usually given credit for.  
As Prabhu Mohapatra notes in relation to early nineteenth century colonial Bengal, 
the “customary practice of receiving advances before commencing work” was not so 
                                                 
14 Brass and Bernstein, ‘Introduction: Proletarianisation and Deproletarianisation on the Colonial 
Plantation’, 17; Banaji, ‘The Fictions of Free Labour: Contract, Coercion, and So-Called Unfree 
Labour’, 87; Mohapatra, ‘From Contract to Status?’, 120. 
15Arnold J. Bauer, ‘Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems of Peonage and Oppression’, The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 59, 1 (1979): 478–86; McCreery, ‘Debt Servitude in Rural 
Guatemala’, 744; For Mexico see the overview by Alan Knight, ‘Mexican Peonage: What Was It and 
Why Was It?’, Journal of Latin American Studies 18, 1 (1986): 41–74; The revisionism begins quite 
early with Charles Gibson, The Aztecs under Spanish Rule: A History of the Indians of the Valley of 
Mexico, 1519–1810 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 248–56. He argued that debt peonage 
was not that common and that it wasn’t even a form of servitude. “The amount of the debt may be 
considered in some degree as a measure of the bargaining power of the worker.” For the counter-
revisionist see Brass, Towards a Comparative Political Economy of Unfree Labour, 202; Dore, Myths 
of Modernity, 28; For a contemporary and theorized discussion of advances Stephen Gudeman and 
Alberto Rivera, Conversations in Colombia: The Domestic Economy in Life and Text (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 90–7. 
16Harry Walker, ‘Demonic Trade: Debt, Materiality, and Agency in Amazonia’, Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 18, 1 (2012): 140–59, 152. 
17Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba, 235; see also Balboa Navarro, Los brazos necesarios. 
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much an imperial “imposition” scheming “to tie down labourers”, but rather an 
“absolutely necessary compromise in face of workers demands”. The imperial wage 
advance in South Asia sprung from the indenture-like contracts made with sailors. As 
they were continuously enlarging their demands for them, the besieged British 
officials on site took it to be a principal “cause of their mutinous behaviour”.18 
Coolies from the Bay of Bengal, along with engagé labourers from Mozambique and 
Madagascar, had started making very similar demands on the plantations in Reunion 
and Mauritius—but only during the second round of contracts from the 1840s on. 
Their “weapon: competition among employers”—which resulted in an uncoordinated 
rise of ever higher advances and rates of desertion.  
As in Fernando Pó of the 1940s, there was no overarching entity “between estate 
owners” and workers would move “from one estate to another,” becoming “fugitives” 
and “deserters”.19  Returnees to Madras and Bombay relayed “high wage rates or 
advances” and increasingly became sirdars or informal recruiters. Immigration levels 
to Mauritius peaked in the 1850s and because of the escalation of this recruitment 
system planters adopted a “further shift in labour strategy”, by “replacing the 
emphasis on immigration with the utilisation of existing labour through job 
contracting and the rise of small cane farming.” In the 1860s “planters launched the 
first of several attempts to check the growing independence of time-expired Indians” 
or who “lived by cultivating rented or freehold plots, or hawking produce, by reviving 
sweeping vagrancy legislation.”20  Planters took every chance they were given to 
denounce the “Indian propensity toward idleness, thievery, petty commerce, and 
                                                 
18Mohapatra, ‘From Contract to Status?’, 121; Nitin Sinha, ‘Contract, Work, and Resistance: Boatmen 
in Early Colonial Eastern India, 1760s–1850s’, International Review of Social History 59, S22 (2014): 
11–43, 43; Balachandran, ‘Making Coolies, (Un)making Workers’; Though some lascars could be more 
radical than the dashers: In “1800, British merchants accused lascars of wholesale arson: taking wage 
advances and then torching their ships so that they could abscond.” Fischer, ‘Working Across the Seas’, 
34. The “Commander in Chief at Madras, seriously suggested that all British soldiers on foreign 
service be tattooed to prevent them taking the bounty [and] deserting.” Singha, ‘Settle, Mobilize, 
Verify’, 20. Only over the course of the nineteenth century were advances and capitalist bondage recast 
in the moral languages of hybrid debt-ideologies of obligation, Prakash, Bonded Histories, 223–5. 
19Stanziani, ‘Beyond Colonialism’, 74; also Carter, ‘The Transition from Slave to Indentured Labour in 
Mauritius’, 271; Allen, Slaves, Freedmen and Indentured Laborers, 59. 
20Carter, ‘Strategies of Labour Mobilisation in Colonial India’, 238, 230; North-Coombes, ‘From 
Slavery to Indenture’ 109–13. 
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financial irresponsibility”, the last of which was projected in relation to their demands 
for advances. These “traits” were thought to lay behind the principal “reasons for 
[their] desertion and absenteeism”.21 
In Assam, British planters started complaining in the 1870s “that time-expired 
coolies” had “become ‘complete masters of the situation’ due to competition for their 
labour-power, and went in search of the highest remuneration.” A “bonus system had 
developed” where they were being paid up to 6 months dashes “to reengage”.22 On 
these “‘bargaining’ capabilities” enabled through “garden sardars” operating “outside 
the legal-institutional framework”, Nitin Varma cites a contemporary official in Sylhet 
who noticed “‘the increase in desertion of [the] tea garden coolie [who] have learnt to 
sell their labour power in the most profitable market, and are not mere adscripti 
glebae of the garden for which they were imported’.”23 But it was especially those 
“labourers sent up by professional recruiters” the arkatis, who “had no particular bond 
to a specific garden and would, if they could, abscond from their contracts if offered 
better conditions in another garden.”24 In Ceylon in the early twentieth century the 
planters complained not only about having “‘suffered shortness of labour, but they 
have also suffered to a very considerable extent by the large advances now demanded 
by kanganies and coolies.’” The escalations and desertion arranged by touts of these 
“unrecorded advances” were paradoxically known in the Indian Ocean in this period 
by the term “crimping”—because the dash was an inversion of the recruiter-crimp.25 
While the dash was not an oppositional movement, it could overturn and invert the 
default flow of power relations and existing orders. Like plantation slavery but for 
                                                 
21Allen, Slaves, Freedmen and Indentured Laborers, 59. 
22Behal and Mohapatra, ‘Tea and Money’, 147; Singha, ‘Settle, Mobilize, Verify’, 163. 
23Varma, ‘Coolie Acts and the Acting Coolies’, 53, 50. 
24Sen, ‘Commercial Recruiting and Informal Intermediation’, 9. “The sardar was cheaper and his 
workers more likely to be ‘suitable’ since they were from a similar background. Sardari coolies were 
less prone to absconding, because of kin and community affiliation among new immigrants, the 
preponderance of married couples and a smaller number of solitary men and women, agreed inspecting 
officers in Assam.” 
25S. B. D. de Silva, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (London: Routledge, 2012), 206, 329. 
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different reasons, the system of indenture exploitation could only work through 
continuous renewal, with ever more batches of new recruits. 
When the dash appears in African labour historiography it is sometimes considered as 
a credit-wage, even though it was often not technically an advance but an excess that 
surpassed the official wages of a contract. The efficacy and presence of the advance is 
always accounted for in the labour historiography. Outside of non-dialectical 
violence, the advance was the core component of the button that was carried all the 
way through in the thoroughly researched aspects of colonial wage-labour migration: 
recruitment26, stabilization27, and desertion.28  As can be shown in relation to the 
Southern Africa literature, the wage-advance is the switch that accounts for much of 
the early trajectories of labour mobilization in imperial labour markets, setting them 
off, holding them together and undermining their very constitution.  
In most of South Africa around the 1910s advances had climbed to 30£ or almost a 
full years wages on contracts that were rarely signed on for more than six or nine 
months at a time—a dash outside but generated by the contract. 29  In the early 
twentieth century gold mines of the Witwatersrand “wage advances bound the 
                                                 
26Beinart, ‘Joyini Inkomo: Cattle Advances and the Origins of Migrancy from Pondoland’; Jeeves, 
‘Migrant Labour in the Industrial Transformation of South Africa’, 116; Worger, South Africa’s City of 
Diamonds, 288–90; Coquery-Vidrovitch, ‘The Colonial Economy of the Former French, Belgian and 
Portuguese Zones, 1914–35’; Schuler, ‘Kru Emigration to British and French Guiana, 1841–1857’. 
27Arrighi, ‘Labour Supplies’, 223–4; Richardson, ‘The Recruiting of Chinese Indentured Labour for the 
South African Gold-Mines’, 102; Berman, Control and Crisis, ch.6; Berman and Londsdale, ‘Crises of 
Accumulation, Coercion and the Colonial State’, 76; Freund, ‘Labor and Labor History in Africa’, 20–
1; Ferguson, ‘Mobile Workers, Modernist Narratives’; Cooper, On the African Waterfront; Cooper, 
Decolonization and African Society, 63, 155–6; Cooper, ‘Industrial Man Goes to Africa’. 
28Van Onselen, Chibaro; 230–3; Harries; Work, Culture and Identity, 40–5; Atkins, The Moon Is Dead! 
Give Us Our Money!; Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters; Brown, ‘The Dialectics of Colonial Labour 
Control’; 50–5; Breckenridge, ‘Confounding the Documentary State’. 
29Kubicek, ‘Mining: Patterns of Dependence and Development’, 78. In Southern Africa advances were 
bulky partly because until the 1910s they often came in the form of indivisible and valuable cattle. 
Beinart, ‘Joyini Inkomo: Cattle Advances and the Origins of Migrancy from Pondoland’; Crush, 
‘Swazi Migrant Workers and the Witwatersrand Gold Mines’, 33. Though where contracts were not 
very long or labour scarcity not too intense, such as in the cities, mining areas with a longer history, or 
well-worn labour migration routes, the advance was actually that: advances amounting to the first few 
months of wages at most that would be deducted on payday. Martin, ‘Krumen “Down the Coast”’, 410; 
Mark-Thiesen, ‘The “Bargain” of Collaboration’, 29–30. 
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voluntary workers” because they “had to accept employment on one of the mines”.30 
Though it is clear that advances were so welcomed that many were accepting 
employment at two or more mines. In Southern Africa recruiters from the mines 
‘“induced”’ potential wage workers to “enter into contracts [with] such large advances 
that the borrower ‘remained in debt’”. At the same time, mobile workers were 
“accepting advances from several agents” with evidently “no intention of honouring 
their debts to any of them”.31 Advances had become “so large that the incentive to 
desert before contract completion was considerable”.32  
Wage-advances, desertions and forgery were the integral folds of Van Onselen’s 
“stop-go labour route”—a spiral which fully emerges in early twentieth century 
Southern Rhodesia, looping ever further south across the emergent lunar scape forged 
by mining capital, a quest for just remuneration that led many Zimbabweans to the 
Witwatersrand, the “best labour market of all within the regional economic system.” 
Ever more bulky advances for new or deserting recruits and “inducements” to 
“recontract” incited much of this movement, a dialectics of presence and absence, of 
stabilization and abandonment. 33  Van Onselen sketches the intricate itineraries of 
flights—mapped onto the incremental but negotiated wage-levels—as a political 
victory: “a relative coup which improved their lot.” Attempts to track deserters down 
were often hopeless and haphazard.  
In spite of decades of imperial experiments in papered contraptions—obligatory 
contracts, registration regimes, pass-laws and the like—most deserters, oscillating at 
around ten percent of the workforce, came out triumphant. The “most radical way” to 
outmanoeuvre the pass system as Van Onselen says was “simply to destroy them—a 
procedure widely resorted to by immigrant workers between 1904 and 1915.” 
Destroying “what they knew to be a millstone around their neck” workers found their 
                                                 
30Jeeves, ‘Migrant Labour in the Industrial Transformation of South Africa, 1920–1960’, 116. 
31James and Rajak, ‘Credit Apartheid, Migrants, Mines and Money’, 462; citing Schapera, Migrant 
Labour and Tribal Life, 109. 
32Stichter, Migrant Laborers, 114. 
33Van Onselen, Chibaro, 229; Worger, South Africa’s City of Diamonds, 288–9. 
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way, indubitably though the help a knowledge economy saturated by touts, to some 
new “pass office on the northern borders” where “new certificates” could be bought.34 
This documentation regime was seen by the miner’s lobbies as exactly that which 
gave “facilities” to “natives for desertion an re-engagement”—that is through 
“deserters leaving labour districts and re-entering them with fresh travelling passes, 
obtained from outside.”35  There “must have been some comfort in ‘working the 
system’ in such a way that it left the exploiters exploited!”. 36  
This is the double excess created by the dash—prolonged indebtedness and incited 
desertion—both the bind and the flight. In African labour history, the discrete 
connections and the wildly reconfigured moments of the actual handover—the 
passages of money before and after the bind—have not received the sustained 
attention and appreciation they deserve.37 On Fernando Pó, the dash, the cash that 
employers intended to advance as a debt-trap, left colonial capital in retreat, trying to 
fend off the escalations on the front line populated by reenganchos—‘re-hooked’ 
labourers signing onto a further contract. The reenganchos were accompanied by 
relatively small but disproportionately effective groups of ganchos and fugados—
‘hook-people’ and ‘fugitives’ or recruiter-touts and deserters. For the rest of the article 
                                                 
34Van Onselen, Chibaro, 230, 232. The 1910s saw the “state’s drive for rigorous implementation of the 
Pass Laws” being churned out on a “significant scale”. Breckenridge, ‘Flesh Made Words’, 88; 
MacDonald, ‘Forging the Frontiers’, 56. The “worker has almost complete control of the situation 
owing to the constant demand for his services. He is almost always able to find another employer 
anxious to engage him, so he can at any time leave his job and find another where conditions or type of 
work are more attractive.” Orde-Browne, Labour Conditions in Northern Rhodesia, 21–3, cited in 
Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 60. Even in late 1950s, desertion rates of almost 20% 
were reported by Rhodesian Native Labor Supply Commission for contract workers from Nyasaland. 
Clarke, Contract Workers and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia, 55–6. 
35Witwatersrand Native Labour Association and Transvaal Chamber of Mines, ‘Annual Report’, April 
1907, 576. 
36Van Onselen, Chibaro, 230, 232. 
37For a similar situation in anthropology see Maxim Bolt, ‘The Sociality of the Wage: Money Rhythms, 
Wealth Circulation and the Problem with Cash on the Zimbabwean-South African Border’, Journal of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute 20, 1 (2014): 113–130. In contrast, in precolonial West African 
history, debt bondage—and even “self-pawning” or people “selling themselves to get money 
(cowrie)”—has received substantial attention. Law, ‘Finance and Credit in Pre-Colonial Dahomey’, 25; 
Law, ‘On Pawning and Enslavement for Debt in the Pre-Colonial Slave Coast’, 55. 
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I follow the intersecting movements of these three figures along the archival sources 
they made an appearance in. 
4.1 Assembling an Economic Coup in 1952 
Until the early 1950s the “system in force” for “re-engaging workers on second 
contracts was quite irregular” to say the least. Spencer-Cooke, the British Vice Consul 
on the island, goes on to explain that it was “sufficient for an employer”, without the 
bracero, to appear “in the Spanish Labour Office and state that the particular 
[bracero] wished to enter into another with the same employer”. The Curador, 
Sebastian Llompart Aulet—a post he held between 1943 and 1962—would happily 
stamp these unsigned reengancho contracts that were being justified on the grounds of 
the outstanding debts generated through the “undesirable” and “illegal system of 
inducements”; as “all employers keep the personal copies of workers contracts this 
practice was all too easy”. 38 Llompart Aulet would eventually authorize the release of 
people after they had completed a few contracts; in this sense peonaje on Fernando Pó 
was akin to Igbo precolonial “debt-slavery”, in that it promised an in-built but 
sometimes ill-defined expiry date.39  
                                                 
38British VC (Spencer-Cooke) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 8 January 1950, ‘Annual Report’, 
TNA, CO 554/169/2; British VC (Lewis) to Cámara (Carbonell), 6 May 1946, AGA, C-81/08130, E-1. 
In 1950, the highest number of complaints related precisely to the issue of “cheques being delayed in 
the Spanish Labour Office”, which would often leave a bracero bound “to recontract with same 
employer.” British VC and LO (Spencer-Cooke) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 30 September 
1950, ‘Labour Report for the period 1st of July to 30th September 1950’, TNA, FO 371/89597. 
39Uchendu, ‘Slaves and Slavery in Iboland, Nigeria’, 128; Ekechi, ‘Pawnship in Igbo Society’, 169, 
citing Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, 698. makes the observation that “the status of a pawn 
[in] some Igbo communities” seems to be “analogous to that of an indentured servant or laborer” 
because “a limit of several years was imposed” after which a pawn was “to be released ‘whatever the 
amount of the debt’”. Precolonial forms of peonage have, particularly in West African history been 
artificially divorced from the worlds of imperial labour. Clarence-Smith, ‘Cocoa Plantations and 
Coerced Labor in the Gulf of Guinea, 1870–1914’; Miers and Roberts, The End of Slavery in Africa; 
Falola and Lovejoy, Pawnship in Africa; Miers and Klein, eds., Slavery and Colonial Rule in Africa; 
Afigbo, The Abolition of the Slave Trade in Southeastern Nigeria; see Campbell and Stanziani, Bonded 




Figure 10 The Curador, Sebastian Llompart Aulet, 195540 
Without a nullified contract “the labourer is unable to leave the island by orthodox 
means and the military control of the island is such that it is virtually impossible for 
him to leave by canoe”. 41  Indeed, a prominent trader from Lagos, Lola Martins, 
visiting Fernando Pó wondered why no one “absconded. Not under the Spanish 
Government. There is no way of escape in Fernando Po except to run into the sharks 
surrounding the island.”42 While there are indeed scattered traces of very risky exploit 
of a group of Nigerian braceros stealing “a canoe” who then tried to “row themselves 
back”, desertion took the shape not of a permanent subtraction, an outwards escape or 
a flight onto the mountain tops, but as a cleft, spiralling inwards.43 
                                                 
40‘Hablando con el Delegado de Trabajo de la Guinea’, Industria En Guinea, September 1955. 
41British LO (Nery), 17 June 1943, ‘Nigerian Labour in Fernando Poo’, TNA, CO 554/127/15. 
42Lola Martins, ‘African Tradition Abused in Fernando Poo’, Express, Lagos, 22 February 1962. 
43Policía, ‘Registro de Incidencias 1953’, entry of 10 November 1953, page 464, BNM. Already in the 
1890s the Consul reported that “British West African subjects had escaped by canoe from Fernando Po 
after being duped that they were going to work in Nigeria.” Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 132. 
This was relatively rare unlike for example in São Tomé, Clarence-Smith, ‘The Hidden Costs of 
Labour on the Cocoa Plantations of São Tomé and Príncipe’, 164–5. It does however resemble slave 
marronage in eighteenth century Mauritius, where, as Megan Vaughan says, “many maroons were 
urban runaways”, working as hired subjects under negotiated terms of payment and with a variety of 
forged permits and identity papers in hand. In some “sense, a much more threatening prospect”, she 
says. Vaughan, Creating the Creole Island, 172, 173. 
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The “regalo”, the dash, “through times past has served as an index of the variable 
scarcity—but always scarcity—of labour power on this island”. 44 In the three decades 
of colonial Francoist rule thousands of new settlers and a heavy dose of large 
corporate plantations rushed onto the island. The axiomatic “labour scarcity” was 
obviously intensified: in 1948 barely half of the island’s self-declared “labour needs 
were being met”.45 A resident amateur social scientist on the island notes around the 
year that the dash as well as the “labour scarcity” was reaching “a distressing and 
agonizing limit of which everyone is sadly very well aware”: “demand has been so 
intense that the primas” the dash “given to the braceros the moment they sign the 
contract are swelling day by day. On the shoulders of this desperate necessity, the 
braceros have organized a picaresca laboral”, a picaresque labour movement, that 
“has been very much to the benefit of the unscrupulous bracero and pretty damn 
onerous for our agriculture.”46 Indeed the British Vice Consul to his own surprise was 
forced to speak of “the labour force [that] is, in many instances, exploiting the 
employers.”47 Wages for a two-year contract were held down at a constant 700 to 
1000 pesetas low, while the dash briefly reached 7000 pesetas (or £60), at which point 
the reenganchos were pocketing the entire surplus value being produced on the 
plantations—in particular cases twice as much. The “uncontainable rise” of the dash 
made “las fugas” flight, “become habitual. The braceros had been changing their 
names, and hired themselves to multiple employers, creating a malign indiscipline and 
an invitation to continuous fraud.”48 
From the distant existing literature the movement of people from south-eastern 
Nigeria onto Fernando Po’s plantations has been painted as a short wide pipe, with 
                                                 
44Cámara (de Sola Galvez) to Curaduría (Llompart Aulet), 17 October 1949, AGA, C-81/08130, E-3. 
45DGMC, 15 January 1948, ‘Informe sobre braceros’, AGA, C-81/12373, E-392.  
46Rafael Romero Moliner, ‘Crónica de los territorios de Guinea’, Cuadernos de Estudios Africanos 17 
(1952): 90–2, 91. 
47British VC (Lewis), to British Embassy, Barcelona, 5 July 1946, ‘Labour Conditions in Fernando 
Poo: Report on’, TNA, FO 371/60392; or NAE, 17/1/278. 
48GG (Ruíz), 12 May 1952, ‘Ordenanza prohibiendo las primas o regalos en la contratacion’, Boletin 
Oficial; see also British VC and LO (Rylands) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 8 January 
1947, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278. 
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two phases. On one end, during the first phase, for about a decade after the beginning 
of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, is the canoe smuggling phase. The second phase 
(1943–1973) was an “indentured labour treaty” that supposedly represented the 
“efforts of the Nigerian Government [to] control and regulate on a sound 
humanitarian basis a traffic which existed on a slave basis”. 49  Under the ‘treaty’ 
prospective braceros signed their contracts in Calabar and received a small dash 
officially capped at five shillings, ostensibly so that labourers would not become 
“heavily indebted”. 50  These “treaty-labourers” were attached to planters 
proportionately and after a two year contract or a maximum of 42 months they were 
repatriated and paid out on their return. The treaty had given the island a generous 
quota that had been “calculated to meet the demand”, up to 10,000 labourers per year, 
however during the first decade of operation it never managed to sign up more that 
“about one third of this figure”, and sometimes as little as a thousand per year.51 Until 
1959 the services of direct or ‘free’ recruiters proved indispensable. They proved to be 
more effective when it came to numbers than any diplomatically negotiated labour 
treaties. Indeed, to subsist during the Francoist period many planters had to rely on 
touts as they were being excluded from ‘treaty-labour’ by the more powerful Spanish 
planters. This group of tout-dependant planters was made up of small Spanish 
planters, and small and large Portuguese, Fernandino, and German planters who made 
up over a third of employers. 
From the archive there emerges a distinct and interstitial pipe (1940s–1950s), a kind 
of manifold funnel turning in on itself, made up of reenganchos contracts signed on 
the island and containing the dash component. The reenganchos were drawn from the 
ranks of clandestinely recruited first time labourers, deserters and new illegal 
immigrants. This bursting pipe generated a capillary like overgrowth with fugitive 
                                                 
49British VC (Lewis), to British Embassy, Barcelona, 5 July 1946, ‘Labour Conditions in Fernando 
Poo’, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278. For an analysis of British ‘indenture’ as a kind of bureaucratic 
humanitarianism see Carter, Servants, Sirdars, and Settlers, 1–3; . 
50Resident, Calabar to Editor, Nigerian Eastern Mail, Calabar, 4 August 1945, ‘Nigerian Labour in 
Fernando Poo’, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278. 
51 British VC (Lewis) to GG (Bonelli), 8 June 1946, AGA, C-81/08130, E-1; Llompart Aulet, 
‘Nigerianos en las provincias ecuatoriales’, 66. 
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spores that rotted out the other two—“collapsing a filthy drainage pipe, causing a 
deluge to break loose, liberating a flow.” The flow of the dash was not “an escape”, a 
withdrawal, but was a flight “through” the world of the plantation, coupled to the 
multiplicity of “holes that eat away at it”.52 This is the pipe of the dash, of the dashed 
recruits, a texture where the tracing of individual routes in the actually existing 
archive is quickly frustrated by so many aliases, and hidden dash renegotiations; 
discontinuous spores, dispersed and overgrowing. Only the dash jammed a plantation 
island that was depending on conned and kidnapped Nigerians bound by long 
contracts during World War II and warded off what would become a tiny cousin of 
Apartheid’s labour recruiting system in the late 1950s.  
Dash workers were one of the broadly three figures that made up the ranks of 
braceros. This inherently unstable third pipe, made of a tout-worker assemblage, is 
one of broadly three figures that were seen to populate the ranks of plantation labour 
in post-civil war Fernando Pó. The first says, Bona Ekatem, were those “recruited by 
deceit and shoved into the plantation by force, who did not want this work and are 
therefore more prone to wreak palabras”, palavers or disputes; the second are those 
“that are voluntary, the good ones, the bien conformados” which means those who 
have acquiesced, have resigned themselves or been knocked into shape—partly a 
provisional category and largely a figment hovering over the canvas of any planter’s 
idyll.53  Braceros were not there to make a welfares career or seeking “stability” 
“security” or any long-term “guaranteed employment”54—anyhow any actual trace of 
this paragon always hovering on the canvas of any planter’s idyll, defected fairly 
quickly into the third class. This third class enacted and demanded a politics of radical 
proletarianization—elementarily to be paid the value of one’s labour and to be able to 
                                                 
52Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 341. 
53J.E. Bona Ekatem, ‘El trabajo en Fernando Poo’, La Guinea Española, Santa Isabel, 3 September 
1939. 
54Alfredo Jones Niger, December 1938, ‘Memoria sobre el problema de la mano de obra en la isla 
Fernando Poo’, AGA, C-81/08128, E-1. Less than 1% stayed on, on the plantation hierarchy. By the 
late 1950s many capatazes were Nigerians who would also “inflicted corporal punishment when need 
be.” ‘Fernando Poo’, Eastern Nigeria Guardian, Port Harcourt, 14 August 1957. For a critique of the 
paternalism of debt bondage, see Brass, ‘Class Struggle and the Deproletarianisation of Agricultural 
Labour’, and its dissolution because of workers’ independence, see Surinder S. Jodhka, ‘Agrarian 
Changes, Unfreedom and Attached Labour’, Economic and Political Weekly 30, 31 (1995): 2011–13. 
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leave employers unencumbered by borders or contracts—as well as a politics of 
radical deproletarianization. Indeed the principal aim of braceros was to “exit the 
colonial contract” world completely “as soon as the internal circumstances that forced 
him to contract cease”.55 After listing the first two classes, the Nigerian journalist 
Bona Ekatem outlines this “third class” whom he calls “the vagos”, the vagrants. In 
“one word the maleteros”, the ‘suitcasers’ “who have until now have dedicated 
themselves in Calabar to trying to carry the suitcases of passing passengers in order to 
live off the tips and in this way to spend life in ‘dolce far niente’” in ‘delicious 
idleness’. “These types have gone to Fernando Poo following the scent of the regalo 
[advance] which the recruiters then swindled them out of.” 56  
British colonial authorities saw this and thought that “for reasons quite unknown 
illegal immigration offers certain attractions to the immigrant”, but the Secretary for 
the Eastern Provinces in Nigeria surmised that the “principal reason, not the least 
among them”, was of “an economic nature”. 57  Spencer-Cooke, the Vice Consul, 
thought it “strange that so many workers are persuaded to come here [but] the 
fascination of being promised such a large sum of money as £15 to £30 is a 
temptation hard to resist [for someone] who has probably rarely handled a greater 
amount than 1/”—that is 1 shilling, twenty shillings to a pound. The “hopes” of these 
new smuggled recruits were “never realised of course”, a first time bracero was 
“lucky to get £3” at the end of their contract, while “the remainder” invariably went 
“into the pockets of the illegal recruiters”. 58 Okon Archibong, a political activist in 
Calabar sums up the mood amongst these braceros, once they realized what type of 
exchange had just taken place: “Every thinking man can prove beyond doubt how 
                                                 
55Romero Moliner, ‘Apuntes sobre la estructura social de Fernando Poo’, 46. 
56J.E. Bona Ekatem, ‘El trabajo en Fernando Poo’, La Guinea Española, Santa Isabel, 3 September 
1939. He was apparently a Nigerian journalist of the West African Pilot, although the name was more 
likely a pseudonym of a Spanish agent publishing under a propagandist alter-ego. 
57Secretary, Eastern Provinces, Enugu to the Resident, Calabar Province, 9 June 1951, NAE, RIVPROF 
2/1/53. 
58British VC (Spencer-Cooke) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 8 January 1950, ‘Annual Report: 
Fernando Poo 1950’, TNA, CO 554/169/2. The annual tax obligation in Nigeria hovered around the 5/ 
mark and an Igbo bride-wealth around the 15–25£ mark. 
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these victims felt when they were landed at Fernando Po” their “wages” meaning their 
potential dashes “having been paid to the middle-men”.59 “They always sell man two 
years called sign”, as a letter from a group of braceros explains.60 Another petition by 
a group of braceros tells how after a week into their first contract “we saw one man 
who shows us road back to the town” where they complained to the Curador, who 
“reply us that the parties who brought us here have claimed £6-0-0 per each head 
[and] so we must go and work for the farm for good 2 years”. When they “strictly 
refused” to be interned in the plantation the Curador “held us in prison until we are 
agreed to go back to the farm, as up to date we are in prison with heavy 
punishment”.61 The Curador, an agent of neo-slavery, pulled the carpet from under 
the feet of new braceros; but this only happened once.  
This Atlantic crease was upended by reenganchos who transformed the dash from 
being a component of a recruiter’s capitation fee, into a moving medium for assessing 
and asserting their own bargaining power. The “odd thing”, says a slightly surprised 
British Consul General in 1953, “is that although men who are sent to Fernando Po by 
illegal means, such as trickery or kidnapping, tend to be resentful at first, many of 
them give in and agree to the conditions”. The Consul General’s subdued way of 
phrasing these realities concealed both preposterous overstatements—“give in and 
agree”—as well as understatements: “it is also odd that although in some ways the 
Spaniards are strict, if not harsh, in their relations with their African workers, many 
Nigerians stay on there for years”. 62 In the early 1940s, W. Evans, the British Labour 
Officer on site gathered from some of the migrant workers who served as his paid 
informants, that those who were “completing their contract” were not going back 
home just yet with nothing to show from many years of hard work abroad, but had 
instead started to “put a high premium on their future services”. The “recruit, soon 
learns that without his services the employer will be ruined and at the expiration of his 
                                                 
59O. Archibong to Resident, Calabar, 23 January 1939, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194. 
60Petition signed ‘Your Prodigal Sons’ to Resident, Calabar, 24 March 1936, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194. 
61 Petition signed by A.Afiatai, addressed to ‘District Officer, Nigeria’, 28 October 1932, NAE 
CALPROF 5/1/192. 
62British Consul General, Brazzaville, 12 June 1953, ‘Tour’, TNA, FO 371/102621. 
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first contract he may himself employ a tout to offer his services for re-engagement to 
the highest bidder”.  
Evans describes the reenganchos as being “fully alive to the possibilities”, and “out to 
make capital of the situation”. During this reshuffling for the second round of 
contracts he also witnessed how “intermediaries who have scented the elements of a 
racket are springing up wholesale. These ‘agents’ – themselves Nigerians – haunt 
Santa Isabel and the neighbouring farms in search of likely recruits and, of course, 
take their cut out of the bonus offered”. 63 This was a novel shift. A German scientist 
stuck in Fernando Pó at the outbreak of World War II, observed that “usually the 
Nigerian Gastarbeiter returned home” after a first contract “with three to five pounds 
in savings”.64 In the late 1930s it could still be said that “the labour question” was 
“likely to become serious” since those “who finish their contracts show little desire to 
sign a new one.”65 The labour question took a serious turn not because of the refusal 
to sign second contracts and the absence of new arrivals but because of those already 
there redeployed themselves. 
Up until the early 1930s there was an officially registered regalo of exactly 300 
pesetas “for re-engagement [which] changes hands in front of the Spanish labour 
officer”—a small sum, about the price of 15 bottles of olive oil or ten dozen eggs or 
twenty five meters of cloth in the markets of the capital Santa Isabel, that almost 
exceeded one year’s worth of official bracero wages. In the 1940s, however “outside 
the door of the Labour Office” around the negotiations of decentralized tout-
emissaries “an unofficial and much more substantial dash” was being exchanged.66 
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This “unofficial regalo” laments a planter “has been consecrated by the reality of the 
bargaining power of labour”. 67  In 1949 the Curador refused to inscribe the real 
amounts of this “free playing system of primas” in his registry or onto contracts. The 
“300 peseta limit”, he says, one imagines in a desperately raised voice, was the “only 
way to brake the regalos of the underground market of labour which have been 
elevated to absurd levels”. For the Curador—who was annually being rewarded some 
45,000 pesetas for performing his duties—the “regime of regalos, free playing as to 
its quantity is a danger”, not only because it “defrauds the fiscal regime”, since it was 
tax free, but because he saw it as driven by the “venality of the uneducated native and 
the maliciousness of men in general, when they are moved by economic reasons 
alone”.  
Sebastian Llompart’s immediate reasons lay in a more prosaic and typical anxiety: the 
workload of paper-shufflers. “Today”, he says, “the handing over of the 300 peseta 
regalo is always the same, it is done automatically and everyone knows the quantity 
given and received.” He then engages in some arithmetic acrobatics for rhetorical 
sway: “it would take at least 4 minutes to hand over 1500-2000 pesetas”, counting the 
labour of the “cashier, then the necessary European supervisor has to count the bills, 
the bracero who is contracting would have to count the bills as well.” The “average 
number of contracts presided over” by the Curaduría per day were “approximately 
fifty, and this means” that the process of counting and inscribing the dash in the books 
“would take over three and half hours more per day”! His “office” it seemed was 
already “way too knee-deep in work” to play cashier.68 During the post-war decade it 
was reenganchos, “as many as 25,000 non-Treaty labourers” in 1952, who were 
making the majority of contracts—some fifty a day. 69  
The press-storm forming over Fernando Pó was reaching one of its many apogees in 
the late 1940s—with vivid and haunting titles of incarceration and damnation that 
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drew on a Euro-African imaginary of satanic mills and cruel dungeons: a “Biblical 
Hell”,70 a “Hell on Earth”,71 an “Island of no return”,72 the “Brutal Island”,73 with 
“Wickid Laws and Wickid Rulers”, where a warp or short-circuit had spawned “paid 
slavery”.74 Journalistic exposés contained interviews with returning labourers who 
told “newsmen in Calabar that they had suffered ‘the most inhuman, hellish and brutal 
treatment’ they ever had heard of in their lives”—principally at the hands of the 
colonial police. While licensed recruiters were operating in south-eastern Nigeria 
from 1943 on, they had difficulties persuading a substantial new generation of 
recruits—at least until the very late 1950s. For the popular writer Peter Enahoro, the 
prickly question—a modern fright—was what seemed to be an irrational consent to 
‘voluntary servitude’. “In Fernando Po, I was ashamed. I WAS ASHAMED that in 
spite of the treatment they got, they still came in numbers”.75  Understanding the 
precise number and composition of the workforce goes a long way in assuaging 
Enahoro’s sense for the incomprehensible goings-on.  
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Times, Lagos, May 1962; Peter Pan, ‘The Brutal Island’, Sunday Times, Lagos, 18 February 1962. 
Enahoro’s wrote under the moniker “Peter Pan”. Enahoro’s vicarious sense of disgrace was also 
projected onto colonialists: “I WAS ASHAMED for the Spaniards -good Catholics all of them- who 




Figure 11 Peter Pan’s ‘Brutal Island’ in Sunday Times76 
In the hundreds of press articles covering or commenting on the scandals coming out 
of “hell’s island”, the dash was never mentioned directly, though if it had been, it 
might have been described as a deal with the devil. After World War II, the canoe-
going clandestine recruiters started encountering a revamped Nigerian navy and the 
number of smuggled labour dropped sharply. So it was Nigerian reenganchos who 
were signing the majority of contracts. They were the first generation to radically 
escalate the dash. They renegotiated its twenty-fold increase in a little over ten 
years—doubling the effective wages of braceros every time they were released from 
an expired or sabotaged contract. Thrown and kept in the bottom rung of the colonial 
economy because of an initial ruse, a dire need, or dreams of excess, they figured out 
a way to stay on the plantations only as long as necessary. This they did in 
collaboration with touts. 
                                                 




Figure 12 Nigerian braceros in plantation ‘Casa Mallo’, 1950s77 
4.2 Dash Renegotiations: Gancho-Touts 
For the “prospect of returning to Nigeria with £24 in their pockets”—that is with the 
dash of a reengancho in their pockets—the bracero was “prepared to risk work in 
Fernando Po [even] if he is unlucky to find a bad master.”78 Contracts on the island 
were irrevocable and fixed in length. The dash marked the entry into them, a threshold 
with a very ambivalent sign: “it [was] generally recognized by the labourer that the 
higher the ‘dash’ the worse the conditions are on the farm, but quite often their 
cupidity gets the better of them”. 79 Once on the island however, the reenganchos 
were “very discerning when signing second contracts: they naturally seek the best pay 
and amenities”, and this was the only “stimulus” for “employers to make their farms 
more attractive.”80 Reenganchos tended to stay clear of planters “who had a reputation 
                                                 
77Adapted from José Manuel Brunet et al., Guinea en Patués: De los bueyes del Valle de Benasque al 
cacao de la isla de Fernando Poo (Huesca: Diputación de Huesca, 2008), 121, see also 116–9. 
78British LO, Calabar to Government, Lagos, 23 March 1945, AGA, C-81/08130, E-1; British LO, 
Calabar to Government, Lagos, 15 November 1945, AGA, C-81/08130, E-1.  
79British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 31 March 1950, ‘Labour Report 
No.1/1950’, TNA CO 554/169/1. 
80British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 20 March 1956, ‘Annual Report 
covering the period 1st of April, 1955 - 31st March, 1956’, TNA, CO 554/1346. 
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of ill-treating the labourers”. Planters with a reputation “sufficient to frighten” 
reengancho “labourers away” were slowly forced to do away with the ranks of 
abusive Portuguese, Spanish and British West African overseers—in that numerical 
order—if they wanted anyone to “recontract”. When they did, they found that they 
were “now able to find labourers from other farms, who were prepared to serve their 
second contract with” them.81 Up until the 1940s the “farms that treat their workers 
like in the rest of the civilized world” were “very hard to find” and those who did 
“recontract, the reenganchos, prove to be badge of honour and reputation for the 
planters, and benefit the bracero too because it represents an increase in salary and a 
guarantee of good working conditions.”82 
The dash for reenganchos far exceeded the ‘trade-dash’ commanded by clandestine 
recruiters because planters were paying out extra for experienced hands—the skilled 
wielding of long-armed sickles making exact incisions on the dangling cocoa pods 
without which any subsequent blossoming was irreversibly lost; the keeping constant 
of furnace temperatures in the tin roofed chimney sprouting cacao drying houses; and 
much more. The British Vice Consul thought he knew his economics: the 
“undesirable” and “illegal” “system of inducements” “would disappear entirely if the 
numbers” of new recruits under the Treaty could be “increased.”83 He was partly 
right, but he excluded from his estimation the value of experienced labour.  
                                                 
81 British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 2 January 1952, ‘Report 
No.4/1951’, TNA, FO 371/96714. At the work place braceros had to deal with people like Domingo 
Alvarez Cruz, a Portuguese plantation manager of whom a small vignette has been left in a labour 
inspector’s report who was on his very first tour on the east side of the island, only reachable by surf-
boat. Even this inspector, a military man—who had been a roused fellow traveller, as all Francoist 
administrators on Fernando Pó were, in the systematic deprivation, war-crimes, attrition and firing 
squads during the Spanish Civil War—was struck by the figure and presence of Don Alvarez. With an 
emphatic distance and a penchant for character study he depicts Don Alvarez as “a tall and slender 
man, sinewy, with a cold and penetrating stare, of a forceful and uncompromising character” with an 
“opinion” he repeatedly expressed: “the bracero is indolent and one needs to make them work to 
extract from them the maximum yield.” Unsurprising then that at this plantation there were “several 
fugados and almost no recontratados, no one prolongs their contracts for normal motives.” AT Santa 
Isabel to GG (Fontán), 17 December 1941, AGA, C-81/08128, E-13. 
82Carles, Misioneros, negreros y esclavos, 38. 
83British VC (Lewis) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 11 June 1946, ‘Illegal Recruitment in Nigeria 
by “ganchos” appointed by Spanish Employers’, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278; British VC (Lewis) to 




Figure 13 Cacao trees with ripe cocoa pods, 1940s84 
The numbers of treaty labourers did not anyhow increase, in fact he writes in 1950, 
“since 1946 the labour force has fallen steadily in numbers but production figures 
have not”—compensated by the experienced “workmen” often being “kept under 
pressure all day from 6.30am to 5.30pm without any established rest period” during 
the harvest season. 85  The “high productivity of these most diligent reenganchos 
quickly generated a group of agent entrepreneurs, the ganchos” or recruiter-touts.86 
The “tout, called ‘gancho’ which means ‘hook’ in Spanish receives 400 pesetas for 
                                                 
84Original caption: “Cacaotal, en Fernando Póo, en plena fructificación”, in Baguena, Manuales del 
Africa Española, 50. 
85British VC and LO (Spencer-Cooke) to Consul-General, Barcelona, 8 November 1950, ‘Report on 
the existing Labour conditions in the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea’, TNA, FO 371/89597.  
86Velarde Fuentes, ‘Problemas de empleo’, 165. 
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every recruit whom he claims to the employer.”87 But like some recruiters before 
them who “took commissions” on “the same braceros from at least three employers” 
the “result being a very profitable business, and a very illegal one,” the worker-tout 
assemblage that took over the island in the 1940s could ally, recombine all the same 
elements and coil up the system to the extreme.88 
Ganchos were a discontinuous and unrelated groups, who often started off very 
modestly and, again, armed themselves only with the capacity to handle, embellish 
and inflate language and money. They were drawn from the ranks of lowly and 
landless Spanish and Portuguese pichinglis speaking settlers, from the community of 
urban Creoles or Fernandinos and West African self-employed immigrants, from the 
existing entourage of Calabar-based recruiter kingpins, or they were former braceros 
themselves with a few contracts under their belt—they were “neither planters nor 
merchants, they [were] usually not even actual proxies or company agents”. 89 The 
dash was fanned by refractory mediators who never operated with the full blessing of 
the planters and the administration. A planter pleaded: “make the intermediaries 
disappear, for, as a rule, they are persona extraña”—external, but also strangers, 
strange, startling—“to real colonial interests, their only aim is the acquisition of 
maximum wealth with minimum effort, and for sure they do not create the permanent 
wealth” that agro-capitalist planters, like himself, liked to think of themselves as 
generating.90 They generated wealth on the move, at a distance from both capital and 
labour. Labour touts could confound and reroute the imperial economics of labour 
scarcity—they spotted gaps and pushed it, and its paperwork, to extremes. 
                                                 
87British VC (Lewis) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 11 June 1946, ‘Illegal Recruitment in Nigeria 
by “ganchos” appointed by Spanish Employers’, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278. 
88Curaduría (Guixeres) to GG (Guerra), 29 June 1936, AGA, C-81/08153, E-1. 
89Joaquin Jose de Sousa to GG (Manresa), 17 September 1931; Curaduría to GG (Manresa), 26 of 
September 1931; Primitvo Alvarez to Chrits Nordenholz, 14 March 1931, AGA, C-81/08126, L-1, E-
34. 




The Spanish settler Fernando García Gimeno worked as a labour contractor for a 
group of Portuguese planters and fondly recalls in his memoirs how he enrolled a 
small but peaceful army of Nigerian ganchos. These “would bring potential recruits to 
the best farms we had”—often not the ones “they were actually going to be destined 
to”—and would “win them over by inviting them to lunches and things. We even paid 
for a session with a woman of the night.” This Dionysian pampering, an inversion of 
the plantation’s unchanging and imported food rations of rice and stockfish that came 
with the contract, served to “screw the competition” out of labourers, as García says.91 
Everyone was “well aware of the existence of ‘ganchos’ whose mission it [was] to 
capture those braceros who presently find themselves in Santa Isabel because they 
just completed a contract”—but no one could actually stop them.  
The touts gained a status, not from a division of labour, but from inserting themselves 
into the modalities of commissions. With almost theatrical pathos, planters started 
complaining that the ganchos were “twisting the will” of the braceros who were 
abandoning them after their first contract. 92 This liminal phase corresponded to the 
validity of a 14 day papel de libertad, a “freedom paper” handed over to braceros 
when finishing a contract so they could buy a ticket and wait for the bimonthly 
steamer to take them to Nigeria, or so they “may look for work without risk of being 
taken by the police”. 93 A contract was always laid out at the end of this strangely self-
imploding grid of reallocation and inducements, because a series of vagrancy 
ordinances had made unemployment illegal on the island. 
                                                 
91Garcia, Fernando el africano 45–48. García was a Spaniard of a modest family who arrived after the 
Civil War when he was a boy. His parents started working at his aunt’s restaurant in Santa Isabel. It is 
strange that being informed or allowed to select the place of work did not seem to matter to the Spanish 
settlers, bracketing it under the “daily conflicts were of a minor sort”, such as “being destined to 
plantations other than those promised. This was because the majority of firms had different ‘patios’, 
one in Basakato the other in Fistown. The workers was promised work in the farm closest to the city, 
but in the end he was sent to the one further away.” 
92Cámara Bata to GG (Bonelli), 3 August 1946, AGA, C-81/08129, E-1. The shameless Cámara even 
tried to propose a tax on the reenganchos who hire themselves elsewhere, about “half the going rate of 
a regalo to be paid to the Camara” to disarticulate the relation between a “new employer and his 
‘gancho’”. 




The dash could only emerge from a reign of long contracts, but its flourishing was 
purely the outcome of touts and workers combining. The African history literature 
that promised to offer “a rare glimpse into the actual mechanics of the labour market” 
has shown that the internal logistics of the dash were largely arranged by touts. But 
these touts have nevertheless been explicitly disparaged as “lawless” and 
“depraved”.94 Dispersed sets of touts were the ones channelling and bidding up the 
informal dash, relaying but also cracking open the edifice of imperial bondage on the 
final African shores of the Spanish Empire. Out of it came a realization and a practice 
that effected a radical coup against an arrangement that officially only promised 
poverty wages and a high risk of being killed—there were one to two deaths per 
day—by what can euphemistically be called the guardians of public order and work-
related injuries. 95  By “hook or by crook”, as is said in Nigeria, they pocketed 
commissions, proposed unnecessary fees and often conducted scams—the 
underground has its contradictions too. 
                                                 
94Murray, ‘“Blackbirding” at “Crooks” Corner’, 376. See especially Jeeves, Migrant Labour in South 
Africa’s Mining Economy, 3–34, 239–64; and MacDonald, ‘Colonial Trespassers’, 242–90. 
95“During this quartile for example 26 Treaty workers and 41 non-Treaty workers […] have died […]” 
Counting only the Treaty workers the Vice Consul says: “Up to March, 1952, 508 deaths had been 
reported which represents 3.6% of a labour force of 14,174, 13,666 of whom were repatriated during 
the period May, 1943 to March, 1952. This death rate was “11 times greater than in [the rubber 
plantations of] Calabar”. The Spanish “medical authorities continue to be reluctant to certify workers 
who become physically incapable of completing their contract and this is certainty a contributory factor 
to the high death rate amidst Nigerian workers”. British VC and LO (Bradley), 1 October 1952, 
‘Labour Report, July 1st to 30 September 1952’, TNA, FO 371/96714. Eyo Udo registered a complaint 
with the Vice Consul in 1941. He simply wanted to be able to get to the Hospital, it “being dangerous 
to just wait and die as happened with the other braceros”. Explaining his situation, he remembers his 
recently deceased brother “Isaiah” who “had a wound on his foot”, and instead of “receiving treatment 
at the Hospital” as he had requested he was taken “to the warehouse” of the plantation of Antonio Perez 
Lopez, and whipped several “times with a rubber tubing” and “locked inside during the night.” His foot 
injury festered and the overseer sent Isaiah to the hospital four days later as a corpse. The pick-up truck 
that brought him there carried away “the cadaver of another bracero, who had also died due to 
mistreatment at work in the same farm.” Udo explained to the Vice Consul that the Spanish authorities 
“take it as joking we don’t know that it fact they say.” The Gobernador, Fontán, replied to the Vice 
Consul regarding this case, clearly deflecting, by insisting “that the veracity of such declarations are 
untested”. Fontán then forwarded him a copy of the coroner’s report which blatantly lying, declared: 
“natural death caused by organ failure.” Eyo Udo, 8 September 1941, AGA, C-81/08128, E-12; GG 
(Fontán) to British VC (Michie), 27 November 1941, AGA, C-81/08128, E-12. The warehouse—a 
granary-like provisional prison pioneered by the ancients in Mesopotamia—was the favoured place for 
overseer to lock up and abuse workers. 
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4.3 Dash Life: Smugglers, Prostitutes and Planters 
The “point of view of the bracero” was to “never want to remain a bracero but for as 
short a period of their life as possible, or at least that is their intention.”96  The 
Nigerian reengancho found himself in “Fernando Po with the sole object of making 
his fortune in his small way”—figuring out an overriding purpose: to “make money as 
quickly as possible”. 97  A survey of 500 new recruits were asked at the labour 
department in Calabar as to the “purpose for which the labourers were seeking to earn 
money under contract”. The answers were: “To engage in petty trading”, 36%; “To 
pay dowry for a wife”, 23%; “To purchase a bicycle”, 10%; “To assist parents or other 
relations”; 9%. The questionnaire is a nonsensical format since all four reasons 
contain and presuppose each other, and much else besides.98 A former bracero—who 
in the 1950s turned himself into a prosperous smuggler of canes and batons—
remembers the Fernando Pó of the booming post-war heyday as “a place of many 
profits”, “money everywhere, if something was a luxury in Nigeria, here it was in 
abundance”. 99 The thousands of Spanish settlers—when not bossing and attacking 
people on the plantations or manning most administrative positions—were largely 
busy running the “many, many, many factorias that plague Santa Isabel. The 
European emigrant is quite a fan of commerce. Santa Isabel is full of their factories, 
                                                 
96Romero Moliner, ‘Apuntes sobre la estructura social de Fernando Poo’, 42. 
97LO Calabar to Government, Lagos, 23 March 1945, AGA, C-81/08130, E-1; Osuntokun, ‘Relations 
between Nigeria and Fernando Po’, 10. Among “Nigerians” in Cameroon “on the whole do not intend 
to stay longer than is necessary to obtain capital with which to return to Nigeria.” Ardener and Ardener, 
Kingdom on Mount Cameroon, 198. 
98Nigeria, Annual Report on the Department of Labour and Resettlement of Ex-Servicemen, 1949/50, 
24. Of 400 interviewees, it is said by the report writer that “other purposes named by small numbers of 
workers were - to improve knowledge, to get experience by travel, to buy farm land, to build a house, 
and to pay school fees. The desire to possess a bicycle is in the Eastern Provinces from which the 
recruits come, inspired by more than the mere pleasure of riding one. Bicycle carriers are a special 
feature of both Ibo and Ibibio country and serve the needs of the population in place of carts and taxis. 
A bicycle owner thus possesses a means of livelyhood.” All the four hundred “were asked to state their 
previous occupation, with the following results”: Occupation-Number, Farmer-132, Petty trader-60, 
Artisan-44, Labourer-32, Fisherman-28, Domestic servant-24, Carrier cyclist-24, Palm tree cutter-24, 
Student-20, Clerk-8, Teacher-4.  
99Interview with [anonymized], July 2013, Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. 
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selling all sorts of goods, and almost all are in their hands.”100 These merchant shops 
openly catered almost exclusively to a clientele of wholesale brandy and tobacco 
smugglers from the Cross River delta and the Wouri estuary who sailed to the island 
on large ocean-going canoe convoys. By the 1950s they had orchestrated the largest 
contraband smuggling network in coastal West Africa. 101  
 
Figure 14 Factorias in Santa Isabel, Francoist period102 
 
                                                 
100Pozanco, Guinea mártir, 25. In the 1960s there were about 1500 employed in “commerce” in Rio 
Muni and 1000 in Fernando Po. This was the largest European population in Africa outside of Rhodesia 
and Angola. Spanish working for less wages than Europeans elsewhere in colonies, but three times the 
wage rate in Spain. Pélissier, Los territorios españoles de Africa, 46, 75. 
101‘Smuggling – Nigeria’s curse’, Drum, January 1961. 
102Clockwise from top left, images are captioned by the settlers who posted them: ‘1964. chaflan 
exterior a la derecha calle Cristo Rey’; ‘1964. interior de factoria Victorero mi padre a la espera de 
clientes’; ‘Factoria y era de un nativo de Nigeria, que se llamaba Okon. Año, (puede), 1955’. Images 
from http://bioko.net/galeriaFA/, searched ‘factoria’ and ‘Victorero’; except bottom right, ‘El Barato’ 
from Kicks-Dadzie to Resident, Calabar, September 1939, ‘Confidential Report: Labour in Fernando 




Map 6 Santa Isabel, 1950s; each dot is one factoria103 
                                                 




While on a fundraising tour in Santa Isabel the secretary of the Ibo State Union whose 
members on the island were being continuously arrested, beaten and deported—
remarked that “it is truly a ‘market country’, throughout the island one can scarcely 
distinguish the shop fronts from the government offices. In its entirety it is filled with 
gigantic mansions and warehouses with innumerable merchandise for sale”.104  In 
“reality, the Ibo went for two reasons: to make money and to take advantage of the 
opportunities the island presented for smuggling.” The “return trip” of the “great sea 
canoes filled with Africans being taken to Fernando Po for illicit engagement” were 
“laden to the gunnels with brandy, guns and trade good for sale in Nigeria. Labourers 
also at the end of their contract shipped contraband.”105 After the contract, under 
certain circumstances, it was possible to obtain “a trading license”, which allowed a 
braceros with an finished contract to stay for a month without being picked up by 
police.106  
The dash was also being poured into expensive “bicycles and gramophones” or 
Spanish-made “sewing machines, before returning home”. 107  Labourers made it 
“clear” to anyone who asked them that the “principal attraction of [a] term of 
employment in Fernando Poo [was] the acquisition of a lump sum”—“the inability of 
the individual to save when employed in Nigeria on even well paid work is well 
known”. 108 One “Mr. Chinebu Echu, from Okigwi” after returning from four years of 
contract labour “from Fernando Poo’s cocoa and coffee plantations” told a journalist 
                                                 
104Ibo State Union, Delegation to Fernando Poo, 1954, AGA, C-81/08223 E-1. See van den Bersselaar, 
‘Creating “Union Ibo”’. 
105Ian Brook, The One-Eyed Man Is King (London: Cassell, 1966), 196. This is the autobiography of 
the Ian Brinkworth, artist, solider and eventually District Officer in Eastern Nigeria. 
106British Consul, Yaounde, 4 May 1961 ‘Extract from Yaounde Despatch No.46’, TNA, CO 554/2502. 
107British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 14 April 1953, ‘Annual Report’, 
TNA, FO 371/102612; Gabriel B. Hart, ‘Public Opinion: Recruitment For Fernando Po Labour’, 
Nigerian Daily Standard, Lagos, 30 July 1957; see also Ríos, La España ignorada, 55; Adro Xavier, 
España en Africa: ayer y hoy (Barcelona: Ferma, 1960), 16. 
108Minister of Labour, Lagos, 18 January 1956, ‘Report of the Federal Minister of Labour and Welfare 
on visit to Fernando Poo, 4th-8th January 1956’, TNA, CO 554/1346. 
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that “the conditions” on the plantations “were fine”, he was even considering 
“heading off again to said place.” Echu had managed to earn “some 35£”, because, he 
said, “there was also a bonus given by employers” and indeed “every labourer 
receives this bonus.”109  
One of the Vice Consul’s informants gave him the impression that “the majority of 
labourers, on receiving the lump sum bonus on contracting, paid a large part of it over 
to a woman and this gave them the right to spend the night with her, whenever they 
came to Santa Isabel”. 110 This was only partially true; she was more than a prostitute. 
Several thousand Nigerian and Cameroonian women ran and staffed the market-stalls, 
and brothels and bars that populated Nu Billi (New Village) or Campo Yaounde—the 
migrant slum of Santa Isabel.111 These women acted as the so-called ‘money-keepers’ 
accounted for elsewhere in West Africa, because informal dash money was obviously 
unbankable.112  The peseta lost fourfold its value vis-à-vis the West Africa pound 
between 1936 and 1952, so it made sense to quickly convert the dash into fixed assets 
such as liquor bottles that could eventually be smuggled back and easily sold in 
Nigeria—a delayed conversion usually arranged by these women.  
                                                 
109‘Fernando Poo’, Eastern Nigeria Guardian, Port Harcourt, 14 August 1957. 
110British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 14 April 1953, ‘Annual Report’, 
TNA, FO 371/102612. 
111Policía, Entry of 28 September 1953, ‘Registro de Incidencias 1953’, 278, BNM; Paul Iregbulam, 
Jefe de los Ibos Owerri, Santa Isabel to Administración Territorial, Santa Isabel, 14 December 1955, 
AGA, C-81/08601, E-5. 
112Berry, ‘Stable Prices, Unstable Values’, 309; Gustav Peebles, ‘Rehabilitating the Hoard: The Social 
Dynamics of Unbanking in Africa and Beyond’, Africa 84, 4 (2014): 595–613; Guyer, ‘Gains and 




Figure 15 Campo Yaounde, Francoist period113 
                                                 
113Variously also Campo or Barrio Yaunde. “Campo Hausa” was to the left of the image. Photographs 
gathered from http://bioko.net/galeriaFA/. Inset from Map: Ramon Izquierdo Cotorruelo, ‘Planos de 
Población’ (Madrid: Talleres del Instituto Geográfico y Catastral, 1946), BNE, AFRMPS/20/1017. See 
also Severo Moto Nsa, ‘New Ville, Alias Campo Yaounde’, Diario de la Guinea Ecuatorial, Santa 
Isabel, 5 December 1972. 
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Braceros never actually held on to the dash money for long. Keeping unattended 
valuables in the housing barracks of the plantations was not a good idea—theft was 
common.114 Also, as there were no official receipts for dashes braceros would avoid 
carrying around large sums of cash for fear of being accused of theft and immediately 
thrown into jail—beaten and thrown onto the road-gangs of the public works 
department.115 
In the 1930s in the wake of the Great Depression, large groups of West African traders 
started appearing on the island to engage in a range of licensed and unlicensed money 
making activities in the towns and outside the plantation patios. Santa Isabel, was a 
key node strung along the West African steamship routes. The mostly Nigerian 
passengers on the steamships were by and large itinerant self-employed traders or 
those who joined friends and family engaging in various stripes of informal economic 
                                                 
114Curaduría (Llompart) to GG (Bonelli), 29 November 1946, AMAE, R2370, E-11; AT Santa Isabel, 
‘Palabra Civiles’, 1938–1958, AGA, C-81/08530 to AGA, 81/08545. Theft of each other’s possessions 
was clearly marked off from the appropriation of planters’ property: “It seems that the saying that there 
is honour amongst thieves is very apt in this case, for whereas all labourers seem to consider robbing 
their employers as all in a day’s work, they do not rob each other with the same monotonous 
regularity”. British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 31 March 1950, ‘Labour 
Report No.1/1950’, TNA CO 554/169/1. 
115In 1962, two braceros, Amureke Uwualaka and Waite Rugus, “died under strange circumstance”. 
They had been beaten to death by the Guardia Colonial after being accused and “confessing” a 
substantial theft in order “to disclose where they hid the stolen goods”. The “European in charge of the 
plantation” had called the Guardia in and himself started “kicking” the two accused while they were 
being held down. “After this interrogation, everyone had something to eat, and the braceros ingested 
large amounts of gari and water, and only felt sick after their meal. It should be noted that what is being 
recounted is based exclusively on the testimony of the two Guardias Territoriales and the European in 
charge.” Note taken. This time the “autopsy report” actually documented the “signs of having been tied 
up by the arms, and the imprints of the melongo [whip] on their lower back, and a variety of violently 
inflicted wounds throughout the body” yet the Spanish medic still insisted that “the death could 
conceivably have been caused through the ingesting of large amounts of food.” GG (Núñez), 27 
February 1963, ‘Fallecimiento de dos obreros nigerianos en Puerto Iradier’, AGA, C-81/08935, E-s/n 
864. “In September, 1962, a labourer in our farm was accused of stealing some amount of money and 
this labourer my husband's name as one of his associates in the crime. The soliders came afterwards 
and arrested my husband, the man who mentioned his name and another labourer. The solidiers took 
them away and later brought them them to the farm and after severe beatings, my husband and and the 
other labourer by name Rufus died as a result of the beatings on the spot. While the soldiers were 
beating my husband and the other men, with their hands tied together behind them with wire ropes, my 
husband's European big master called Ramon trampled on the stomach of my husband and joined the 
soldiers in beating my husband to death. The two men died in the presence of the European Ramon. 
Later their dead bodies were carried in a launch to the hospital at Kogo. I understand that the three 
soldiers and the labourer who mentioned my husband as his accomplice are now detained in the Benito 
and Bata prisons respectively. I was taken to Kogo to give evidenc and later to Bata to give evidence. I 
do not know whether the soldiers are imprisoned or not.” Virginia Uwalaka, 1963, ‘Statement made in 




activity on the island. An observer from Santa Isabel in 1934 says that the “freedom to 
access our Colony could not be greater, whoever disembarks on our shores does not 
experience any discomfort except that of hopping off the steamer”.116  These new 
migrants partly catered to the needs of braceros, who on Sundays were “given ample 
liberty to visit the many bars and vagabond women of the Island, the principal import 
from Spain is a cheap wine chiefly for indigenous consumption.”117  
 
Figure 16 Imported wine barrels at Santa Isabel harbour, 1930s118 
A British missionary, responsible for a mostly Nigerian congregation in an isolated 
plantation area, noted in 1934 that “lots have been terribly disillusioned and suffer 
terribly from home-sickness. Behind them they have left their families, parents, tribal 
chiefs, laws and restraints [and here] except to their employers and the country laws, 
have no other allegiances. Soon they acquire new sins and vices.”119 Many braceros 
                                                 
116Jefe de Policía to GG (Manresa), 15 March 1934, AGA, C-81/08146, E-1. 
117Curaduría (Romain Ordoño) to GG (Manresa), 16 July 1931, AGA, C-81/08125, E-2. For those of 
Victorian sentiment this was a “state of freedom. There are plenty of cafes and idle women on the 
island, and the chief import from Spain is a crude wine for native consumption only.” Murray, The 
School in the Bush, 25. 
118http://bioko.net/galeriaFA/, searched ‘puerto’. Site has no permalinks. 
119W.H. Collins ‘Fernando Poo To-day: A weekend visit to San Carlos by Rev. W.H. Collins’, in 
Kingdom Overseas, 2 (1934), 222. 
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themselves, at the end of the working day earned well from participating in the 
informal economies of the island; “producing charcoal”120, engaging in the “theft of 
firewood [to bring] to the town for sale”,121 catching crabs from the innumerable 
rivers streaming down the volcanic slopes and selling them to drivers on the road, or 
gathering fruits from the shadow trees of the plantation. These activities were often 
followed by the accusation of “alleged robbery”.122 It should be emphasized that in 
colonial work sites in Africa as elsewhere, this type of informal economies, 
leveraging and pilfering was “certainly did not considered [to be] criminal 
behaviour”; those involved in it “talked openly about forging exchange and selling 
networks.”123 
Given the commercial intensity of the island it was unsurprising that braceros were 
“tempted to fritter away” the “ill-gotten gains” of the dash on “wine, women and 
tobacco”. While “the more prudent of them”, says the Vice Consul, “invest the money 
in goods with which to trade on their return to Nigeria”.124 The Methodist Reverend 
on the island lamented that his churches were being “neglected” because the bracero 
went on Sunday shopping trips to “spend his money in shops [with] fine displays 
offering a bewildering variety of cheap Spanish drinks”, for export and 
consumption.125 In a rare archival find, the confiscated diary of a bracero, a politically 
                                                 
120British LO (Evans) to British Consul General (Lawrence), Duala, 31 July 1945, ‘Labour Report 
No.17’, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278; “sold a sack for 20pts for which the master had him beaten. 
Manager fined 100pts”. 
121British LO (Evans) to British Consul General (Lawrence), Douala, 31 August 1945, ‘Labour Report 
No.18’, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278. 
122British LO (Evans), 30 April 1945, ‘Native Labour, Monthly Report, No. 14’, TNA, FO 371/49598. 
The “stealing of coffee beans form the plantations” was a systematic affair, these could be sold on to a 
highly organized underground circuit of Hausa intermediaries.   
123Ralph Callebert, ‘Cleaning the Wharves: Pilferage, Bribery, and Social Connections on the Durban 
Docks in the 1950s’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 46, 1 (2012): 23–38, 26; Harries, Work, 
Culture, and Identity, 114; William Freund, ‘Theft and Social Protest Among the Tin Miners of 
Northern Nigeria’, Radical History Review 26 (1982): 68–86. 
124British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 31 March 1950, ‘Labour Report 
No.1/1950’, TNA CO 554/169/1. 




conscious and torn convert, a young unmarried man called Monde, reads: “Shameful, 
I had over doze shots of illicit gin and palm oil wine and adultered and woke up to 12 
noon at the premises in the Afonta local Bar. My action when I was very high was 
rewarded as madmans way of life”. 126 Those with the certain type of nerve to stay on 
the island for several contracts, says Israel, a former treaty-bracero, were given the 
appellative “griho”: “this simply means that those people were carried away by the 
high life in Fernando Po that existed in the form of women and alcohol”.127 
In the mid-twentieth century a colonial accountant found himself somewhat anxious 
by the fact that the “custom of the pequeño regalo” had become the “single largest 
expenditure” for running a plantation: the dash was having an antagonistic seizure 
with obvious “repercussion on the costs of production”.128 When in 1952 the dash had 
“risen to amounts oscillating between 6000 and 7000 pesetas the benefits of the 
harvest [were] squarely falling into the hands of the braceros themselves or to the 
intermediaries who intervene on their behalf.” The convulsion and acceleration of the 
dash was paid for by large Spanish and capital-rich corporate plantations who were 
the ones “needing a large amount of braceros and constantly renewing the contracts 
of their recruits”.129 Until the early 1950s these hegemonic planters were busy fuelling 
the dash in order to drown out the undercapitalized small farms owned by Spaniards, 
Portuguese and Fernandinos, who had not been “able to stand the pace” of the dash 
and had “no alternative but to sell out to the larger concerns”.130 Only during ‘peak-
                                                 
126Monde Obongue, 15 October 1961, ‘Annals 1961’ [Diary booklet], AGA, C-81/08803, E-622. 
127Oham, ‘Labor Migration from Southeastern Nigeria to Spanish Fernando Po’, 62. Griho may have 
been a nickname derived from the Spanish word for cricket, grillo, the noisy and night-alert creature. 
128 Delegacion de Hacienda, Santa Isabel to GG, n.d. [1950-1951] ‘Oficio Num. 150’, AGA, C-
81/12373, E-392. 
129Vicepresidente del Comite Sindical del Cacao, Barcelona to DGMC (Díaz de Villegas), 5 May 1952, 
AGA, C-81/12373, E-392. 
130 British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 10 April 1951, ‘Report 
No.1/1951’, TNA, CO 554/169/2.  
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dash’ in June 1952 did the Cámara call upon the Governor to “resolutely intervene in 
order to cut the rising costs of labour in its tracks.”131  
Within three weeks the Spanish colonial authorities had “put in motion a study to 
wipe out the escalating regalo”, but they found that they could not get rid of it. They 
partially rearranged it into a registered bonus, into a reduced “lump sum paid out only 
at the end of a contract, [because] the total suppression of the prima would have 
completely paralyzed the agriculture of the island.” The Vice Consul gathered that 
braceros “did not take to this new method at all”.132 Those “who completed their 
contracts had no interest in staying” on the island because their “calculations or 
estimation of the regalo were no longer being taken into account”. 133  New dash 
prohibitions notwithstanding, over a third of the planters continued to pay upfront and 
off-the-books to subsist; otherwise they were simply unable to harvest their crop. 
Indeed, to subsist during the Francoist period many of these smaller planters had to 
rely on touts as they were being excluded from “treaty-labour” by the more powerful 
Spanish planters. This group of local tout-dependant planters made up over a third of 
employers. The labour treaty with the British colonial state gave the Spanish-only 
executive committee of the Cámara a monopoly to “fairly distribute and allocate” any 
new braceros arriving from Nigeria, but the growing number of cheaper “treaty-
labour” was “blatantly” directed to the Cámara’s own members. No new braceros 
were “allocated to foreigners”, and “very very few to Spanish emancipated natives”, 
so the large Portuguese and German plantations and the Fernandino and Bubi 
                                                 
131 Vicepresidente del Comite Sindical del Cacao, Barcelona to DGMC, 5 May 1952, AGA, C-
81/12373, E-392. 
132GG (Ruíz) to DGMC (Díaz de Villegas), 17 June 1952, AGA, C-81/12373, E-392; British VC and 
LO (Bradley) to Consul General, Barcelona, 4 July 1952, ‘Report No.2/1952’, TNA, FO 371/96714. 
For treaty-workers the bonus was even being paid out in Calabar at the end of their contract. “A man 
returning after a two year contract usually received about £20 in cash on arrival in Calabar; after a 
double contract of 42 months in all.” “Deferred wages are paid into an account in Calabar controlled by 
the Department of Labour. The current balance awaiting disbursement on the return of the labourers 
concerned is £117,000.” 
133 Llompart Aulet, ‘Nigerianos en las provincias ecuatoriales’, 68. The decline in numbers was 
attributed to the “electoral politics of Nigeria,” as the Spanish were fond of saying, when newspaper 
scandals and politicians came out against Fernando Poo. Comisión para el Desarrollo Económico de 




farmers—about a hundred or so who usually only had one bracero under contract—
had to “rely on retaining their pre-treaty labour or obtaining illegal labour [or 
deserters] in order to carry on”. 134  If medium-sized Fernandino planters of very 
diverse backgrounds dominated agriculture in the early twentieth century, then by the 
first decade of Francoist rule, bar a handful of exceptions,135 they were wiped out.136 
The planter class always in motion, agglomerating and disappearing, the island 
underwent a mitotic spindle, and soon “employers” were all large “Spaniards and 
workers [were] all Nigerian.” In 1958 someone writing for the magazine West Africa 
based out of London supposed that there was “probably no other territory in the world 
so completely dependent upon immigrant labour.”137 
                                                 
134British VC and LO (Spencer-Cooke) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 30 September 1950, 
‘Labour Report for the period 1st of July to 30th September 1950’, TNA, FO 371/89597; British VC 
and LO (Spencer-Cooke) to Consul-General, Barcelona, 8 November 1950, ‘Report on the existing 
Labour conditions in the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea’, TNA, FO 371/89597. 
135 See of course the Joneses, no one could keep up with them. San Carlos was known for its 
Fernandino agriculture, but even this was the situation in the early 1940s: The biggest planters were 
Libanio Vaz Serra with 1300h; Veiga y Avendano with 1200 hectares; Antonio Perez with 850h, Casa 
Drumen with 582 Hectares, Mera y Compañia with 500h; Comapañia Colonial de Africa with 500h, 
and of course the Herederos de Maximiliano Jones with 280 h. Only the last were Fernandino. The 40 
European plantations in San Carlos employed over 8000 braceros, each between 20 to 700 braceros. 
While only 4 plantations of emancipados (excluding Jones) hired about 60 Nigerian Treaty labourers 
on some 200 hectares. AT San Carlos, 1944–1949, ‘Movimiento de braceros: estadistica Delegación de 
trabajo’, AGA, C-81/08129, E-4. 
136Clarence-Smith, ‘African and European Cocoa Producers on Fernando Poo’, 199. In 1940, 26,340h 
or seventy-one per cent of land under cultivation was under the control of Europeans, and 10,600h or 
twenty-nine per cent by Africans. There were some 270 cacao producers, one hundred of whom did not 
employ migrant labour. Wolff, ‘Ein Beitrag zur Wirtschaft von Fernando Poo’, 93. In the late 1950s 
about 400 Bubi and Fernandino farmers remained, hiring about one labourer each, see complete table 
at Curaduría, 1957, ‘Relacion de trabajadores nigerianos actualmente contratados con las empresas que 
se mencionan en la provincial de Fernando Poo’, AGA, C-81/08667. They were also decimated 
through systematic fines. The most common fine for employers was not “depositing 50% of the income 
of braceros in the prescribed intervals,” a deposit system where half of the wages were banked by the 
Labour Officer and only paid out at the expiration of the contract. This unconditional and obligatory 
arrangement was officially to guarantee final payment but was also clearly made to disincentivize 
desertions. And while fines were small, thousands of pesetas were racked in monthly, with practically 
the entirety of the many hundred smaller Bubi, Fernando and Liberian farmers penalized for running 
their plantations on credit, and having liquidity only after the sale of a crop to one of the commercial 
houses. Delegado de Haciendo to GG (Alonso), 30 November 1942, ‘Sanciones por incumplimiento de 
la Orden de 4 de Agosto de 1942’, AGA, C-81/08128, E-13.  
137‘Nigeria over the Water’, West Africa, London, 1 January 1958. 
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4.4 Dash Desertion: Fugados  
The 1952 decree that tried to ban dashes was also explicitly geared “to stop labourers 
deserting and recontracting, under false names, with false documents in order to 
obtain the engagement bonus”.138 Deserters “appeared to consider that the risk of 
breaking the law is well worth the ‘dash’, which they would receive for contracting, if 
they were not caught”. 139  The labour market into which the fugados inserted 
themselves into was characterized by an excess of paperwork. It was a costly routine, 
but a routine nevertheless, to acquire paperwork in the different labour, medical and 
police departments and fill the pockets of one of the “at least 400 functionaries who 
easily succumb to the temptation to falsify a paper or document as soon as the 
opportunity presents itself.”140 Marck Oturu, a Nigerian recruiter-tout from Bende 
who was “inscribed as a peddler residing in this city”, was arrested and held in the 
police headquarters of Santa Isabel and assured the new Spanish Chief of Police in 
1961 that any “necessary paperwork could all be arranged for here” in Santa Isabel.141 
Deserting reenganchos again enlisted the collaboration of Nu Billi’s bar owners, who 
“protect[ed] fugados in their homes” when they needed to await a supply of new 
                                                 
138GG (Ruíz), 12 May 1952, ‘Ordenanza prohibiendo las primas o regalos en la contratacion’, Boletin 
Oficial de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea; Negociado de Estadística del Gobierno 
General, Resúmenes Estadísticos, 221; British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, 
Lagos, 14 April 1953, ‘Annual Report’, TNA, FO 371/102612. 
139British VC and LO (Bradley) to British Consul General, Barcelona , 4 January 1952 ‘Report 
No.4/1951’, TNA, FO 371/96714. 
140Romero Moliner, ‘Apuntes sobre la estructura social de Fernando Poo’, 43. A settler in 1936 makes 
the judgement that the Fernandinos, the “landowners” the “elite caste” of English-speaking and 
Protestant Fernandino who “feel hate for Spain”, nevertheless “for inexplicable reasons make up the 
greater part of African staff in out colonial bureaucracy”. Babiloni Navarro, ‘Los territorios españoles’, 
AGA, C-81/12427. 
141Jefe de Policía (Jaime) to GG (Ruíz), 22 June 1961, AGA, C-81/08215, E-5. For example Gowdin 
Amadi of Owerri, explained that he had turned up at the Agency in Calabar, penniless, he was turned 
back by the medical officer, possibly due to being under the age of 16, he was given “9 shillings and 
two pence to return to his village whence he accidentally met MARCK OTURU” whom he told he 
wished to go to the island but was penniless, to which “said gentleman promised him help for 20£ to be 
returned once he’s earned wages on Fernando Po, which he gladly accepted”. Another illegal recruit, 
Sunday Akpan, said this paying of fees to transport brokers and illegal recruiters was consensually 
arranged: “he acknowledges that he was helped when brought here from Calabar.” 
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paperwork. 142 Ganchos prescribed, brokered or sold any supporting documentation to 
deserting labourers. This was usually arranged beforehand, because the “detaining of 
immigrants without the appropriate papers” was almost instant. Dozens of 
detachments and road-blocks of the militarized police, the Guardia Colonial, were 
placed around the only road that by the 1940s had encircled the island—a road largely 
built and maintained by imprisoned Nigerian braceros. 143  In the late 1930s the 
Curaduría had 17 staff—desk clerks, guards, a driver, a cashier and a separate guard 
for the catching of braceros fugados. The Curaduría had its own handful of police 
officers too with wide-ranging powers to raid all homes and plantation patios without 
notice: so as to “keep in continuous fear the braceros fugados o maleantes”.144 The 
                                                 
142Policía, ‘Registro de Incidencias 1953’, entry of 9 August 1953, page 174, BNM; In the 1950s the 
colonial authorities started delegating the task of finding fugados to eight Nigerian “chiefs” in Campo 
Yaounde, and who for denouncing fugados and vagos, keep a third of the fine. The Campo chiefs of 
were also at the behest of the local administration, and would organized, “without pay” and “against 
their will” the sending of “Ibos and Calabares” to do “cleaning jobs and chapeo” in the slum. AT Santa 
Isabel to GG (Bonelli), 15 May 1946, ‘Campo Yaounde’, AGA, C-81/08601, E-1. By the 1960s dozens 
more Nigerian chiefs were appointed, “to fulfil the laws of Public Order, especially amongst the 
Nigerian population.” They “were authorized to arrest any delinquent, bringing them to the Police or to 
the courts”, see ‘Nine Nigerian “Chiefs” appointed in Fernando Poo’, Daily Times, Lagos, 22 August 
1958. 
143 GG, 25 September 1963, ‘Circulares Indocumentados’, AGA, C-81/08781, E-3; In Francoist 
Fernando Pó, just the series of jails run by the Guardia Colonial housed between 600 and 1000 inmates 
a day. Guardia Colonial, 1950, ‘Memoria’, AGA, C- 81/08183. In San Carlos the “number of prisoners 
driven” per day in 1955 ranged between 300 to 500. Guardia Colonial, 1955, AGA, C-81/15865, E-9. 
In San Carlos this is out of a population of 8500 contracts workers, 7500 of whom were Nigerian, 800 
Spanish and 430 ‘French’. Prisoners being driven in labour gangs would desert quite regularly, like 
clock-work: “at the end of the work day at 7pm when we take them to rinse themselves off by the water 
they always manage to fugarse”. 
144Curaduría, 1936, ‘Inventario’, AGA, C-81/08126, E-28. Curaduría, September 1934, ‘Reglamento 
de la Policía de Curaduría’, AGA, C-81/07722 E-1. Eight guards supervised the forced labour of those 
arrested on vagrancy charges in a floating jail population of 80–150 braceros. Most braceros were held 
by the Guardia Colonial who also had many outposts on the island. While the colonial Ley de Vagos y 
Maleantes was almost identical to the one passed in early twentieth century Spain, the only 
modification, the colonial adaptation, the mark of the extension to the plantation complex, was the 
clause, at the service of employers, specifying desertion. The extra clause for the fugitives, the fugados 
“those, who are under contract and escape without a justified cause [and who] show an aversion to 
labour”, reflects the labour scarcity on the island as well as the power of the planters. Planter power is 
also evidenced by the comparatively reduced sentences or “correctives”, of being “interned in an 
establishment for the regime of labour, for no less than a month, nor more than a year”—in Spain 
vagrants were interned for two to four years. Indeed the penal sanction for runaways in the first labour 
code of 1906 specified that “once recaptured the fugado will suffer a correction that shall not exceed 
ten days in jail”, and shall then be “reintegrated” into their place of “work”. GG (Sánchez), 1 
September 1936, ‘Ordenanza del 22 Agosto 1936. Vagos y Maleantes. Normas’, Boletin Oficial de la 
Colonia. In Spain sentences for forced internment into labour camps were one to four years; GG, 1906, 
‘Reglamento del Trabajo Indígena’, Art. 72. 
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authorities did not pick up figures for desertion consistently, though it tended to be 
over 3% and less than 10% of the workforce. Nevertheless, even in the 1960s the 
“principal problem” was still “related to, above all, the breach of contract” that is 
desertion; statistically desertion was aggregated under “absenteeism”, which 
according to the calculations of one colonial economist constituted an average of “5 
days a month per worker” or “15%” of total labour time. This colonial economist 
collapses the categories of deserters and absenteeism in order to cloud the realities of 
desertion; in fact desertion was also distributed, diffused and counted along the other 
“problems” related to contract labour: “punctuality, theft, and the non-return of 
debts,” when workers tried to cut short their contracts with the advances.145 
The detachments and road-blocks of the Guardia Colonial also served as place where 
planters could punish their workers. The longest serving British Consul, Bradley, 
sympathised with the “employer, [who] quite rightly, considered that his eight 
labourers were idling their time away. He took them round to the local post of the 
Guardia Colonial and persuaded a soldier to beat them.”146 The British Vice Consul, 
Spencer-Cooke, opined in 1950 that the “award of arbitrary sentences [on] workmen 
[who] are insubordinate or act in any malicious manner on a farm is possibly 
deserved”. Spencer-Cooke was talking about the most elementary—and the most 
powerful—act of resistance: refusal; to decline. Off “the victim goes to prison where I 
understand he is greeted with a flogging as a preliminary to serving his sentence.”147 
One of the first active labour inspectors in the Francoist period—almost half a decade 
after they taken power—observed in 1941 that in the plantations of the Compañia 
Colonial de Africa a twelve hour working days where the norm, but “the work day 
has been reduced to ten hours”. There were “corporal punishments, especially the 
                                                 
145Velarde Fuentes, ‘Problemas de Empleo’, 174. 
146 British VC and LO (Bradley) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 2 January 1952, ‘Report 
No.4/1951’, TNA, 371/96714. He continues “The men concerned stated that they each received 50 
strokes but the employer and the solider stated they had each received 5 strokes. As there were no 
marks on the bodies of the men concerned, I believe the employer's and solidier's version.” 
147 British VC (Spencer-Cooke) to Consul-General, Barcelona, 8 November 1950, ‘Report on the 
existing Labour conditions in the Spanish Territories of the Gulf of Guinea’, TNA, FO 371/89597; 
“[C]orporal punishment invariably administered on entry into the prison”, British VC and LO 
(Spencer-Cooke) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 30 September 1950, ‘Labour Report for the 
period 1st of July to 30th September 1950’, TNA, FO 371/89597. 
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whipping of the braceros who are unwilling to work”—this was allowed, though it 
depended on the instrument and its ability to cause an irreversible bodily 
disfiguration. The inspector also observed that while braceros “were generally well-
behaved in order to avoid corporal punishments in the fincas” he proposed that “there 
is the pressing necessity of creating within all army outposts the brigadas de castigos 
[punishment brigades] employing the prisoners with heavy pickaxe and shovel work, 
which is what most upsets the indígena.” The brigadas disciplinarias were spread out 
and revamped to an unprecedented extent under the Francoists. It is almost the first 
thing they did.148 The road-gangs of the public works department were indeed a place 
of dread. As an “agonish report from Nigerian boys” explains in 1938: “When we 
finish contract from each of his master’s farm where there is hell, that’s a bad master, 
and refused to go back there, they will put the boy or boys to jail”. “Some are 
numerable in that road they call caratera [road] which is the worst of all punishments 
in Sta Isabel ... beating us to death by their policers with big rubber and to carry a 
heavy pan of stones, plenty boys have sick and died away”.149 
The terrain of value between capital and labour on Fernando Pó was often jarring, 
verging from absolute injustice to spectacular coups. Planters clawed back their 
profits by extending contracts and by adding to their length arbitrarily imposed jail 
time. A group of braceros told George Dove-Edwin, a Nigerian Krio lawyer visiting 
                                                 
148 AT Santa Isabel to GG (Fontán), 17 December 1941, AGA, C-81/08128, E-13. The brigadas 
disciplinarias, the disciplinary brigades, were “special regime of regeneration [...] where indigenous 
delinquents are obliged to work”, that were “dedicated to the maintenance of roads and tracks, or other 
works of analogous hardness.” ‘Ord. GG. 18 Agosto 1936. REGIMEN PENITENCIARIO. Normas 
B.O. 1 septiembre’, in Miranda Junco, Leyes coloniales, 1487; The prison was to become not only 
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1960s when a governmental circular reached the Guardia Territorial, instructing them to withhold 
severe corporal punishment, the Governor quickly reissued a clarification: “An incorrect interpretation 
of the instruction of 9 of February (1961) it seems, has led to the festering among some prisoners of an 
apathy towards work, possibly caused by their false idea that they cannot in any case be subject to 
corporal punishment; such apathy results in a decreased work performance rendered by the inmates, 
which I am in no way willing to tolerate.” He adds that those in charge of the “prison regime are my 
most effective collaborators; they are undertaking an aspect, of such transcendental importance for the 
policies that my Authority is developing in these Territories [...] and out of respect to my own position I 
can not consent to any deviation or passive resistance.” El Delegado Gubernativo, Santa Isabel to GG 
(Ruíz), 28 March 1961, ‘Instruccion sobre trato a los reclusos’, AGA, C-81/08221, E-4. 
149Anonymous, 19 July 1938, ‘An agonish report from Nigerian boys to the above Captain of English 
man of war,’ TNA, FO 371/22669. For a map of the road network on Fernando Po and details of the 
technicalities, kilograms of gravel per kilometre and the like, see El Ingeniero Jefe a GG (Fontán), 3 
March 1938, ‘Avance de un plan de carreteras en la isla de Fernando Poo’, AGA, C-81/07796, E-2. 
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his brother-in-law on the island, that “a note from anyone of their employers was 
sufficient not only to confine them in prison but for them to be treated as convicts”—
the sign of the ‘convict’ in Nigeria as elsewhere in colonial Africa was unmistakably 
that of penal labour.150 In addition “if a labourer’s employer has any sort of grounds 
of complaint he can send the labourer along to the Police and have him soundly 
flogged.”151 As Mateo Ríos, a Spanish sailor passing through the colony, notes in the 
early 1950s, there was “no need for brute force on the plantations” it was “sufficient 
to threaten the worker with dropping him off at the police station, and out of fear he 
returns to work. The barracoon de la Policía is a ‘tabú’, there he will be beaten with a 
rubber truncheon wrapped in leather for as long as the Guards wish, while they serve 
out a sentence of forced labour.”152 There was plenty of insurgent push-back against 
capatazes or overseers—a good enough reason to desert. 
The planter Jose Ramirez lodged a complaint: on a Sunday when it was “customary to 
have some festivities in the patios”, he ordered “his braceros to go to sleep and rest 
for the next day, whose order they all obeyed without exception”. But when Ramirez 
approached a rowdy room in one of the barracks “at this moment an unknown 
indígena, without prior warning and without an exchange of words, punched him in 
the face, bruising his left eye and nose.” The protagonist of the low-blow surprise 
attack, was a young Cameroonian form Mamfe, a bracero from a nearby plantation. 
When arrested he “pretended to be drunk” while being held by the guards, and then 
“pretended that he needed to go wee”; he was actually “quite sober” as he “used the 
opportunity to flee.” Caught again soon after his defence was alcohol: he had 
“stumbled upon a fellow countrywoman” and “with a guitar” in they sat “together 
drank a little, with seven others we drank four bottles of wine and one cognac bottle.” 
But “indeed he did try to get away because he knew that if he disappeared the massa 
                                                 
150George Frederick Dove-Edwin to British VC (Robertson), 31 January 1944, NAE, CALPROF 
17/1/277; British VC (Spencer-Cooke) to Consul-General, Barcelona, 8 November 1950, ‘Report on’, 
TNA, FO 371/89597. See Bernault and Roitman, A History of Prison and Confinement in Africa. 
151British VC and LO (Rylands) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 8 January 1947, NAE, CALPROF 
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152Ríos, La España ignorada, 55. 
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whom he punched in the face would not be able to recognize or locate him.”153 Only 
the massa could arrange for his pursuit—he was confident that none of his drinking 
companions would inform on him. Nevertheless, he got caught and was sent to the 
brigada disciplinaria for one year with a subsequent order of deportation, all of which 
he was forced to pay himself; returning destitute to Cameroon. This happened in 
1954. Cases like these happened very regularly, though many came out the other end 
unscathed. For example, Jose Ocoyo from Calabar, who like almost everyone had 
signed a contract with an alias, a “bracero working for Casa Lampert” a German 
contractor, who was the “alleged author” of a “head-wound” inflicted “with a shovel” 
on “Mr. Garcia”, the overseer or capataz. Ocoyo wisely “fled apparently to Santa 
Isabel”, untracked, the Spanish police gave the vague markers of colonial memory: 
“approximately 35 years of age, heavy built and very dark.”154  
However, hitting the planters where it really hurts was someone who went by the 
female alias155 Okpara Anita. Anita fled back to Nigeria with a forged “freedom 
paper” and then proceeded to send a personal letter taunting his former employer “Mr. 
Pedro”. While working a seemingly prime job at the recently inaugurated Pepsi-Cola 
bottling plant, he was temporarily entrusted to deliver an envelope, that allegedly 
contained 46.600 pesetas.156 From the safety of his own country, to which he had 
                                                 
153AT San Carlos (Matres Calvo), 25 January 1954, ‘Atestado’; ‘Atestado: Manifestacion de Edet 
Elachea’, AGA, C-81/08215, E-5. 
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“flyed away by avion”—or airplane, as he says in mix of Spanish and English—and 
insisting on the more or less ethical conduct of his operation, he says: “the money was 
given me by Master Pinga, not by night or hidden thing it is in day time.” Like the 
dash, money changed hands in broad daylight, the cosmological opposite of stealth or 
night-time banditry.157 This practice of escalation and sabotage worked, importantly, 
only if performed with theatrics and props—with aliases, assumed identities, 
forgeries, and a stash of documents—in the plane light of day rather than through the 
stealth of the predatory lone burglar.158 If deemed just or worth the risk, a labourer 
could “contract himself to five different employers in the course of a month, each 
time receiving a handsome ‘dash’”. “One man [who] had 13 current contracts” might 
have broken a record with all except one of his hopeful employers denouncing the 
bracero as a fugado. A “great many Treaty labourers” were also defecting to the 
spiralling dash by simply “adopting a new name”. They “realise that if they run away 
and obtain false papers, which can be bought [they] receive a ‘dash’ of some £30”.159 
Ato Santos, an “Ijaw from Opobo” signed a treaty contract in Calabar but soon fled 
back “to Nigeria in a canoe” and two months later he came back “paid FIFTY 
PESETAS to a nurse of the Sanitary Services who gave him a medical certificate with 
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4 July 1952, ‘Report No.2/1952’, TNA, FO 371/96714; British VC and LO (Rylands) to Commissioner 
of Labour, Lagos, 8 January 1947, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278.  
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this changed name” and with it he hired himself under the false name of “Patric 
Chinaka Alaga” to “another employer”.160 He was unlucky to be caught. 
The deserter-tout nexus reassembled with a vengeance by deploying some of the 
techniques of financial capitalism—generating speculative debts based on their 
labour—within a state of generalized corruption. Touts could not generate their own 
kingdom, only the knowledge of whom to approach and where to go. Touts—these 
self-schooled virtuosos of commercial life—were driven by their share of the dash, 
but they were also personally solicited as they enabled a radicalization of workers’ 
strategies and expectations. Together they came up with an extraordinarily creative 
praxis, a co-operative but risky logistics, a tuning into ever widening relays of 
localized savoir-faire, the flaring open of loopholes, actively deploying but wholly 
indifferent to the preformatted rules of exchange. The devices that capital and 
bureaucracy deployed to infiltrate and gain strength—the forced distribution of 
paperwork to enforce and detect as well as the social control enabled by debt—could 
be rendered inoperative by ever more audacious incursions. The cumulative play of 
flight was one of withdrawal and tactical re-entry, a guerrilla without bloodshed. 
Desertion was highly individualized and has therefore been said to have been a 
“conservative”, “inhibiting” and fragmentary form of resistance or even as not a form 
of resistance at all.161 The tone of ‘proletarian resistance’ has no place in any shape or 
form. Even when faced with the same constellation of facts, where workers “fled so 
early in the term of recruitment that they had not yet worked off the advances”, and 
indeed gave “false names to the recruitment agency in order to more easily cover their 
tracks once they fled into the wage labor market” this historical action was misread as 
resistance, says Eric Allina, mocking the image of workers who had been represented 
not “merely” as “actors” but as “nimbly planning ones who schemed to exploit their 
would-be exploiters.”162 Clearly the tout-workers were not primarily ‘victims’ nor 
                                                 
160Jefe de Policía (Jaime) to AT San Carlos, 22 July 1960, AGA, C-81/09006, E-1. 
161 Harries; Work, Culture and Identity, 42; Atkins, The Moon Is Dead! Give Us Our Money!; 
Manchuelle, Willing Migrants; Dougnon, ‘Migration for ‘White Man's Work’. 
162Allina, ‘Resistance and the Social History of Africa’, 192; see also chapter 4 and 7 of Allina, Slavery 
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technically ‘freedom fighters’ but in practice, the crossing, staying, appropriating, 
experimenting and redeploying whatever was circulating in the confines of the 
colonial economy of Fernando Pó easily amounted to an outright anti-colonial stance 
of the most fundamental kind. 
The dual spiral of the dash—escalating advances and fraudulent desertion—did not of 
course involve any syndicalist organization. On Fernando Pó collective “politics is a 
forbidden fruit”; “in that island of terrorism and brutality strikes are illegal and 
agitation is criminal.” 163 “In this part of the world” says the resident British Consul 
“labour relations”, meaning the industrial sociology of deliberated negotiations, “are 
unknown.” Any “attempt to discuss or argue an issue with the employer would be 
regarded as an affront and the labourer may find himself in serious trouble.”164 The 
surreptitious movement to and from contracts has often been downgraded to a 
technical search “for slight better wages”, 165  sustained by a “spontaneous and 
ephemeral” “communications network” strung along by touts in “a continuous, 
although unofficial, level of organization”. The dual spiral of the dash—desertion and 
escalation of advances—cannot be mapped out from the codes of official payrolls, but 
only from the constant renegotiation of dash politics. While delineating the ways in 
which “migrant workers combined” Patrick Harries stops short of considering the 
touts and the advances and information they relayed as a radical self-organization. He 
does however vindicate the “transient and shadowy tramping system” as autonomous 
wielding by saying: “it was the very obscurity, ephemerality, and flexibility of this 
form of organization that was their greatest weapon.”166 A fight, where what was 
being sustained was a devastating critique of the colonial contract system itself.  
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It was only outside or between contracts that reenganchos opened up the space for a 
form of contestation that first of all managed to get rid of the most abusive overseers 
and planters and then gutted the plantations at their very core—their declining rate of 
profit. The escalating dash was maintained by the self-organized working 
relationships between braceros, touts, prostitutes and smugglers. These groups did not 
only reside in a parallel “second economy” but navigated and configured the 
breakthroughs and contradictory interdependencies between “wage-earning and self-
employment”. 167  Drawing on the repertoire of dash negotiation techniques—self-
evident demands, up-to-date scripts, masks made with forged papers—the 
reenganchos outwitted the imperial capitalist stamp that tried to engineer low-wages, 
and this, with an indispensable dose of confidence and dexterity; a remarkable 
manoeuvre. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The dash, with and without deserters, was well on its way to finish off the plantations 
for good—until “reforms” or the violent scenes of repression outside the doors of the 
Curaduría where the dash was being renegotiated and informally paid out, kicked in. 
The dash—and the touts who made the connections between the respective dash 
parties—emerged from this void of registration surrounding the Curaduría, from the 
thwarted ability of dirigiste political power to make reenganchos stand in an orderly 
queue behind unilaterally stipulated terms of payment. Such state co-ordinated 
contract monopsonies had been set up across imperial islands and enclaves of 
indenture in order to drive down and cap wages and worker bargaining power.168 As 
Keith Breckenridge shows, the elements of an “archival government”—contract 
templates, administrative stamps and sundry identification techniques—were only 
deployed in colonial economies in the first place to try to regulate the mushrooming 
of both wage advances and the related desertions that accompanied “capital intensive 
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forms of labour recruitment”. 169  Commenting on the generalized system of 
“advancing wages”, Major Orde-Browne recommended that “some written statement 
of any obligation of this nature should be drawn up at the time of incurring it”—
keeping tallies obviously helped when trying to sanction defaulters.170 Debts, after all, 
“must” be repaid. However, such binding properties did not emerge from the moral or 
quasi-magical invocations of sheer debt alone, but rather from the “organized 
violence” of those who measured and enforced repayment through labour.171 In post-
colonial Latin America, like in colonial Africa, the advances of peonaje “usually 
involved indebtedness and always involved the machinery of state to make the system 
work”. Laws tried to set limits on such advances, courts kept tallies of receipts and 
police sanctioned defaulters.172 This was the source of bondage in the labour relation, 
not the dash. 
Even though bound by the “grotesque nuisance”173 of a chain of imperial contracts, 
passes and ‘freedom papers’, the reenganchos escalated the dash through an 
uncompromising commodity economics: the ‘real value’ of their labour as a type of 
‘free’ labour, in the elementary sense of agreed wages and the ability to exit contracts. 
As Isaac Pepple, a Nigerian journalist arrested on the island in 1956, found out from 
“a group of five thieves [in the] prison cell”: “strangely enough”, the Nigerians who 
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had “smuggled themselves” onto the island, did so “because as free men, they can 
bargain for high wages”—in the form of a dash.174 Needless to say, the autonomous 
escalations of the dash took place entirely besides imperial self-definitions of ‘free’ 
contract labour, and indeed wholly outside liberal notions of the self-regulating 
market. The element of “freedom” in the dash had nothing to do with fixed wages for 
a set period, but with inserting an own criterion into the parameters of exchange. 
Across the boundaries of imperial states as well as those of the cellular plantation 
patios, an alliance of workers, touts, prostitutes and smugglers opened borders and 
doors where these had been closed. 
Even though the spiralling coup of the dash was a provisional and rare feat, the self-
propelled trajectory of the reenganchos on Fernando Pó was sustained by a praxis 
based on a sense of fairness—a moral economy of radicalized economics—in one of 
the most structurally violent colonies of its day. Dash-peonage had a deeply 
ambivalent and highly volatile trajectory that straddled and circumvented the 
free/unfree labour binary and the colonial economy itself. For braceros the dash was a 
promising, even a just moment that could be pulled out from inside a colonial state-
imposed device for calculating bondage, a rare leverage around the wholly 
predetermined terms of contract. With it, they ignited an unpredictable series of 
events. Employers attempted to deploy the dash as a bind to keep experienced labour 
power, but the ploy of the dash clearly got way out of hand. The gifty code of the dash 
came back to haunt the planters by providing the braceros with the tool—a peaceful 
one rooted in the creative capacities of language and renegotiations—to arm 
themselves on the island. 
                                                 




5. It’s Time to Talk about the Contract 
The ‘labour question’ in slave colonies was straightforward, buy people from people 
who sell them. How was this question answered after emancipation? ‘Recruit them’; 
recruitment, pay recruiters to bring them or pay workers in advance to come and stay. 
Recruit, recruiting, recruitment, are terms most consistently found and applied in 
military circles. The root for the word recruit stems from the sixteenth French word 
recrue which in a solely military context meant “a supply” or “a levy of troops”; the 
literal French meaning is “new growth” or to “grow again”, to enlist new soldiers or 
supply military reinforcement to the front line. Where the army is weak, depleted and 
outnumbered and where there is no state-organised conscription, the military 
dispatched recruiters who always seemed able to target and find groups of overzealous 
and fantastical minded people as well as the very vulnerable, poor and young. How to 
get people to a place where they do not necessarily want to be? Recruitment channels 
needed to be held in place by something else. Recruitment splits from other forms of 
unfree labour which are bound and dependent within the categories of one place, 
involving a range of customary collective categories such as castes or serfs. Yet a type 
of social ordering in place, usually hierarchical and violent was indispensable for 
recruiters to forge their channels. They required the existence of a customary legal 
status of unfree labour: the colonial contract. 
In Havana, Cuba, already in the mid-nineteenth century commissions were being set up 
by colonial authorities who were now facing a large number of mostly self-manumitted 
“negros libres” or “free blacks”. The first questions they asked was: “What regulations 
can we impose to establish el trabajo obligatorio para los negros libres.” Trabajo 
obligatorio for the libres; forced labour of free people that was the labour question 
posed in the colonial plantations of the Spanish Empire.1 In 1847, commenting on the 
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abolition of slavery in the British Caribbean and the “invention of a system to force the 
blacks to work under contracts for a certain period of time”, the Spanish minister 
responsible for the colonies wrote to the Capitan General in Cuba to say that these 
“partial contracts” of tutela or apprenticeships and indentures were “a system that does 
not improve the condition of the slave, but the English Government has accepted it 
under the banner of ‘free labour’, and is using it as a medium to save the [plantation] 
colonies that are now under threat.”2 The Spanish colonial authorities soon followed in 
their ideological steps and missteps. 
In this chapter I add empirical and combine conceptual material so that these steps and 
missteps may be put to rest—the colonial indentured contract had nothing to with free 
labour, even if voluntarily entered into. Indentured contracts are sometimes taken to 
signal a clear step to “liberty”, principally because of the formalities of “consent” and 
the existence of the “wage” for a specified period of hire. 3  But consent loses its 
meaning in situations of obligatory contracts.4 Contracts were a relationship of “master 
and servant”; as John Locke said, all the contract did was to stipulate the expectation of 
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“limited Power on the one side, and obedience on the other”. 5  Indeed the minor 
orthodoxy amongst critical legal and feminist historians is clearly that there are 
“problems with contract.” Whether “classical or neo-classical models are employed” 
these are “unable to sustain the baggage of rhetoric that constructs it as emblematic of 
freedom”.6 This insight had been established by earlier generations of labour historians, 
who, faced with systematic treachery in colonial contract labour, happily rid 
themselves of the notion of consent. As Jan Breman said long ago: it is “nothing other 
than a colonial fantasy to maintain that a contract was entered into voluntarily.”7 
Traditionally registered and legible along a moment of signing, the notion that this was 
the primary ingredient of ‘free’ or contract labour has historically proven to be a moot 
point. In Fernando Pó as elsewhere employers and the colonial state did not actually 
seem to screen workers who entered their contracts for a discrete moment of 
consciousness unencumbered by the world in order to draw a “boundary between 
compulsion and free will”. This divide as elsewhere, also in fascist Europe, was 
“neither distinct nor of any great interest”.8  
The contract that braceros signed was between two to five years long—this time-frame 
was practically irrevocable and set in juridical stone between 1862 and 1968. Breaking 
or cutting-short one of these contracts was close to impossible, except through 
desertion. As Peter Enahoro said with a dose of earnestness: “It is easier to divorce a 
catholic than to break a contract on Fernando Poo.”9 Those working under the same 
contract on the island could be kidnapped labourers brought on canoes, prisoners or 
tributary subjects of conquest, or they could be indentured through international labour 
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treaties, or they could be resident immigrants on the island with three contracts of 
service under their belts. In some obvious sense, consenting beings were the opposite 
of kidnapped and extorted ones. The type of contracts that operated on Fernando Pó 
can only be understood as their own form of bondage, with its own distinctive 
parameters and temporalities. The contract was a device to strip people who were 
previously considered to be free and legally reconstitute them in bondage.10 It was a 
paradoxical passage as, unlike hereditary or chattel slavery it also promised a release. 
A Gobernador of Fernando Pó, who previously held an administrative post in Cuba, 
was “reminded of the Cuban planters” who “screeched and screamed into the heavens, 
arguing that the abolition of slavery will paralyze and cause total ruin of the island.”11 
After the abolition of slavery in Cuba in the 1880s, as Rebecca Scott notes, “planters 
seeking subsidized immigration or laws restricting workers’ rights tended to speak in 
terms of a ‘scarcity’ of workers.”12 She may have added that they also sought out and 
generated a new class of intermediary agents to constantly bring in new recruits. As the 
planters on Fernando Pó—many of whom had arrived from Cuba after the war of 
independence in the 1890s—were well aware, by the early twentieth century “Cuban 
planters [were] employing many thousands of blacks during the sugar harvest; they are 
free to recruit indigenas wherever they find them, inside or outside their territory. They 
fork out wages and commissions at whatever price can be negotiated”, either to 
recruiters or to workers themselves.13 The planters on Fernando Pó looked over to 
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Cuba’s flexible oscillation between recruitment systems and generated in the Gulf of 
Guinea a kind of new Caribbean presence. 
The imperial state was not monolithic or impervious, but it was also not “thin”.14 
Fernando Po was a small place; behind it lay the technical and emotional investments 
of the nostalgic Spanish armed forces—who organized its colonization and 
administered its daily affairs until the very end. The power of the imperial state can be 
felt and approached in various ways. Formally it is axiomatic and self-constituting, 
practically it is haphazard and experimental, but through both the domains of the 
abstract and the concrete, the state founded and sustained the recruitment economy 
through one thread: the contract. A simple piece of paper. The contract was not a 
blueprint or a design, but the result of borrowing and compromises, a mix of copy and 
pasting other legislations and a mass printing that sedimented into a local custom. 
Planters in Fernando Pó could not make labourers step down from their assorted sets of 
grid paper into which they monthly jotted down their required and desired number of 
braceros per hectare. They had to enlist a mostly ‘peaceful’ army of touts. Touts could 
only turn recruiters if they, in the final instance, appeared through channels structured 
by the destination, the “contract, legal and binding; it is an artefact of action and 
connection.”15 Yet touts were not despots—they were categorically not the agents of 
violence or, even less, of “law”. A despot can always afford to operate without 
negotiation and can also call in militarized back up. If a tout tried to be a despot, they 
would have been quickly avoided or assassinated. 
Braceros all fell under the same contract, but they could come into it through a variety 
of recruiting assemblages, between touts and despots, between those who produced 
debt bondage through the wage advances enabled by long-term contracts and those who 
submitted people into pre-defined terms of temporary servitude. With touts, recruitment 
                                                                                                                                              
Organización del trabajo y resistencia sbrera’, Clío América 2, 4 (2008): 238–58, 246; They also 
recruited Spaniard from the Canaries. Spanish braceros see Francisco J. Macías Martín, Cuba: Crisis 
política, crisis económica y emigración (1920-1935) (Tegueste: Ediciones de Baile del Sol, 2002). For 
the switch to rising dependency on precarious Carribean labour where people could be deported at will, 
see Philip A. Howard, Black Labor, White Sugar: Caribbean Braceros and Their Struggle for Power in 
the Cuban Sugar Industry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2015), 21–61. 
14Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 182. 
15Alexander, ‘Legal and Binding’, 482. 
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rotated with speed and secrecy around commercial propaganda and hands-on 
improvisation. Its principal characteristics were deception and an open-ended deluge of 
promises of wage-advances. In despotic assemblages the way into contracts was 
transparently declared and premised on a painfully slow instance of staged contractual 
‘consent’ that could be imposed or opted into without an excess of language or debt-
money. Indeed, austere is what it aimed for, the lowest possible wage and only the most 
economical communication enshrined in a despotic stamp—in Fernando Pó it was: 
‘No?! Think again’—or in Nigeria it was an affidavit—‘Yes? Nod, thumbs up, sign’. 
For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, Fernando Pó was trying to eagerly 
latch onto state-led exporting facilities for indentured labour. The colonial office in 
Madrid, Spanish embassies the world over, and well-connected friends of the Cámara 
initiated failed indentured labour treaties intended to bring indentured labour from 
India (1928, 1947), China (1896 via Cuba, 1928), Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines (1928), Morocco (1929–1930), Romania (1929), São Tomé (1929, 1931), 
Cameroon (1934–1936), Congo (1945), Cape Verde (1951), Upper Volta (1962), El 
Salvador (1958), Haiti (1934, 1949, 1959), from Liberia again (1949), and persistently 
Mozambique (1927, 1933, 1952) and Angola (1930, 1939, 1945, 1952). “Oh the long 
list of hopes and the aborted plans: Romanian workers, Muslim braceros, and even 
Chinese coolies!”16 The archive is filled with these un-histories of a standardized global 
indentured labour market. Most of these far-fetched plans were false starts, while others 
crumbled after a first batch was sent (China, Morocco) or after being signed 
(Cameroon). Treaties had offered glimmering but always thwarted hopes for “the 
agriculture on the island, as [free] recruitment costs made up the highest share of 
expenditure” for planters. The costs of la recluta libre “would be almost eliminated 
                                                 
16Llompart Aulet, Legislación del trabajo, 12. This was amply commented upon by impressed British 
colonial officials going over the range of fanciful “schemes [that] were mooted, for example, for 
obtaining labour from places as remote from the Gulf of Guinea as Rumania and Canton. Chinese labour 
was in fact brought to the island, but the scheme was a failure and those who had been brought had to be 
repatriated.” Nigerian Secretariat, Lagos, [undated, ~1953] ‘Memorandum’, RHL, 600.18 s. 21/XI (10); 
‘Los Braceros Chinos’, España Colonial, Santa Isabel, 1 February 1929. Well into the 1960s, when 
Spanish Guinea was desperate to disentangle itself from their complete dependency on Nigeria, the 
diplomats continued to pursue indentured labour treaties throughout vulnerable parts of the world under 
dictatorial rule such as Haiti and El Salvador, asking for at least 10,000 workers on five-year contracts. 
See AMAE, R887, E-52; R3215, E-56; AGA, C-81/08095; C-81/08147; C-81/12373; and Liniger-
Goumaz, ‘La cuestión bracera’, 497–534. 
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[through a labour treaty] and so we will have finally resolved the problema de 
brazos.”17 
Before the British allowed licensed recruiters to operate out of Calabar in 1943, they 
had for decades been rejecting repeated requests by the Spanish for a formalized 
indentured labour treaty. The top diplomat of the British Colonial Office, with a very 
Colonial Office name, Cecile Bottomley, recommended to a Spanish counterpart to 
“encourage [the] natives to work on their account, that is to say outside a regime of 
contract or servitude.”18 A Francoist Gobernador shared a cognate thought to a close 
confidant: “the problema is kind of our fault for we chose the system of colonization 
based on propertied Europeans. I always thought that Europeans should be the 
intermediaries and the indígenas the producers, but oh well, what’s done is done and 
now we have to deal with it.”19 
Spain’s and the planters’ mostly failed negotiations peaked long after these sorts of 
arrangements were unanimously in decline—indeed the literature orientated around 
Asia and the Caribbean uses the British threshold of the early 1910s to declare 
indentured labour dead and buried. In broad framings of colonial indenture, some 
historians have insisted on definitions that involve “inter-continental” long-distances 
organized as wholesale passages by colonial states—“indenture at the point of 
departure”.20 This seems not right, since a migrant that signs on nearby or in situ to an 
indentured contract is still indentured, no matter how or when they arrived. Divides 
                                                 
17GG (Lluesma) to DGMC (Alvarez-Buylla), 18 September 1933, AGA, C-81/06867, E-5. 
18Embajador de España (Barcenas), London to DGMC, 25 June 1930, AMAE, R887, E-52. A few 
republican reformers agreed with the characteristic British line of fearing an African proletariat: “We 
should guarantee the future with the existence of an indigenous capitalism, which a part from being more 
productive, staves off the dangers of full immersion in our civilization, which is to convert the totality of 
the indígenas into salaried workers”. Arizcun and Martínez, ‘Memoria sobre los territorios españoles del 
Golfo de Guinea’, 126, BNE, AFR/13541. 
19GG (Suances) to SubGG (Cabrera), 1 October 1939, AGA, C-81/08195, E-2. 
20Northrup, ‘Free and Unfree Labor Migration, 1600–1900’; For this definition that falls back on an 
arbitrary and one-dimensional measuring stick—let’s say over 4000 kilometres—see Northrup, 
Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 13; “Indeed, overseas indenture was written into the very 
definition of emigration in the Emigration Act of 1888, which defined emigration as ‘Departure by sea 
out of British India of a Native of India under an agreement to labour for hire in some country beyond 
the limits of India other than the island of Ceylon or the Straits Settlements.” And even then “indentured 
labour contracts” were principally thought of as those “with European employers”. McKeown, 




were types of Master & Servants like penal sanctions for the breaking of contract—
these were in full force until independence in 1968—but that ‘transgression’ and prison 
was a default. Arriving on the island without appropriate paperwork was a punishable 
offence in the first place. The vast majority of those who immigrated or were smuggled 
onto the island understood the contract as a regime of “temporary paid servitude”, 
where the “only choices on offer”, as for the coolies in nineteenth century Cuba, were 
either “perpetual servitude or expulsion” after the expiration of a contract.24 
There were a myriad of different contracts regulating different employment relations 
and statuses, but what matters is the route into these contracts and how these routes 
were made possible by the contracts themselves. The contracts were how relations of 
recruitment were knotted together, even though the first steps were initiated in far flung 
corners, circulations always passed through them; both panyarring and the dash were 
extrapolated and premised on its stamp. The messy character of recruitment—
recursive, embedded, inflected—is part of the history of the prefigurations and 
consequences of imperial formats. The imperial contract cannot be meaningfully 
studied as a formal procedure and a statement of consent and conditions in its own 
“emic” terms—otherwise historiography lapses into old habits of writing out the 
legislative small-print and ratifying the liberal ideological projections that the term 
“contract” seems to stubbornly entail. 
5.1 Contracts 
Functionaries, managers, overseers and braceros all had a contract, of different types. 
Contracts were obligatory, a constant feature of the “custom of the country”, as the 
early bondage contracts in colonial Americas which indentured recruits signed onto 
                                                                                                                                              
heart of liberal ideology of private contract and laissez faire lay the invocation to the State power.” 
Mohapatra, ‘From Contract to Status?’, 120. 
24 Walton Look Lai, ‘Asian Contract and Free Migrations to the Americas’, in Coerced and Free 
Migration: Global Perspectives, ed. David Eltis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 229–57, 
246; Chris Evans, ‘“Carabalí” and “Culíes” at El Cobre: African Slaves and Chinese Indentured 
Labourers in the Service of Swansea Copper’ (World of Copper: Globalizing the Industrial Revolution 
c.1830–1870, Burra, Australia, 2012), 12. 
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were called.25 The bracero contracts were called that, contracts, but they were of course 
not some sort of deliberated civic agreements of mutual accord, a ‘meeting of the 
minds’, a will electing roles and obligations; rather, contracts were a material force, 
creating a motion around an ‘object’ through a pull.26  The indentured contract on 
Fernando Pó objectified the very person it generated, it allotted the bracero a place 
within a sub-genre of a reigning contractual order, a “type of contract called ‘bracero’ 
to which all who are braceros are subject.”27 On Fernando Pó employers kept the 
original contract. All paperwork, except the very hesitantly granted “passes” or 
temporary permits needed to lodge complaints or visit the hospital in Santa Isabel, were 
kept under lock and key by employers—including “the personal copies of workers 
contracts”; for “safe-keeping”. 28  This original copy of the contract was a “living 
document”, “for the indígena, the contract is a document vivo” wherein “all incidents 
                                                 
25John Donoghue, ‘Indentured Servitude in the 17th Century English Atlantic: A Brief Survey of the 
Literature’, History Compass 11, 10 (2013): 893–902, 893. 
26Property arrangements created “not by virtue of the relation of an object to my subjective will, but by 
virtue of another will, and share in a common will, is contract”.” He saw all the usual absolutes in the 
contract: “it is reason, or the idea as it is embodied in the realized will of a free person” that “really” 
“occasions the contract”. Hegel took a lot for granted: “It is taken for granted that contracting parties 
recognize one another as persons and owners.” Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 23. Weber called this a 
“voluntary agreement constituting the foundation of claims and obligations”, and the basis for “enabling 
law,” as opposed to coercive law, Economy and Society, 671. This type of contract theory, only held 
sway in minor intellectual circles between 1770 and 1870, where it was assumed that two parties with 
equal bargaining power could freely choose to impose mutual obligations upon themselves in order to 
carry out a transaction through time. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract; Herzog, Happy 
Slaves, 161–3. As the jurist Friedrich Kessler already reasoned in the inter-war period: when all 
employers “use the same clauses” or deploy contracts under a “monopoly”—always “artificial” and 
taking place under “sovereignty”, then the contract becomes by definition “but a subjection more or less 
voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger part.” Friedrich Kessler, ‘Contracts of Adhesion: Some 
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract’, Columbia Law Review 43 (1943): 629–42, 632; also Banaji, ‘The 
Fictions of Free Labour’, 77. 
27 Curaduría (Carrillo) to GG (Núñez de Prado), 9 December 1926, ‘Asunto: Recontratacion 
(reengancho)’, AGA, C-81/07720, E-1. This is what indentured meant, being turned into a mix of a 
servant and an employee, through an elaborate conversion, not a worker working but a category of a 
working person, a bracero, “whose ‘indenture’ contracts subordinated them under their employer” for the 
“whole duration of their contract”. Ahuja, ‘Networks of Subordination’, 16. Best, ‘Outlines of a Model 
of Pure Plantation Economy’, 287, calls this a “total economic institutions” that “encompass the entire 
existence of the work force.” The bracero contract was what Weber, Economy and Society, 672, would 
call variously a “political”, a “feudal”, or a “status contract” that “temporarily or permanently” changes a 
person’s “total legal situation (the universal position) and the social status of the person involved.”  
28British VC (Spencer-Cooke) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 8 January 1950, ‘Annual Report: 
Fernando Poo 1950’, TNA, CO 554/169/2. 
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and relations with his employers are inscribed, whether it be for contracting debts”, or 
“for annotating the loss of labour days due to sickness, desertion and permission, etc.”29 
A “copy of the contract” was put into “the hands of the carrier”, “free of charge” in 
order to “serve as the document supporting the ‘identity’ for all procedures that need 
this effect.” Losing or hiding the paper-copy of the contract would translate into a 100 
peseta fine or about three months’ wages.30  This inscription of identity took place 
immediately after the “signing of the contract, in front of the Curador Colonial, who 
adds any identifying markers and prepares the fingerprints.”31  In a situation where 
“95% of the workers do not of course know how to sign their own name”, fingerprints 
inscribed on all contracts and were thought of as the mark of consent.32 The ceremonial 
and communicative aspect of the signing was confounded by the fact that “at the 
Curaduria there [was] an interpreter who elaborates and explains the reach of the 
contract, the language used for this interaction [was] very limited, formulated in the a 
mix Portuguese, English and Spanish and words in the dialect of the Krumanes” or 
Pidgin.33 The contrato was simply a fiche to keep track of wages and fines. The bulk of 
the contract contained empty columns for calculating and summing up these numbers. 
It was followed by an appendix with the entirety of the labour code printed in 
miniscule. While this code was essentially a compendium to pre-empt or disable 
resistance and every precisely detailed sanction contained the residue of past collective 
                                                 
29Llompart Aulet, Anuario estadístico 1942–1945, 192. The live document was like the machine the 
Harrow in Kafka’s story of the penal colony, that etched “whatever commandment the prisoner has 
disobeyed” into the skin of the prisoner. Kafka’s unfortunate protagonist “will have written on his body: 
HONOR THY SUPERIORS”. Clastres, Society against the State, 177; Kafka, The Penal Colony. In 1936 
the Labour Officer took a look at the booklet of one labourer who had “been detained for 138 days in 
addition to being fugado for 58 days.” His sister petitioned the Governor announcing that his employer 
“ordered the detention of Apolonio, alleging that he abandoned his place of work”. The Labour Officer 
took a look at his “contract booklet that is full annotated punishments” and concluded that the labourer 
“has fugado several times. He is wayward and rebellious towards the powers that be, the ones who give 
orders.” He was kept in jail: ‘Honor thy superiors’, ‘fulfileth your obligations.’ Josefa Ntolo to GG 
(Serrano), 17 November 1936, AGA, C-81/08153; Curaduría (Guixeres) to GG (Serrano), 24 November 
1936, AGA, C-81/08153. 
30Curaduría (Carrillo) to Farley Smith, n.d. [1940], AGA, C-81/08131, E-3.  
31DGMC (Jordana), 1928, ‘Trabajo en las colonias españolas’, AMAE, R887, E-52. 
32Peter Pan, ‘‘Spanish’ is a Synonym for Savages’, Sunday Times, Lagos, 4 March 1962. 
33DGMC (Jordana), 1928, ‘Trabajo en las Colonias españolas’, AMAE, R887, E-52. For this faux-
translator to be present, the Spanish until the 1940s even charged a small fee, that they deducted from the 
wages of the bracero. 
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contestation, the contrato, a result of struggle, was however a non-negotiated device, 
perpetually imposed and prescribed from above.34 
Planters furiously maintained and refused to reassess the form and length of the 
contract.35 By the 1930s the Cámara thought of the two-year minimum as a “tradition”; 
“it has always been this way on the island.” “Shorter-term contracts” would be 
“detrimental rather than favourable, well after six months el problema would rear its 
head again”. In earnest antipathy to the types of bureaucracy which could have 
underpinned less attached labour, the Cámara, always lamented that “a short-term 
contract” would be absorbed by formalities, that they would “lose” the labour time of 
“their braceros” to “all the time-consuming tasks, like registration, medical check-ups, 
etc.”36 Though the favourite rhetorical justification of planters was to start form the 
inverted logic of the premise of recruitment costs: only “long contract” could offset the 
“repayment of the onerous initial expenses” represented by the recruiters’ commission 
and the dash.37 
5.2 Labour Office 
The Spanish made contracts obligatory in their first labour code, the 1906 Reglamento 
de trabajo indígena. The code made “unemployment” illegal by declaring an 
“obligation to labour either for the state or for private parties”. Article one was straight 
                                                 
34This part of the contract stipulated the conditions and “perfectly defined rations, housing conditions, 
hours of work”, thought of as the concrete “obligations that an employer has to his braceros”. In theory 
this provided the legal terrain for contestation and setting the bar for what would be codified as 
insufficient, excessive or abusive, but it also contained “obligations that the latter has with the 
employer”, defined principally on a temporal axis of duration, and a command to follow any and all 
work orders for that time-span and remain in place, except for Sundays. These obligations could only be 
rendered null if a workers was expelled for being “useless” or “dangerous” or an employer had engaged 
in “cruel abuse”. Ramos-Izquierdo and Navarro, Descripción geográfica, 263. 
35As the delegated recruiting agent in Rio Muni of the Cámara, a former Captain of the Colonial Guard, 
Julián Ayala says—without forgetting to explain the key reason why his commissions were so high: “the 
problema is difficult and needs to be tackled head on and defeated. I think we should be looking at it 
from a different angle, not about the # of braceros we consign to you, but that these come for 3 years and 
if longer, then better. 1000 men for three years are preferable and gives superior results than 2000 for two 
years.” Julián Ayala to Cámara, 26 March 1929, AGA, C-81/06418. 
36Cámara to GG (Fontán), 13 April 1938, ‘BRACEROS’, AGA, C-81/08126, E-1. 
37Union de Agricultores de la Guinea Española (Rodriguez Barrera), Barcelona, to DGMC (Canovas), 9 
October 1931, AGA, C-81/08095, L-2, E-21. 
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out of the box: “Foment civilization and thrust the indígenas to work”. The “wording 
used was impulsar”, to propel or thrust, “a word which tend spontaneously and 
irresistibly to action”, says Juan Bravo, the leading colonial ideologue; yes it does.38 
They chose this wording so that the uniquely colonial institution, the Curaduría 
Colonial—thought of as tutelary body mediating all forced and voluntary contracts—
could immediately shovel the indigenous Bubis of the island into contracts.39 In these 
state-decreed contracts there was obviously a “total lack of contractual rules [which] 
turned the Military Authority into the immediate addressee of such provisions.” These 
decrees did “not deal with the issues of harvesting, contracts, and farms and simply 
turned [the] shortage of labour in Guinea into a purely military matter.”40  
In “Africa” says an excited Spanish settler “it so happens that the African does not or 
does not feel the need to work for us. A whole new philosophy and morality and even 
law must be demarcated. Before proclaiming his right to freedom, the African 
proclaims his right to laziness. European governments who want to realize public 
works and the colonial companies who are trying to turn the virgin forest and the 
miasmas of malaria into plantations of cotton, rubber and rice are confronted with the 
problema de mano de obra which contains that anxious dilemma, whose choice is 
either violence or ruin. Let it be violence!”41 The ensuing imperial assault was mildly 
indirect, orchestrated through the skirmish of contracts backed by the state. The 
violence of the state was not principally whimsical, a series of racist attacks, it was a 
                                                 
38Juan Bravo Carbonell, ‘De la Guinea Española: El trabajo indígena’, El Sol, Barcelona, 3 June 1930. 
39España, ‘Reglamento del Trabajo Indígena’, Article 1, Article 24. The Reglamento de Trabajo Indígena 
was constantly added to with variety of gubernatorial decrees or instrucciones, ordenes, directly 
instructing and ordering corvée or prestación for the cacao plantations. The Gobernador Luis Ramos 
Izquierdo insisted that the Bubi “should acquire the habit of disciplined labour [so] I made them work 
during the harvest of 1907 and 1908.” Ramos-Izquierdo and Navarro, Descripción geográfica, 257. The 
next Gobernador decreed forced contract labour in a slightly indirect way, “all the Bubis of Fernando Po 
not possessing 1h of land were compelled to enter into a temporary contracts” or face unpaid prestación. 
“This provision was harshly enforced, for in 1910 the Bubis of Balacha revolted.” British VC (Michie), 
28 February 1941, ‘Labour Conditions in Spanish Guinea’, TNA, FO 371/26908.  
40Petit, ‘The Colonial Model of the Rule of Law in Africa’, 468, 470; Campos Serrano, De colonia a 
Estado, 59–61. 
41Dionisio Perez, ‘España acusada de esclavismo?’, La Voz Galicia, 26 January 1930. 
190 
 
subjection wedded to a “quest for productivity”, violence as a matter of axiom and, in 
the last instance, sustained and fed through violent intentions and designs.42 
“These indígenas, non-industrious, depraved, unruly, serve no social purpose and need 
to be channelled into production, a life to which men are all obliged to,” says Juan 
Bravo—but this “non-economic” spectre, of overpriced workers or counter-productive 
practices, was a generic and ubiquitous presence in the colonial mind. The Curaduría 
was tasked with drawing in people who were not seen as inhabiting the same space, 
who at best now resided in the realm of ‘native policy’ or in the hinterlands beyond the 
fictitious but extraordinarily effective notion of the “economía”. What colonial capital 
upheld when it talked of the economía and its “interests”, was the separation between 
existing social forms of activity, creation and exchange from a politically-organized 
extraction geared to the metropole.43 Indeed they talked up this sphere, economía, to 
enable the weaving and spinning of recruitment and disciplining systems that came into 
existence to generate capital’s expansion. Two of the most intelligent colonial scientist-
ideologues, the economist Perpiña Grau and the jurist Cordero Torres, both repeat the 
same line: “the concept of colony and its economy do not express two concepts, but 
only one.”44 The contract is the essence of this imperial-capitalist hybrid. Colonial 
despots like capitalist despots, the “state, its police, and its army form a gigantic 
enterprise of antiproduction, but at the heart of production itself, and conditioning this 
production.” The despotic capitalist bureaucracy “insinuates itself everywhere in the 
productive machine and becomes firmly wedded to it in order to regulate its 
productivity and realize surplus value.”45 
                                                 
42See first two chapters of Mbembe, On the Postcolony, 28, for a theorization of the steps colonial 
violence took to mark its presence, implant itself and realize extraction. As “a productive agent” the 
colonized, “he/she was in effect marked (literally), broken in, compelled to provide forced labor, obliged 
to attend ceremonies, the aim being not only to tame and bring him/her to heel but also to extract from 
him/her the maximum possible use. The colonial relation, in its relation to subjection, was thus 
inseparable from the specific forms of punishment and simultaneous quest for productivity.” 
43Bravo Carbonell, Fernando Póo y el Muni, 386. Bravo employs the imagery of silver as a sign of 
smooth, flowing permanence: “It is indispensable to get to work right away, so that rivers of silver can 
start flowing from the colony to the metropole.” The constant haunting of Spanish colonial officials was 
this thwarting of this “actualizing” or “unlocking of the wealth in the inscrutable forests”, principally of 
human resources. 
44Perpiñá Grau, De colonización, 45; Cordero Torres, Política colonial, 528. 




Figure 17 Fincas or plantations, twentieth century46 
                                                 
46Captions or description from From top left clockwise: Finca Tapé of Serra Parera; Patio of large finca, 
with drying beds or secaderos visible and above it the bracero living quarters; bracero living quarters of 
Finca Vaz Serra; cacao drying beds; bracero living quarters in Finca Santa Maria Tomazia; Finca San 
Eugenio. Sources: Terán, Síntesis geográfica, 50; Kicks-Dadzie, ‘Confidential Report’, September 1939, 
NAE, CALPROF 5/1/195; Rodríguez Barrera, Manual del agricultor en Fernando Póo, 50; entire left 
side is from Gobierno General, ‘Memoria de la labor realizada en el período 1949–1955’, 130–40. 
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The Curaduría itself was founded in 1901 as a centralized tax-gathering instrument, an 
institution set up purely for extraction—in 1900 half of the colonial treasury’s entire 
revenue came from a “tax of the registration of the Krumen and other workers.”47 A 
Nigerian policeman explains how authorities were not there to prohibit or regulate, but 
to intercede and extract a slice of whatever recruiting arrangements planters had 
managed to mobilize or pay for: the “Colonial Curaduria collects a duty of SIXTY 
PESETAS on each boy imported”, and he adds “What a shameful act Spanish 
Government too collecting duty on human cargos!”48 The state not only profited from 
structuring recruiting assemblages but even when it started fining planters for being 
avid customers of illegal recruiters, what it was essentially doing was increasing the 
proportion of value it could skim off from their on-going existence—levied fines were 
higher than an initial tax, but not a disabling burden for the employers or the recruiters. 
This was so until the early 1950s—until then if anyone was being jailed or deported it 
was only a few of the lowlier ganchos. 
The machinery of the contract emanated from the Curaduría in Santa Isabel. In the 
early 1920s, when the operations of touts were at their lowest due to the labour treaty 
with Liberia, some leading planters were sceptical of the conditions underwritten in the 
contracts set up by the state. The contract “cuts the opportunities of braceros to lodge 
complaints, because even if well founded he will be sent to a brigada [prison brigades]. 
Everything goes against the braceros. If we apply these laws the braceros will all 
disappear within a few months […] the employer cannot be dignified if the bracero is 
turned into a slave”.49 Contracts were onerous to say the least, a paper clutched by 
employers as the reason for why their commands and expectations must be obeyed, a 
pretext for continuous harassment and assault by overseers. The Spanish “labour code 
bears the marks of having been compiled by employer to safeguard the privileges of the 
                                                 
47Ricardo Beltrán y Rózpide, La Guinea Española (Barcelona: Soler, 1901), 159. 
48S. Muyiwa to Commissioner of Police, Calabar, 24 May 1936, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194. “Does it then 
not also prove that the Spanish Government is aware really of this abominable traffic? Of course Spain 
can never stop oppression, Slavery and forced Labour.” 
49Cámara to GG (Barrera), 1921, ‘Sobre moción presentada por la Cámara Agrícola en el gobierno 
general de Fernando Póo formulando propuesta de modificación en el Reglamenta del Trabaja indígena’, 
AGA, C-81/06400; cited in Sanz Casas, ‘Política colonial y organización del trabajo’, 223. 
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employer”.50 The contract goes some way to explain why the “condition under which 
they toil are the equivalent of paid slavery” or why “workers are engaged under the 
terms of a charter which is a twentieth century devise for slave dealing.”51 Sergeant 
Muyiwa, relates actual working conditions found on the worst plantations on the island 
well into the early 1950s. Broaching Orlando Patterson’s thesis of the relationship 
between slavery and death, he says those “captured from Calabar and Port Harcourt are 
subject [to] work from six in the morning to six in the evening rains and sun – their 
masters at their back with canes in hand watching any one that would lift up his head 
for a second and if there be any that would lift up his head for a second – it is the cane 
that will tell him that his master has paid dearly for him and as such he has not right to 
rest even for a second. Is this not more than Slavery? Is this not more even more than 
Killing?”52 
After going through the conditions on the plantations, a Spanish journalist on Fernando 
Pó writes that “sure the planters over-work their braceros, but that’s not slavery”. He 
then poses and answers his own rhetorical question: “so the exploitation of the African 
is based only on the contract? Pretty much, yes.”53 Another more scandalized Spanish 
journalist in the 1930s—Guillermo Cabanellas in his j’accuse exposé ‘¡esclavos!’—
adds details that were largely true if not always continuous. The contract was “slavery 
in every sense of the term, because the African cannot release himself from a contract 
made under the pressures exerted by the delegates of the colonial administration, when 
not by outright brutal force exercised by the gendarmeria or the deception of a 
professional recruiters. The sale price ranges from one to five hundred pesetas, with the 
obligation to serve for a period not less than two years.” For the bracero “the contract 
is irrevocable even though it was not made and carried out on the basis of contractual 
                                                 
50British VC (Michie), 28 February 1941, ‘Labour Conditions’, para. 13, TNA, FO 371/26908.. 
51Peter Pan, ‘The Brutal Island’, Daily Times, Lagos, 27 January 1965. 
52S. Muyiwa to Commissioner of Police, Calabar, 24 May 1936, NAE, CALPROF 5/1/194. For the use 
of whips, canes and outright murder, in a very large handful of plantations, where braceros were “beaten 
with a rubber truncheon and often kicked severely whilst on the ground” and “kept without food or 
wages”. see British VC (May) to Under Secretary of State, London, 30 April 1936, TNA, FO 458/126; 
Curaduría (Ordoñez), 23 January 1932, ‘Sanciones’, AGA, C-81/07720; Eyo Udo, 8 September 1941; 
GG (Fontán) to British VC (Michie), 27 November 1941, AGA, C-81/08128, E-12. 
53Madrid, La Guinea incógnita, 111. 
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law. The contract assigns, attaches him onto a plantation like a serf. They have no rights 
during the duration of the contract, but they do have cruel obligations. They lack all, 
including the right to complain”.54 
A small seam of the archive contains the un-histories of ‘free’ labour. An unsuccessful 
petition of indigenous Bubi farmers on Fernando Pó in 1931 already proposed to the 
first Republican Gobernador that braceros “should be freely allowed to search out 
diverse patrons, and be paid on a daily basis”, because, they claimed and witnessed, for 
those “now entering into a contract, for the braceros, means bad treatment, and many 
deaths from being overworked and beaten by the masters, all for 20 pesetas a month?” 
The small Bubi and Fernandino farmers had from early on openly opposed the contract 
system represented by the Spanish labour office, because the vast majority of them 
could not actually hire labour at all through the Curaduría. Only settlers and a small 
number of African elites—emancipados—could make contracts with workers: “so that 
the labour question will apply to all equally, we need to make the CURADURIA 
disappear.”55 
5.3 Vagrancy  
In schematic and largely valid terms, the change in the structure of the colonial 
economy—the growth of towns, warehouse and plantations—generated a shift in 
colonial discourse—of which tropes where mobilized to describe Africans on the 
                                                 
54Cabanellas, ¡Esclavos!, 21. 
55Jefes Bubis to GG (Manresa), 28 August 1931, ‘Proposiciones de los hijos del Pais. Los Bubis’, AGA, 
C-81/08028, E-2. Even for those who could hire labour, their main issue with the contracts seemed to be 
also that of “depositing the wages in the Curaduria” which is “impossible for us”, the undercapitalized 
small farmers. From 1938 on, labour could only be contracted by those with a “canonical marriage” 
certificate. Ballano, Aquel, 527; Nsue, Historia de la colonización, 215. While flourishing well into the 
twentieth century, small African farmers barely survived and were slowly expropriated by the large cacao 
exporting houses in Santa Isabel. These merchant warehouses could hire braceros and so they would rent 
braceros out to different small farmers in ‘exchange’ for an artificially lower price of cacao. “These 
creditors have no interest that there be an abundance of braceros, well the small farmers and their 
produce would otherwise escape from their clutches.” Anonymous, Santa Isabel, 17 August 1951, ‘El 
problema de braceros en Guinea Española’, AGA, C-81/12373, E-392. The John Holt “papers indicate 
that the key to securing cocoa from smaller Creole farmers was to provide services, such as credit, 
secretarial help, and labour at harvest time.” Clarence-Smith, Cocoa and Chocolate, 120. In the late 
1950s the so-called “cooperativas indígenas del campo de Fernando Poo” organized the Bubi farmers by 
villages and localities and through these they could hire braceros, the 30 cooperative hired about 169 
braceros in the late 1950s. Patronato de Indígenas de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea, 
Santa Isabel, 1956, ‘Datos para su historia y antecedentes y memoria del 1954’, BNE, D/16263. 
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island, of which legal codes were elaborated upon and more thoroughly enforced. As 
elsewhere in early colonial urban Africa, the early contours of a racist colonial ideology 
of “disease and inactivity”, with which both the decimated indigenous Bubi 
population—mourning with alcohol—and the unregistered immigrants were being 
enveloped with, quickly shifted by the 1930s to the superimposed label of 
“criminality”.56  
The “sole mission” of the Curaduría, writes the Curador, David Carrillo in 1936, was 
“to exercise a tutelary function for the indígenas, both nationals and foreigners, and to 
prevent that these be enslaved in any form.” Carrillo continues to say that while “our 
ordinances contain only the most just and humane orders”, it is only when these are 
“transgressed” that “peonaje follows, and in some sense this is similar to classic 
slavery”.57 Penal labour was unpaid and potentially perpetual, a kind of slavery; it 
needed no recruiters, only the architecture of the force of the state.58 Cordero Torres, 
                                                 
56Joel Glasman, ‘Unruly Agents: Police Reform, Bureaucratization, and Policemen’s Agency in Interwar 
Togo’, Journal of African History 55, 1 (2014): 79–100; Odile Goerg, ‘De la ségrégation coloniale à la 
tentation’, in Security, Crime and Segregation in West African Cities Since the 19th Century, ed. Laurent 
Fourchard and Isaac Olawale Albert (Paris: Karthala, 2003), 245–63; see also Rogers, ‘Vagrancy, 
Impressment and the Regulation of Labor in Eighteenth century Britain’. 
57Curador (Carrillo) to GG (Sanchez Guerra), 4 July 1936, AGA, C-81/08028, E-6; Carrillo only very 
briefly held the post during the Republican period. 
58The relentlessly violent role of the violence of the state, whether in legal penal contracts or the credit-
induced status regimes of bondage have for good reasons came to forefront recent labour history 
literature. Too much ink has and continues to be spilled as to whether “extra-economic” coercion or 
“non-pecuniary pressure” is to be located in revamped militaristic feudalism of “primitive accumulation” 
or whether it is an always central backdrop and operational presupposition required for all capital to 
engage in the most profitable aspects of its work. Capital can accumulate irrespective of the precise form 
or length of subjection and its corresponding status. Violence is always there and here, even in the most 
liberal and visibly peaceful places. Try telling a striking worker in Shenzhen or a homeless person going 
in and out of jail or an undocumented immigrant being deported that the threat of violence and violence 
itself do not play a role in capitalist labour markets. A footnote to this footnote. This is of course a repeat 
of a tweaked Marxists explanations that came with the more anarchist rediscovery of the “primitive 
accumulation” chapter in Capital. Violence, “the concentrated and organised force of society” was 
deployed as force that was itself an “economic power.” Marx, Capital, 776. The quote famously 
continues of course with the “transition” “of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode”. It is 
unexpected for both Marx and Engels to insist so much that “primitive accumulation” was “transitional” 
since in both Marx and Engels this political power is there from beginning to end. Engels posits a 
somewhat precise breaking point for when “slavery had been invented”, exactly when “labour-power 
acquired a value”: when the pre-ancients stopped simply killing prisoners of war, these prisoners 
suddenly “acquired value; one therefore let them live and made use of their labour. Thus force, instead of 
controlling the economic situation, was on the contrary pressed into the service of the economic 
situation.” Engels observed that the “enslavement of man” during his time in more “highly civilised 
states [where there] is wage-labour” was being “mitigated”, yet it could only proceed “to a greater or 
lesser degree” by being “carried on under police rule.” Engels, Anti-Dühring, 170, 162.  
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the jurist atop it all, noticed a similar distinction. He says he did indeed “consider as 
forced labour the semi-penal labour undertaken with those whom are considered 
socially dangerous and undesirables, under diverse laws of public order and those 
relating to vagos y maleantes [vagrants and miscreants].”59 It was fine distinction that 
did not hold up, since in effect anyone without a labour contract or anyone who was not 
a recognized landowner, was now folded into the juridico-status regime of the vago—in 
addition to possibly being a “tributary” or other subject, where the ‘educational’ telos 
and hubris of “tutelage” showed up to varying degrees. The vago was strictly a 
corollary of the order of contract: “if indígenas from a neighbouring colony should not 
find work within the said 15 to 30 days, they enter into the category of vago”.60 
All throughout the first half the twentieth century, planters were always anxiously 
awaiting any trickle of immigrants who could be lodged in their plantation patios, but 
many new arrivals did not sign contracts; they were traders. They “arrive without any 
background checks, and with a simple municipal license fill a stall with fabrics and 
tinned food and start to work.” Those who came more or less in accordance with their 
own intentions and designs were unwelcome. The question was how to bring over 
people and make them stay as braceros. Only recruiters, harnessing the power of the 
contract, could make this happen. The colonial authorities in the 1910s and 1920s did 
not need to worry much about African itinerant migrants, as they largely did not exist. 
A bundle of registries and pass-laws was also first issued on the island in 1908, and 
aimed to “reduce the possible number of vagos y maleantes [vagrants and miscreants] 
of colour who circulate through the towns, villages and pathways of these territories.” 
In addition all braceros had to carry a “pass, plaque, or card” with the “name of the 
                                                 
59Cordero Torres, Política colonial, 543. See also Clavero, Bioko, 21, 56. In most African colonies, 
international gold-standards were ratified and generalized from the 1930s on after the ILO conventions 
regarding forced labour (1930), and the recruitment of “indigenous workers” (1936) gave way to new 
labour departments and legislation. All these new benchmarks had surprisingly little bearing on Spanish 
Guinea. The Spanish delegate at the various ILO meetings in the 1930s, observed with relief that nothing 
was said about contracts as this “would have been too complicated”, because a reformist attack on the 
contract—its actual form and practice—would have immediately and automatically conflicted with 
colonial capital. El Consejero Tecnico a la XIX Conferencia Internacional de Trabajo (Cavestany 
Anduaga), 22 May 1935, AGA, C-81/12422. See also Benoit Daviron, ‘Mobilizing Labour in African 
Agriculture: The Role of the International Colonial Institute in the Elaboration of a Standard of Colonial 
Administration, 1895–1930’, Journal of Global History 5, 3 (2010): 479–501; and Cooper, 
Decolonization and African Society. 
60SubGG to GG (Bonelli), 8 June 1944, AGA, C-81/08182, E-6. 
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carrier, place of work, date of contract and signature of the master”.61 However under 
the oversight of the Republicans the first and wholly unexpected, “mass immigration” 
alarm was rung and the call for “coercive,” “restrictive measures” found a radically 
amplified field of operation—‘outsiders’ within.62 
When the Spanish Republicans prepared their “delicate study of the material” on 
vagrancy laws they came across the indispensable “necessity of colonial regulations 
that have been implemented since distant times, the French since 1853 have had 
decrees related to immigrants workers in their colonies, similar norms have been taken 
up by England, Portugal, Italy and Belgium”, norms that would “avoid that the colonies 
become places of refuge of vagos y maleantes if not undesirable people of a political 
order”.63 The Gobernador, Estanislao Lluesma, quickly passed a decree in December 
1933: “All those overstaying a thirty-day visitation period [and] those immigrants who 
are known, or suspected to be in a condition of vago, shall be interned in the 
barracones de Curaduría”. Those who “lack licit means of living, will be kept until 
they contract” or until they are “forcibly repatriated and deported.”64  Lluesma left 
office within a few months and anyhow the types of paperwork required to avoid arrest 
were quite easily acquired or bypassed. 
A lucrative ‘underclass’ was taking shape in a parallel economy alongside the 
plantations. This elaborate service sector built around the plantations consisted of 
liquor-vendors, ruffians, healers and pharmacists, paper-forgers and cacao smugglers—
                                                 
61GG (Centeno), 1 December 1908, ‘Vagos y Maleantes’, Boletin Oficial de la Colonia. This was 
reiterated in 1926. “Con el fin de no original perjuicios a patronos y braceros con la recogida de vagos 
ordenada por este Gobierno, y en tanto no se reciban las pulseras de identidad y las adquieran aquellos 
para sus servidores, se provera a estos de un papel, chapa o carton en el que el dueño, gerente o amo haga 
constar el nombre del intereado, clase de trabajo y numero de contrato.” GG (Núñez de Prado), 1 May 
1926, ‘Identidad de Braceros’, in Boletin Oficial Colonial; In the Francoist period, the paperwork was 
extended for residents and non-braceros with a series of Civil Registers and “Family Books” or Libros 
de Familia, that also obliged all to notify a change of address within eight working days, see Cordero 
Torres, Tratado elemental de derecho colonial español, 160-2. For south African civil registry see, 
Breckenridge, ‘No Will to Know’. 
62Llompart Aulet, Legislación del trabajo, 123; ‘Hospitalidad Excesiva’, El Defensor de Guinea, Santa 
Isabel, 2 November 1933; GG, 28 March 1930, AGA, C-81/07720.  
63DGMC (Duque) to GG (Lluesma), 8 December 1933, AGA, C-81/8156, E-3. 
64GG (Lluesma), 15 December 1933, ‘Decreto de 2 de diciembre de 1933; see Curaduría (Guillén), 1 
Novemeber 1934, ‘Instruccion’ in ‘Boletín Oficial de los Territorios Españoles del Golfo de Guinea’, 
Suplemento, November 1934, AGA, C-81/08126, E-1. 
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“ambulant buyers of cacao”, “especially Lagos [people], who are eminently of the 
commercial type”. 65  The colonial imagery of the vago, was crystallized in the 
“unassimilable” “Hausa mafias”66 who were represented as speculators, landlords of 
the slums, currency converters, peddlers of ‘African’ souvenirs sold to settlers and 
tourists, and ‘quack-doctors’—“the Hausa who dedicate themselves to fetish-making 
and medicine.”67 Hausa healers were held in very high esteem by braceros from all 
over the Gulf the Guinea; they were “reputed to be poisoners, healers and diviners of 
causes of ill-health; they prescribe remedies against evil by selling a simple rams’ horn 
for 500 pesetas [or] a little piece of paper written in Arabic wrapped in a black cloth” 
for 25 pesetas. When accosted by the authorities they could “defend themselves with 
the papel de libertad needed to work as independents [as tailors or carpenters for 
example] and they leave with an air triumph to secretly return to their penchant” for 
“selling medicine.”68 In the early 1930s there were “some 2500 Yaundes, as well as an 
infinitely higher number of Hausas and Lagos, of English origin, and a quite 
considerable figure hailing from Calabar, Port-Harcourt, Victoria, Duala, Cribi, Tiko, 
Sierra-Leone, Monrovia, Accra y Opobo, which means that the number of resident 
foreigners on the island is far in excess of Spanish subjects”—as underlined in the 
original text of this very alarmed letter by the head of the colonial office in Madrid in 
1933.69 The African population on the island—now almost wholly immigrant—were 
seen as outsiders living within, not as subjects to be moulded. They could be exposed, 
without the veil of paternalism, to the extraordinarily spiteful imperial state. 
A host of new registration regimes and paper templates were mulled over and prepared 
by the Republicans at considerable expense, but the revamped vagrancy law only hit 
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66 Pélissier, Los territorios españoles de Africa, 48; García, Fernando el Africano, 35; Baguena, 
Manuales del Africa Española, 52. 
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the ground in their last month in office.70 It was to be expected that colonial laws, 
labour laws among them, were re-implemented with an unprecedented literalism by the 
Francoist regime from September 1936 on—whose ‘early phase’, uncompromising and 
virulently fascist, as in Spain, lasted well into the late 1940s.71 In Spanish Guinea the 
vagrancy code specifically target the Nigerian “los traders”, as the Spanish liked to call 
them—anyone who “worked on their account”.72 The Francoist customs officers were 
given the mandate to “let no one embark on ships, except those duly authorized,” 
barring those who had “outstanding obligations in these territories,” or who were 
“considered vago and who cannot show the required documents”.73 Vagos could not 
leave the island except through arrest and deportation, only someone with a “freedom 
paper”—issued after the expiry of a contract—could. The traders dispersed and 
partially regrouped. It was only under these revamped series of ordinances that allowed 
a series of Nigerian traders to splinter off and become Fernando Pó’s most effective 
recruiters yet. Effective because of the presence of the prison and punishment. The 
contract was not a communication; it was your name in a registry, a necklace, a 
number, a tin plaque, an addendum to the forces of registration and legibility. What 
sustains these forces? It would be tautological to say ‘mechanism for identification’, 
since that is only one of their effects. It is violence, structural violence and actual 
violence74—the latter when necessary, as it so often was, was undertaken by the state, 
after all, modernity purified the public and the private into their respective spheres. 
                                                 
70‘Ordenanza del 22 Agosto 1936. Vagos y Maleantes. Normas’, in Miranda, Leyes Coloniales, 1468. 
71Indeed the Francoists held this Ley de Vagos y Maleantes, (Vagrancy and Rogues Code) intact until the 
end of the colonial rule in 1968, and in Spain until 1970. España, Ley de Vagos y Maleantes (1933), 192; 
see Salvador Cayuela Sánchez, ‘La biopolítica en la España franquista’ (PhD Thesis, Universidad de 
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72Sandinot, ‘Guinea ecuatorial (española)’, 94. 
73Secretario General to GG (Fontán), 9 July 1940, AGA, C-81/08806, E-‘Expediente de Información con 
caracter reservado sobre incidente occurrido en Santa Isabel con un Buque de Guerra Ingles’.  
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Figure 18 Port of Santa Isabel, 1940s75 
 
                                                 
75Photos clockwise from top to bottom; Martínez, Poto Poto, 40, 20; Unnamed and untitled small post-
card like Photobook in BNM. 
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5.4 Law and Order 
Even though there were many cases of flogging by the overseers of plantation, the 
violent disciplinary scene belongs properly to the Guardia Colonial; systematic torture 
was displaced from private to public hands. This degrading “inhuman treatment” was 
not a matter of insider or outsider status, the “social and economic disabilities suffered 
by the British African community (resulting from their relegation to [the] inferior 
status)” of no-emancipado, had much “in common with Spanish ‘indigenas’ at the 
hands of the forces of law and order. Instances of brutality (such as flogging with 
rubber truncheons) and of imprisonment in semi-barbaric conditions, without trial or 
even the preferment of a charge” were reported daily, occasionally only weekly, by the 
British Vice Consuls.76 The Francoist officials summed up the role of the Guardia 
Colonial as “assuring the Empire of Law, serenity and order and assures the respect of 
the people and property of peaceful men.”77  
If “a labourer declined to accept the contract placed before him he can be treated under 
the existing Spanish laws, as a rogue and a vagabond.”78 Indeed the early Francoist 
archives are abound with petitions from imprisoned immigrants “who wish to be set 
free”, a condition “those in charge do not permit unless we agree to be recruited”. The 
Francoist Curadores had no qualms about keeping people in collective and deplorable 
jail cells for months on end: “for refusing to contract themselves, they shall remain in 
the barracoon.”79 The daily routine was “imprisonment and detention without trial”, 
“prison conditions [were] semi-barbaric”. The Barracones de Curaduría were long 
holding dens, without bathrooms: to relieve themselves inmates were marched off in 
                                                 
76Officer Administering the Government, Lagos to CO, 9 January 1948, TNA, CO 554/154/1. 
77Yglesias de La Riva, Politica indígena en Guinea, 97. This is ancient imperial despotic hubris. In some 
of the earliest records of Middle Kingdom (2050–1786 B.C) along the Nile, the pharaoh was seen to 
have a “sacred duty to preserve public order” expressed in the “concept of mar (‘justice’ or ‘order’)” on 
whose principle “depended the equilibrium of the universe.” Peters, ‘The Prison before the Prison’, 8. 
78British VC (Michie), 28 February 1941, ‘Labour Conditions’, TNA, FO 371/26908. 
79Antonio Nsomoro and Simon Ebona to GG (de Mendívil), 17 June 1937, AGA, C-81/08153, E-1; 
Curaduría (Mondeda) to GG (de Mendívil), 2 June 1937. 
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the evening anywhere near the ocean under the supervision of armed guards. 80 The cell 
at Santa Isabel’s police station, as Pepple tells us in his first hand account, “held over a 
hundred prisoners who slept there, almost one over the other. The place was a boiling 
cauldron of carbon dioxide with a repugnant stench of urin and faeces, and the idea 
came obsessively to mind that committing suicide would be the only way out”.81 
As if to parallel the total imbrication of the state in the market, the Francoist regime 
actually started charging prisoners for their own maintenance cost.82 Those who fell 
into the category vago were arrested, put to forced labour, and were charged their own 
maintenance cost, a contract was usually the only way out—as the Nigerian Johsin Oke 
had the misfortune of finding out after being imprisoned “for having wanted to abscond 
from service without having completed the four year contract”. He quickly petitioned 
the Governor: “not having any help to cover the costs of prison and not knowing how 
much longer I could remain in said prison […] I SUPLICATE: please let me finish the 
contract […] a job that will be fulfilled with zeal.”83 A British missionary writing in the 
1950s notes sarcastically that “Spanish prisons do not provide food, they don’t believe 
in pampering their inmates”. 84  In 1961, a visiting Nigerian Minister of Labour 
expressed “his disbelief that some Nigerians who committed offenses, and as a result 
thereof, and after having been deployed in all sorts of penal labour, were charged their 
own maintenance costs”.85  
                                                 
80British VC and LO (Rylands) to Commissioner of Labour, Lagos, 11 July 1947, ‘Labour Report 
No.7/1947’, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278; British VC and LO (Rylands) to Commissioner of Labour, 
Lagos, 8 January 1947, NAE, CALPROF 17/1/278. 
81Isaac Pepple, 16 June 1956, ‘17 dias en una prision española’, AGA, C-81/08221. 
82This was not so earlier. The Republican treasury prepared elaborate measures for provisions and even 
paid penal labourers considerable wages. See AT Santa Isabel to GG (Sánchez Guerra), 13 December 
1935, ‘Proyecto de Organizacion de la Carcel Santa Isabel’, AGA, C-81/08134. 
83Johsin Oke to GG (de Mendívil), 29 January 1937, AGA, C-81/08153. 
84 ‘Newsletter No.3, Fernando Poo, Spanish Equatorial Guinea, August 1952’, in David Lawrence, 
(unpublished memoirs, 1999), ‘Faith Hope Love: A Legacy’, 45, SOAS, London, MMS, MMSL 
MSS/028. Should a prisoner “have no means of obtaining food” he would be allowed on ‘parole’ having 
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85SubGG (Suances), 22 May 1961, ‘Visita de Region Ecuatorial de la Mision Nigeriana por el Ministro 
de Trabajo Federal Sr. Johnson’, AGA, C-81/13039, E-392. It seems a new Curador tried to put a stop to 
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Even in 1962 Spanish colonial law did “not consider” prestación as “forced labour but 
rather obligatory,” with a strange introjection or rendition along the thought-lines of 
‘compulsory education’ that rendered anyone on the island subject to the state’s “fiscal 
and educational policies.” As José María Cordero Torres, the foremost Spanish fascist 
colonial jurist, says: this “obligation to labour” was taking place “under a framework of 
militarization” but it “was paid and limited in time”—so, he probably surmised, it ‘was 
not slavery-slavery’. The same reasoning was applied to contracts.86 It was even the 
Republicans who articulated most consistently the mystified legitimation of forced 
labour, even while they initially abolished it and never re-implemented it on a large 
scale: “in general, we believe, that forced labour turns the indígena into a slave, but in 
this case, forced labour” will be directed for “their own benefit” because it was a tool to 
battle the “state of nature” itself, “the vice of idleness”.87 Imperial formations forging 
the conditions of extractive and endlessly expanding output worked “not just by moral 
compulsion, but above all by using moral compulsion to mobilize sheer physical 
force.”88 
They did not make the common theoretical—liberal and Marxist—distinction between 
the “individual” exploitation of debtors, wage-labourers or serfs and “collective” or 
state coercion such as conscription or convict labour on the other.89 Colonial sources 
almost never make this distinction, in fact they put all their efforts into actively 
propagating their continuous entanglement. On Fernando Pó those conscripted 
suddenly signed contracts; free people received advances and entered contract on their 
own volition but became contracted and were subjected to serf-like relations enforced 
only by the violence of the state; contracts were decreed obligatory; corvée or 
prestación was explicitly intensified to funnel people into contract; contracts exempted 
                                                                                                                                              
it, it is uncertain whether the Governor took his advice. Curaduría (Hanza) to Secretario General, 13 
March 1962, AGA, C-81/08214, E-1. 
86Cordero Torres, Política colonial, 543; See also Clavero, Bioko, 21, 56. 
87Arizcun and Martínez, ‘Memoria sobre los territorios españoles del Golfo de Guinea’, 126, BNE, 
Afr/13541. 
88Graeber, Debt, 346. 
89Geoffrey E. M de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to 
the Arab Conquests (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 44; Graeber, Debt, 127–165. 
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from indefinite detention in prison; prisoners could purchase their release by signing 
contracts. Because of these tightly interwoven labour packages, “wage labor” appeared 
to many colonized subjects from a local “point of view [as] a mere extension of forced 
labor, which in effect it was.”90 The only thing that remained constant was the contract 
as a branch or effect of forced labour emanating from the tributary and criminal justice 
system. 
Forced labour had no difficulty expressing Spanish Guinea. Unfree labour was not 
couched in a regretful tone of expedients. It was not the constantly reverted to 
underbelly of colonials half-heartedly wishing for “free labour”. We need not take “the 
history of unfreedom [a]s the history of capital in disguise”,91 almost without hesitation 
it was openly lauded and morally valorised throughout the planter’s reign in Los 
territories españoles del Golfo de Guinea. Unlike their more paranoid and sicklier 
northern European counterparts, the Spanish in West Africa showed no self-restraint in 
becoming settler colonials and letting the uncompromising conditions for their 
economía colonial unfold. “The Portuguese, with blood from the very same mother, 
have been living for centuries in Sao Thome e Principe, right next to Fernando Póo.” 
“There is no racial or climatic impossibility otherwise this would entail our 
disqualification as a country that colonizes. Sure we will have to foist discipline and 
engage in the spirit of sacrifice, but this will be combined with the stimulus of the State 
and so we have plenty of ways to achieve this”.92 “The system of forced or rather 
obligatory labour for works in the public interest or which increases the output of our 
agriculture”—a system of bondage that caused the deaths of tens of thousands, and the 
torture, actual torture and systematic beatings by guards, of hundreds of thousands—
was said to have “no shortage of benefits. Its inconveniences are minimal, if one takes 
into account the benefits it represents for the development and stimulation of the 
economía nacional”.93 
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Even in the 1960s the Curador—the first one under the Francoist with any appropriate 
legal training—reiterated “labour as a social duty that can be required from anyone in 
the Region Ecuatorial Española without impediment. This is in conformity with the 
laws in force; tributo obligado stimulates the wealth and assets of the patrimonio 
nacional.”94 When Ghana started bringing forward international legal claims against 
Portugal for failing to enforce the 1957 convention on forced labour—that Portugal 
actually ratified soon after—the Spanish started worrying. The Spanish did not sign this 
new treaty on forced labour until 1967, but in the early 1960s they were trying to figure 
out how to pass through all these new international legal accords they had decided to 
open themselves up to. Even though Spanish Guinea had recently passed into the status 
of province in 1959, the Region Ecuatorial, the labour department was still of a 
“synthetic order”—after all “local peculiarities need[ed] to be taken into account”. The 
colonial despot, the “Governor General [was] still taking the place of the [Spanish] 
Ministry of Labour”.95  
“Some of the British officials in Nigeria” had “the unpleasant task of glossing over the 
reports of extreme brutality (cases of Nigerian workers being beaten to death were not 
unknown)”. They sat by; sometimes “conscience-stricken”96 claims a colonial Labour 
Officer in Nigeria who opened his heart out to the Observer newspaper in 1961; other 
times they sat busily and pithily transcribing thousands of complaints, and sending 
labourers to the Curaduría telling them they “must obey Spanish laws,” as confessed in 
a “secret and personal” letter from the British Vice Consul on the island in 1954.97 
Nigerian political activists at the start of their independence were quite struck that a 
few miles from their shores lay an “appendage of Spain”. Even though “every 
                                                 
94Curaduría (Robles Castillo), June 1961, ‘Plan de trabajo’, AGA, C-81/13037. 
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legislation comes from Spain”, the appendage had its own claws. The Nigerian Youth 
Congress saw the “Nigerian government’s support of slavery on the island” as “a 
negation of panafricanism.”98 It was a negation of everything that had been arduously 
deliberated and fought for in the anti-colonial twentieth century—along the contours of 
its own space-time Fernando Pó had one big warped foot residing in the imperial-neo-
slavery of the nineteenth century and a few other places and epochs. Indeed anti-
colonial activist and the press started lumping Spanish Guinea together with Portugal 
and South Africa whose self-declared alliance in the 1960s was formed as “powerful 
political-military-economic of racists and colonizers fighting against the movements of 
national liberation.”99  The radical Zikist wing of the NCNC, the party of the first 
Nigerian leader Nnamdi Azikiwe, composed of millions of members of labour unions, 
associations and other parties, with a support base in the Eastern Provinces, listed the 
“annexation of Fernando Po” into the top four points of its resolution.100 “Progressive 
organizations in Nigeria demand decisive action against the Franco slave-holders. […] 
The movement in Nigeria for the liberation of Fernando Po is spreading. It is a grave 
warning to the Spanish colonialists who have made this beautiful island a hell on 
earth.”101 
The Nigerian journalist Peter Enahoro was one of the few outsiders who gained a 
glimpse of plantation life in Francoist Fernando Pó, by conning his way into one after 
disguising himself as a “Nigerian Labour Inspector from the Consulate”102. He goes on 
to ask: “is there forced labour in Fernando Poo? There is no slavery in the sense 
defined by the codes of international labour [organization]. But before you breathe a 
                                                 
98Linus B. Njoku, ‘The Fernando Po Question’, West African Pilot, Lagos, 3 February 1961; Olatunji 
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sigh of relief let us examine its alternative, the Ordinances that the Spanish have 
elaborated.” 103  Ordinances do indeed explain a lot. Mich Nwoke, a labourer who 
returned from Fernando Pó, sent this to a newspaper editor: “Those of us who have 
worked in FERNANDO POO know very well that a passport to that island is a passport 
to hell.” He even says that Peter Enahoro underestimated the reality of “the brutal 
island” in his widely circulated exposé: “understandably for security reasons, [Peter 
Enahoro] did not stay long enough on the island. This short period of stay probably 
explains why he was so soft on the Spaniards”.104 Journalists, parties, youth groups, 
and a variety of associations entered the civic arena to “act as liasons” and become 
representatives of the “illiterate labourers [who] can find no medium of expression and 
do not know the method of approach.” They filled the space of representation with an 
unending spree of “atrocious and fretful news […] about the inhumane treatment of 
Nigerian labourers recruited to Fernando Poo”—since the late 1930s “local dailies [had 
been] reporting atrocious acts of barbarity allegedly meted out by the Spanish 
Government to Nigerians in Fernando Poo.”105  
The British and Nigerian state kept signing off on the colonial labour treaties were “not 
keen to support the unjust campaign unleashed by the Nigerian press” but rather intent 
on participating in a geo-political ceremonial space of delegations and formalized 
inspection tours that always seemed to end with mutually supportive speeches “at the 
tennis club”. When the Nigerian Minister for Labour visited Spanish Guinea “he 
stopped to chat with some Nigerian hospitalized patients. [A labourer by the name of] 
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Idjo, grumbled that an Official from the branch of the Labour Office did not attend the 
labour complaints put to him because he got along oh so well with the whites who 
showered him with diners and whisky”.106 
A non-militarized civic space could only emerge outside the island. The Spanish 
imprisoned and deported any Nigerians who were seen as “infiltrators” and 
“communist sympathizers”—anyone who had newspapers or other “documents written 
in English”, anyone who was “too well-dressed”, or who “was speaking in a certain 
way”, anyone “who was uttering phrases related to the presence of braceros nigerianos 
on this island that have a possible political character”—and someone who was 
described as an “overeducated bracero” because the “collected works of J. Stalin” were 
found in his bag.107 As the daughter of the Francoist officer in charge of censorship 
says of her father’s work-place duties: “nothing that alludes to black revolts, nothing 
that allude to the problem of slavery or slaving”.108 The Spanish colonial archive is an 
exact inversion of this public censorship. Francoist propaganda did much to repress and 
remove any independent investigators who ventured into the island; these were thought 
to have “the ulterior motive of disobedience and sedition” bent on propagating “the 
infamous media campaign followed by ISAAC T. Pepple, who has disfigured the 
unrivalled civilizing action of Spain”.109  
The African anti-colonial front against Fernando Pó was almost single-handedly 
activated by the accidental journeys of Pepple, and his tremendous revelations made in 
an article written for Drum magazine in 1957—an article that can be described as the 
“Pepple event”. Pepple had been dispatched by the “Observer [newspaper] of Port 
Harcourt to do a story on the island”; initially he was only given “access to the model 
plantation” near Santa Isabel, so he proceeded to write “a glowing account of Fernando 
Po.” “There it might have rested” Pepple says, “had I not required a holiday” for which 
                                                 
106SubGG (Gobierno Civil de la Provincia de Rio Muni), 22 May 1961, AGA C-81/13039, E-392. 
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he decided to “return to this pleasant holiday island.” “On the first day he stumbled 
upon “Meredith Pepple, a second cousin on my fathers side” who “had just been beaten 
up for not going to work for two days.” After bringing this case to the attention of the 
British Vice Consul, a Spanish “police van arrived and I was whisked away to the 
common jail. Now this was their big mistake. For it permitted me to find out from the 
inmates what actually goes on in Fernando Po.” Pepple was “convicted of sedition and 
fined 18 pounds” and spent three weeks in jail before being deported. From “prison”, 
Pepple says, he “saw in all its nakedness the inhuman code of fascist oppression.” 
Much can be gained from always including the perspective of the prison; posterity 
owes much to Pepple.110 The prison changes the equation, but it is the language of 
contract itself that veils this calculation as one rooted in something other than violence. 
5.5 The End  
Before their almost complete flight or expulsion from the island shortly after 
independence in the spring of 1969, planters had been producing up to 3% of the 
world’s cocoa. They had generated growth rates of 3 to 7% in the post-war decades. On 
the back of an explosive global growth, the Governor, Faustino Ruiz (1949–1962) 
christened his long reign the “great flourishing”: “a real surprise these last few years: 
cacao production has doubled since 1943 [and] timber exports have quadrupled.”111 
When the economía imploded after independence recruitment for contract labour did 
not come to an end. Though recruitment with Nigeria ends strictly with decolonization 
in 1968 during the intensification of the Nigerian civil war.  
Macias was democratically elected. Nigerians did not get to vote—if they had been the 
outcome would not have been different. The early mood amongst Nigerians on the 
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island was pro-Macias, he had after all supported Biafra in the realm of relief logistics 
by allowing the airport of Santa Isabel to be used by a variety of humanitarian 
organisations—and, it was widely presumed, also by mercenaries. These had already 
been landing in the summer of 1967. The Spanish supported Biafra because the 
movement, the last Spanish Governor said was “Christian, anti-communist and anti-
British”. In the late 1960s, the number of canoes going between the island and the 
Cross River “exploded, they [were] transporting all sorts of supplies”, principally 
foodstuffs but also weapons. A general of the Nigerian military warned the Spanish 
“that it better be only cognac”.112  The Anglo-Spanish Employment Agency ceased 
operations in late 1967, the flights and steamer connecting Calabar and Santa Isabel 
were withdrawn. Alfredo Jones, the head of the Agency and Spanish Consul in Calabar, 
fled to Lagos. In the summer of 1967 the Spanish on Fernando Pó created “campos de 
concentración for those Nigerians que se nieguen totalmente a recontratarse”—those 
“who refuse to recontract” as well those rendered “useless, by accident or by having an 
air of incompatibility with employers.” The “workers will have to be inclined to accept 
a forcible prolongation of their services, which will be paid, seeing that it is impossible 
for them to return home”.113  
Until 1969, the “events in Biafra led a great number of refugees coming to Santa 
Isabel”, who according to the Nigerian Ambassador “were more than happy to be able 
to find work” on the island. In 1970 there “were at least 70,000 Nigerians distributed 
thought Equatorial Guinea”. However within a few years almost all had left “Macias 
Nguema’s Bloody Hell”.114 When Nigerians departed or were finally evacuated from 
the island in January 1976, an op-ed by one prolific writer, “Signor Tofu” sums up the 
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mood: after “four decades of torture and enslavement, wellcome back to Nigeria. You 
did not deserve to suffer so.” “Nigerians have suffered down through the decades of the 
20th century, from the days when they arrived in large dug-out canoes with the 
connivance of the waves.” “For all intents and purposes it has been a sorry saga, a 
history of human degeneration, a chapter of mans inhumanity to man”.115 
Nigerians started leaving en masse in November 1972 after street riots over 
unclaimable wages were responded with a massacres by the Guardia who shot into the 
very compound of the Nigerian embassy. About 20,000 people were evacuated by the 
Nigerian government. In January 1976 the Nigerian head of state, Murtala Muhammed, 
pulled the final straw: “charging ‘barbaric treatment’ of its citizens” he deployed the 
Nigerian military to organize the emergency evacuation of all remaining Nigerians and 
many Guineans who passed themselves off as Nigerians—9,500 on planes and 15,500 
on boats, during which at least 11 Nigerians were killed on the island. Bioko was left 
virtually depopulated, even Macias had stopped living there in 1972 for fear of being 
captured after many thought could be an imminent military invasion from Nigeria after 
the massacre at the embassy. Campo Yaounde lay abandoned, all “commerce came to a 
complete standstill”.116 In terms of non-diplomatic foreigners only the French, Russian, 
Chinese and North Korean corporations, technical assistance staff and construction 
workers remained. The only shops were state-run and sold Chinese goods, principally 
tinned spam-meat and grey “mao suits”. 
A forced recruitment of 25,000 Fang peasants and “vagrants” from Rio Muni managed 
to salvage the island’s cacao harvests in 1975–1976. A quota system of 1000 
voluntarios or “volunteers” per district was arranged—principally through the same 
channels the colonial state had used, the schools and the prison and partly though 
appointed “chiefs”. By the late 1970s the plantation economy—in the island that had 
been re-christened the Isla Macías Nguema Biyogo Ñegue Ndong—neared collapse. 
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During Macias’ rule, an estimated almost half of the Guinean population went into 
exile in Gabon, Cameroon, Nigeria and Spain. Thousands of “counter- revolutionaries” 
were executed extra-judicially by military personnel and the youth militias—called 
Marcha con Macias. The country underwent a self-proclaimed Maoist cultural 
revolution; expunging the “neo-colonial yoke”; the favoured line in many of the self-
written anthems and poems of the Marcha con Macias.117 Export of cacao fell from 
30,000 tonnes in 1970 to as little as 2000 in the late 1970s, as much as the Fernandinos 
had been exporting by themselves around 1900. The total GNP imploded by 90%, per 
capita income was 70US$.118 The country was soon after taken out of the circulation of 
a long-standing state-led agricultural capitalism. Generals in Macias’ armed forces ran 
any remaining plantations with prisoners; it is they who profited from the continuous 
last-ditch attempts to ‘salvage’ of the cacao harvest. Quite a few of these same generals 
currently run the government and presidency of Equatorial Guinea.119 
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6. Conclusion: Implications for the ‘Spectrum’ 
A look at the specific periods and places where touts ruled recruitment through 
economies of deception and escalation raises some interesting questions for global 
labour history and particularly for the “mesmerizing contrast between ‘free’ and 
‘unfree’ labour”. That the “recruitment of labour proceeded in more complex ways than 
our stultifying orthodoxies suggest” is clear by now. 1 The impression or lesson that 
Fernando Pó imparts is not smooth, it is not one of steady transitions or contiguous 
continuities but is marked by strange reversals and introjected reconfigurations. On 
Fernando Pó the creation of a labour market and the driving of labour into it proceeded 
in much more contradictory and unpredictable ways than the notions of “shifts” or 
“continuities” along the proverbial “free-unfree labour spectrum” suggest. To be sure, 
touts were one of the indispensable and varied rhythms of the “middle” of the 
spectrum, subsisting, economists would say, because of a scarcity or a border, in sectors 
where labour was in great demand, where a business had a high labour turnover, where 
working conditions were sub-standard. Touts were not simply a “blur” in the middle, 
their ossification into a type or their blurring into a segment of the spectrum forecloses 
the reasons for their existence and their range of manoeuvres and potentials. Touts, on 
either end, throw the conceptual pillars of clarity—free and unfree, coercion and 
consent—into disarray. 
Recruiters cannot be adequately conceived as belonging to either free or unfree labour 
relations; though they could channel both. Their open-endedness lay not in the nature 
of their techniques but in how these intersected with the contract and the subjectivity of 
those they recruited. There can be no assessment of whether labour on Fernando Pó 
was free or unfree, or rather this exercise cannot emerge from an examination of the 
contract itself, nor from an imputed or registered abstract mental state of consent, nor 
from a consideration of working conditions on the plantations; these could be seen by 
different actors in a variety of ways, from a more paternalistic, healthy, and biopolitical 
light to a more acidic and tortuous and bitter one. Recruiters could lead to both 
polarities, but they contained the potential to transform themselves, and even 
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reconfigure colonial societies and the experiences of those working in a colonial 
plantation island. Their singular power comes from their generative ambivalence, and it 
is a power that revealed the contradictions of imperial capitalism; they showed how the 
imperial contract was both compatible with unfree labour and incompatible with free 
labour. They exposed contradictions, which is to say, they proved colonial ideology 
wrong. They were effective in this mission, they did a “good job” so to say, but 
recruiters were of course neither part of the “good” or the “bad” end of the “free-
unfree” labour spectrum. Were they then neither, or both? They were absolutely 
“grey”—but a thick heaving grey and continually added to compound—composed of 
both whites and blacks, containing both regressive and upwards spirals. 
To recall the tripartite division of labour mobilization that Cooper makes in relation to 
South African touts, they seemed to largely reside and emerge from a third quality, 
“grey”, the third non-pair of “the good, the bad and the ugly”. Moral categories have a 
way to feed into aesthetic ones and invert them. The panorama, areas of operation and 
categories of experience of touts were beyond good and evil.2 Touts are a problem, 
sometimes to some of their victims, and other times to those who try to regulate them; 
their actions would be described in various moral keys as greedy, irresponsible, 
unreliable, or reprehensible. This profane quality is what makes touts also a conceptual 
problem. Touts cannot be approached or apprehended with binary thinking. Like in the 
profoundly dualistic triptychs of Hieronymus Bosch—The Garden of Earthly Delights, 
The Last Judgement—the images of hell are straight out of early modern lithographs 
depicting the techniques for terrorizing disobedient serfs and slaves, while paradise is, 
if not free labour, then primordial with the potential for liberation—Eve picking fruits 
at her leisure. Even for Bosch, the side panels are the most brutally familiar, from 
dreams and nightmares; everything ‘interesting’, fantastical yet real, happens in the 
broad central canvas that clearly defies labels. In the grand middle panels of Bosch’s 
triptychs are horrendous and tantalizing scenes, depraved and lush, where bodies swim 
and fly with giant fruits; and fallen angels, who have shape-shifted into hybrid insect-
scavengers clumsily wielding blades and cleavers. 
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Recruiters—those quasi-strangers who are paid for their efforts—would clearly belong 
somewhere in the middle of the unfree-free labour spectrum, between perpetual and 
punctuated labour, between unpaid and paid by the day. On either end of the spectrum 
there are no recruiters. In theory, masters had the power of life and death over their 
conquered captives, which is what produces the status of the “slave” as permanent and 
unpaid labour.3 In unrecruited casual free labour, labour spontaneously and desperately 
self-assembles. Only the worker is paid or rather meagrely compensated after the 
task—exploitation in exchange. Touts and despots—labour contractors and variously 
armed bureaucrats—might in theory have withered away by themselves; their services 
of harassment and temptation coupled to direct compulsion were no longer necessary in 
the “transition” to “capitalist society”.4 Yet when it came to recruiters, Spanish and 
other European colonials in the post-emancipation Atlantic worried about the radical 
commercialization of labour resulting from displacement: both the continuing 
wholesale purchase of people and of workers treating themselves as their own 
commodity. What “was at issue was not so much the capacity of market penetration to 
                                                 
3Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), 18–25. 
4Much mostly worthwhile ink has been spilled in the key debates on “free and unfree” labour that 
flooded previous conjunctures of mostly Marxist theory. The debates can be briefly glossed as the Dobb-
vs-Sweezy, Finley-vs-the-classicists, Laclau-vs-Frank, Rudra-vs-Throner, Brenner-vs-the world, and a 
belated but essential and very insightful Banaji-vs-Brass battle. A lot would need to be cited. The debates 
can summarized as taking place between formalist or purists inspired by the late Marx (Gerald Cohen, 
Neil Brenner, Ernesto Laclau, etc.) and World-Systems Theory (Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder 
Frank, etc.) who were accused of conflating and stretching. Capitalists springing up wholesale under 
imperial land and labour laws were not as stringent in applying puritanical definition of free labour, 
whose two pillars, “free from” land and “free to” choose, are famous enough to never need to be repeated 
again. Marx, Capital, 171. For an overview, critique and overcoming of the debates see, Alice Thorner, 
‘Semi-Feudalism or Capitalism? Contemporary Debate on Classes and Modes of Production in India’, 
Economic and Political Weekly 17, 59 (1982): 2061–66; Cooper et al., Confronting Historical 
Paradigms; Shahid Amin and Marcel van der Linden, eds., “Peripheral” Labour?: Studies in the History 
of Partial Proletarianization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1–9. Apart from the 
unfathomable, a person being stolen by another person, owned and treated purely as object and 
possession, as beast of burden and chattel, and the idyllic if the sometimes impoverished relief of really 
free labour, touts and despots appear as the makers of binds. Recruitment is the orchestrating, regulating 
and guaranteeing of an influx of those who did “not spontaneously offer their services at the place of 
employment.” The Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention, no. 50 (Geneva, International Labour 
Office, 1936), Article 2. A more contemporary scene of this type of labour would be the waiting around 
on the roadside for construction contractors or farm work in California or Almeria. Though how this 
“dispensable” and indispensable migrant labour arrived at the roadside, through the advice of kin and 
people smugglers is not dissimilar to some historical recruiting assemblages under colonial rule. Or 
previous late Roman ones: “The labour market in the localized sense of a place where the hiring of 
labour occurred appears only rarely in ancient sources. Optatus in a famous passage refers to the 
nundinae where gangs of Circumcellions would usually hang out” waiting for odd-jobs. Banaji, Agrarian 
Change in Late Antiquity, 203. 
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loosen workers from the land but an excess of commercialized labour mobilization, 
over which neither the planters nor the state was able to establish effective control.”5 
Unravelling the features of touts and despots in recruitment, of the market and the state, 
of Atlantic constellations and imperial formations, reveals a constant sequence of 
abrupt shifts, enabling, giving way and superseding each other: the colonial 
administration repeatedly engineers and retracts the onslaught of corvée, penal 
sanctions and vagrancy laws to shove people into contracts; recruiters appear and 
reappear in different guises once these laws are cast and recast; la recluta generates an 
unexpected lifeline for a new generation of Calabar middlemen trying to recoup the 
fortunes they lost to British monopoly-capital; but after mounting the largest labour 
trafficking network on the West African coast they lose their hold to ventures with touts 
at the forefront, who harness and radically realign an existing labour force; employers 
flood the market with escalating offers of credit and advances to new recruits to try to 
instil debt bondage, but these amounts actually become a pathetic pittance in the eyes 
of labourers who have in mind the rapidly inflating costs and expectations of life, so 
they outmanoeuvre pass-laws to pocket advances, deserting to other plantations and 
signing new contracts under false names in the process; the escalation of this simple 
underhand sign-on bonus relayed by touts threatens the island’s plantations with 
implosion; guards, guards everywhere, yet they are completely unaware of the hide-
outs and pseudonyms of deserters, and are unable to distinguish a fake name on a fake 
contract because bribed functionaries have been handing out forms under the table. 
Timespans and paths coincide or radically diverge, free and unfree were side by side, 
separated only by a piece of paper, yet a doubling, an inconsistency—a forged contract, 
a renegotiation of unofficial advances—could make everything invert or collapse. 
A sustained attention on the ambivalent practices of recruiters reveals creative 
potentials for intensification and unravelling, rather than single points along a ‘free-
unfree’ labour spectrum. The recruiters’ presence was volatile. Touts did not simply 
reside in narrow bands of the grey areas, rather they could combine with others and 
push towards and redefine either extreme at varying times. The early twenty-first-
century drift in the historiography seems to stagnate on the same realization that 
                                                 
5Sen, ‘Commercial Recruiting and Informal Intermediation’, 11.  
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disturbed nineteenth-century abolitionists, some of whom also came to see contract 
labour along a foggy spectrum of slippages and resemblances, “along a very broad 
continuum rather than as a binary opposition.”6 However if the actual operations and 
experiences of such blurs are taken into account a different, even more unstable but 
also more consistently crystallized, image appears.  
6.1 The Middle and End of the Spectrum 
The notion of a continuum or “spectrum” was analytically articulated in the writings of 
the classicists Moses Finley as well as Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, who more or less 
brought the term to bear in academic circles half a century ago. As notable Weberians 
and Marxists amongst the classicists, they engaged in old wrangles over “status” and 
“class”, but in empirical practice they both shifted the attention of their colleagues from 
the “evils of slavery” arising from war and piracy towards “the evils of short-term 
tenancy under the harsh Roman law of debt” as well as “all sorts of other kinds of 
unfree labour” that existed in the first few millennia of empire “to a far greater extent, I 
think, than most classical scholars and even ancient historians have realised.” 
Historians have long since peopled the expanded central canvas of the spectrum with 
what Finley called “involuntary” or “dependent” labour, which was “to a greater or 
lesser extent not free, a category for which our language provides no appropriate one-
word label.”7 Finley thought of the free-unfree range as “metaphorical, discontinuous 
                                                 
6Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor, 8. For how non-historians have adopted this line see 
Stephanie Barrientos, Uma Kothari, and Nicola Phillips, ‘Dynamics of Unfree Labour in the 
Contemporary Global Economy’, The Journal of Development Studies 49, 8 (2013): 1037–41. Though in 
certain sectors of labour historiography the indisputable ingredients of free and unfree have remained 
analytically salient, always when decoupled from the arrow of modernity and the ready-made chart of 
history in two or three separate world. Arif Dirlik, Vinay Bahl, and Peter Gran, History After the Three 
Worlds: Post-Eurocentric Historiographies (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Sabyasachi 
Bhattacharya, ‘Labour Forms and International Labour Flows in the Context of North–South 
Relationship: An Overview’, in The Long Twentieth Century: Globalization Under Hegemony, The 
Changing World Economy, ed. Kwame S. Jomo (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1–32. 
7Finley, The Ancient Economy, 69, 65; Finley was trying to pluralize the debate: “we are the heirs of the 
Roman law, filtered through the Middle Ages, and we are mesmerized by the notion that at the lower end 
of the social scale, in the work force, there are three and only three possible categories, slaves, serfs and 
free wage-earners.” Under “involuntary” Finley includes “everyone who worked for another not because 
of membership in the latter’s family, as in a peasant household, and not because he had entered a 
voluntary, contractual agreement (whether for wages, honoraria or fees), but because he was bound to do 
so by some pre-condition, birth into a class of dependents or debt or capture or any other situation which, 
by law or custom, automatically removed some measure of his freedom of choice and action, usually for 
a long term or for life.” 
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spectrum, with gaps here, heavier concentrations there.” Like in the spectrum of light 
itself when viewed through a prism, fringes emerge but “the difference among the 
primary colours remains perfectly visible.”8  Finley uses the metaphor to show the 
overlaps of “colours” at the “fringes”, while the spectrum itself can be as crisp as a 
rainbow, and be converted into a patchwork matrix. 9  Colonial labour history has 
sometimes fallen into the traps provided by the metaphor of the spectrum. One of the 
effects of deploying such purified states and “status” categories is that static categories 
are foregrounded at the expense of complex transformations, inversions, and mutual 
imbrications—which often recruiters helped bring about. To bring the exhausted 
metaphor of the spectrum to its logical end: light only appears as a rainbow through a 
prism, an analytical lens so to say—a slightly psychedelic sun-dial which generates 
only an uninterrupted stream or continuum. The single prism cannot classify the way 
differences appear, extend themselves, become entrenched or unstable. The spectrum 
has been floated and bloated, but it needs to be shed, even exploded—not in any hostile 
way, my analytical metaphor might be something like a confetti canon or a clunky 
rectangular wheel with fireworks attached to propel its spokes. 
In the historiography of modern empire with a neo- or post-Marxist agenda, the internal 
history of the expansion and accumulation of global capital transpires through a 
combination of free and unfree labour and everything in between. This decentralized 
scholarly output, now often gathered under the planetary but kaleidoscopic lens of 
Global Labour History, took a particularly rich turn around colonial and post-colonial 
South Asia and the post-emancipation Caribbean with the edited volumes of Brass, 
                                                 
8Finley, The Ancient Economy, 65. 
9Whose coherence is always incomplete—partly because the radical third dimension of recruiters never 
appears. The word recruiter does not appear even once—except when conflated with “labor bosses” who 
were “recruiters and managers of labour” in China, and as state-run agencies for exporting domestic 
workers in Indonesia—in the almost thousand pages of Jan Lucassen, ed., Global Labour History: A 
State of the Art (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008), 381, 502; For varied matrices, see Jan Lucassen and Leo 
Lucassen, Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 1997); Van der Linden, Workers of the World; ‘The Global Collaboratory on the History of Labour 
Relations 1500–2000’, available at https://collab.iisg.nl/web/labourrelations; also Karin Hofmeester, Jan 
Lucassen and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, ‘No Global Labor History without Africa: Reciprocal Comparison 
and Beyond’, History in Africa, 41 (2014), 249–76. For hyper-formalized but extremely elegant table, 
see the appendix in Moulier Boutang, De l’esclavage au salariat. Matrices are always provisionally 




Breman, Bhattacharya, Behal, Van der Linden and others.10 In the past two decades 
GLH has taken the centre stage of a social history tasked with setting the records 
straight, with redistributing the history of capitalism by reconfiguring the hangover and 
remnant of a two-point, linear and progressive timeline.11 It is in the broad middle of 
semi-free or partially unfree from where the continuous crossovers and recurring 
stratagems of empire and capital have been revealed. As Alessandro Stanziani says in 
relation to the colonial Indian ocean, this middle contains and combines a “variety of 
forms of debt bondage, indenture contract, and other forms of bondage contracts 
between [masters and coolies], as well as genuine slavery.” 12  But where do the 
recruiters fit?  
They are ambivalent and creative agents who insert themselves with actions and effects 
that deflect the either/or. It is through them that we can finally expand our vocabulary. 
Recruiters cannot be disentangled and shoved into a matrix. In a historical terrain, the 
recruiters in the middle of the spectrum, their tendencies and entanglement, were 
thoroughly unpredictable; touts were free to go either way, they could deploy the same 
tools and become quasi-slave-traders or their exact opposite. Touts harnessed and 
confounded their own potentials. They were rather a series of thick twisted strokes that 
could feed into the experience of binary pairs, the experience of enslavement and the 
experience of reclaiming freedom, a disturbing background noise whose actions took 
place behind a legal optic or an institutionalized definition of status. 
                                                 
10Tom Brass and Marcel van der Linden, eds., Free and Unfree Labour: The Debate Continues (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1997); Rana P. Behal and Marcel van der Linden, eds., Coolies, Capital, and 
Colonialism: Studies in Indian Labour History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Jan 
Breman, Isabelle Guérin, and Aseem Prakash, India’s Unfree Workforce: Of Bondage Old and New (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009); Mohan Rao, ‘Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham: The 
Debate Over Unfree Labour’, The Journal of Peasant Studies 27, 1 (1999): 97–127. 
11 Chakrabarty, ‘Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History’; Jack Goody, The Theft of History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
12 Alessandro Stanziani, Labour, Coercion, and Economic Growth in Eurasia, 17th–20th Centuries 
(Leiden: Brill, 2012), 1–28, 4; foundational in this middle of the spectrum are Willemina Kloosterboer, 
Involuntary Labour since the Abolition of Slavery: A Survey of Compulsory Labour throughout the World 
(Leiden: Brill, 1960), pages 167–8 are on Liberia-Fernando Pó; Tinker, A New System of Slavery; 
Anthony Reid and Jennifer Brewster, Slavery, Bondage, and Dependency in Southeast Asia (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1983); cf. Brij V. Lal, ‘Indian Indenture Historiography: A Note on Problems, Sources 
and Methods’, Pacific Studies 6, 2 (1983): 33–50. 
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After looking at the activities of the touts in and around Fernando Pó I had to conclude 
that the metaphor of the spectrum simply does not hold: the same contract generated 
opposites and more. Contracts were bondage contracts, with their own bounded 
consistency, which nevertheless generated wildly disparate modalities of recruitment. 
The same contracts, the same recruiters, the same workers combining in and altering 
their own assemblages, lead to vastly different outcomes. In one constellation recruiters 
allowed the island’s cacao plantations to flourish on the backs of an unprecedented 
influx of quasi-kidnapped people in the late 1930s and 1940s, and in the next step, a lot 
of these same recruits combined again, quite willingly, with recruiters and together they 
almost collapsed the economy of the island by escalating dashes and desertions. 
6.2 Main Results: Touts Blur the Line with Panya and Dash 
In a sense it is cheating to evoke the dichotomy of free and unfree labour, as there was 
no dividing line in Fernando Pó: once on the island, work contracts were obligatory, the 
strangely constant small print of these obligatory contracts were pre-set by the colonial 
printing press. “Unemployment is not known here. In fact, there are regulations for 
compulsory employment—any person who failed to produce satisfactory evidence of 
being in employment is arrested and detained.”13 However the contract could be both 
rigid and flexible resulting in various prefigurations and consequences. This template 
of colonial capitalist labour control was nevertheless the only thing that kept 
recruitment—in all its different combinations—going. However, the radically different 
experience and circumstance of entering a contract at quasi-gunpoint or propelled 
through one’s own entanglements produced a set of touts that had their own transversal 
direction in the spectrum. The contract on Fernando Pó was not a discrete unit, in spite 
of its formal print and assumed conditions of a rupture with slavery, it contained 
slavery and autonomy, a veil for brutal coercion and the unintended avenue for a radical 
and self-determined escalation that allowed workers to achieve the status of ‘free’ 
labour or at least to receive the total wages of what a ‘free labourer’ would have been 
able to bargain for.  
                                                 
13British VC (Harriman), 22 April 1960, ‘Annual Report 1959/60’, TNA, FO 371/146562. 
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If we start from the lived circumstances of entering the contract rather than from the 
non-possibility of exiting a contract—a common defining marker of unfree waged 
labour14—then the panorama, the spectrum, can sometimes quickly coagulate back into 
two. The radically different effects of touts—a divide marked by wilful entanglement 
and the potentials for creative redeployments—is why a divide between free or unfree 
holds up; a difference defined by workers’ strategies and revisable states of mind, and 
not by categorical preconditions or status. The indentured contract was not part of a 
step-wise linear trajectory but led to these contradictions, folds, and surprises spurred 
on by creative redeployments of the ‘Afro-European’ practices of dash and panyarring.  
Touts radically distorted the usual narrative of “free” and “unfree” labour, through a 
kind of uncontrolled fusion and fissioning. It is through them we can rethink and even 
abandon notions of institutionalized “free labour” and categorical legal or status-based 
definition of unfree labour—i.e. if there was a contract it was contract labour, 
everything else, and particularly the extremes are their own categories with their own 
sets of preconditions that no one can trample on or rewrite. Braceros did not hesitate in 
denoting their experience as a kind of enslavement, when faced by the fact that they 
were being sold and effectively working for free, at least during the first contract. The 
contracts of panya, allowed the randomness and violence of panyarring, as 
dialecticians would say, to be ‘sublated’ or eliminated/preserved, carried on almost 
purely through the broken prism of language on the one end, the West African coast, 
while on the other end the plantations remained unaltered. Touts also reveal a ‘truth’ 
about the proper constitution of ‘free labour’, and rendered the marriage of liberal 
ideology and imperial capitalism explosively contradictory if not fully incompatible.  
In the nineteenth century, touts, like the other informal brokers who had 
unsystematically and clandestinely been organizing most “indenture” labour migration, 
at least during what David Northrup calls the “early phase”,15 started to be a considered 
                                                 
14Tom Brass has conceptually brought together slave colonies, vagrancy ordinances, share cropping, 
penal colonies, indentured labour and even the realities of paperless immigrants under one category, 
unfree, which is only held together by using the definition of non-exit from ‘contract’ or bondage which 
eliminates “the capacity personally to recommodify their labour-power,” selectively citing Marx when he 
says that free labour as “untrammeled” self-ownership “must constantly treat his labour-power as his 
own property, his own commodity.” Brass, ‘Why Unfree Labour is not “so-called”’; Marx, Capital, 271, 
171. 
15Northrup, Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 6. 
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a disturbance, an interference, an impediment to the smooth-flowing but highly 
regulated “free” movement of people whose rational arrival at their destination as 
proper “capitalist” workers was imaged to be the retroactive result of a transparent and 
informed displacement, requiring both the state-surveyed infrastructures of registration 
and explanation and the ideological ideal of a self-sovereign subject. While reading 
through the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention of 1930, Juan Bravo, the leading colonial 
ideologue, pondered why the concept of “voluntary” seemed to him to “be inadequate: 
after all if we do not incline the indígena to work by deploying dadivas o con alguna 
palabreria de una poca fantasia”—“presents/advances or hot air with a dose of 
fantasy”—“he will never offer us his brazos” his arms.16 Amongst more liberal-minded 
colonial Spaniards and certainly in the policy doctrines of the late British colonial 
mind, the idea also roamed that ideally the decision to move and take up a contract was 
to be made without undue influences or duress coming from stranger-brokers or even 
from over-bearing family members. In Nigeria with the Labour Ordinance No. 1 of 
1929, like in other colonial territories, legal means were brought in to prohibit 
recruitment and license emigration to “ensure that illiterate or inexperienced men were 
safeguarded against rapacious employers, traders and others.”17 Their impulse was to 
‘de-victimize’ indentured labour recruitment by removing randomness and innocence, 
though this by itself did not lead to less exploitative working conditions.  
Attempts by the British through the 1942 labour treaty to create a paper trail for the 
declarations of consent were a way to have labour movements and relations be in 
conformity with the laws of exchange and self-interest. It was a bureaucratic 
mechanism that would disenchant the labour market through a congruent arrangement 
of expectations and realities, in order to make its brutal realities and disappointments 
appear legitimate. Even the most formal and properly conducted of contract was a way 
for employers to be simply legitimated in their exploitation. They continued their 
                                                 
16Bravo Carbonell, ‘De la Guinea española: El trabajo indígena’, El Sol, Barcelona, 3 June 1930. 
17 Nigerian Secretariat, Lagos, [undated, ~1953] ‘Memorandum’, RHL, 600.18 s. 21/XI (10). “The 
ordinance was specifically targeted at Spanish Guinea’s labor trade, the notoriety of which was 
becoming well known in the 1920s”. Aworawo, ‘Decisive Thaw’, 93. In Nigeria “no native may accept 
[foreign contracts] without the sanction of an administrative officer (penalty, a fine of £25 and/or three 
months' imprisonment). The administrative officer must satisfy himself that the native is fit to work, is 
over the age of 16, is not abandoning any dependent relatives, and is not absconding to avoid liability 
under native law”. Orde Browne, The African Labourer, 154. 
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plantation regime under practically unaltered conditions of work, the effective 
perpetuation of the same colonial plantation. The colonial plantation island required a 
certain set of contractual templates and vagrancy ordinances to sustain itself, its order 
and productivity. The order of this same colonial plantation was the same one that 
allowed touts to flourish in the first place. Touts reveal the creative role that the 
imperial state and capitalism had in “constituting bondage”, and challenges the 
ideology that “presents servitude as a condition outside its field of operation, as a form 
of social existence identifiable and analysable as alien and opposed to capitalism.”18 
In the dash chapter, I argued that in semi-anonymous imperial contexts the wage 
advance did not generate domination and immobility; exactly the opposite, they 
produced unprecedented waves of further escalation and dispersed flight. The dash was 
pushed up by workers themselves and relayed by informal resident recruiters. Together 
they turned this lynchpin of indentured labour and debt peonage into a counter-practice 
that almost led to the collapse of the plantations in the 1950s. The conclusion that can 
be made through the dash is that the history of freedom resides beyond the terrain of 
the compliance and procedures of “free” labour. The dash was generated wholly on the 
side of the workers and the touts themselves, and produced a free movement aiming at 
improved rights and stakes on the island, that were totally outside the coordinates of 
state-issued legalisms. In fact, the trajectories of the dash can lead to a more pointed 
version of the foundational thesis of Global Labour History, namely that it was actually 
free labour, not unfree labour, that was incompatible with imperial capitalism. 19 
                                                 
18Prakash, ‘Colonialism, Capitalism and the Discourse of Freedom’, 10; also conclusion of his Bonded 
Histories; for a critique see Bhattacharya, Labouring Histories, 14–9; and a sympathetic review, see van 
Schendel, ‘Stretching Labour Historiography: Pointers from South Asia’, 233–4. This is also Banajis 
main critique against Brass. Even if the freest of free labour should be “based on the ‘consent’ of the 
individual worker and the free bargain that embodies that ‘consent’”, to oppose it to “unfree labour” 
ignores “contract law’s role in making actual domination appear free, natural, and rational”. Banaji, ‘The 
Fictions of Free Labour’, 74. 
19Not only is it “the combination of free and ‘unfree’ labor and land that in fact characterizes the 
capitalist world-economy”. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy, 149. World-Systems abundantly 
pointed out the ubiquity of serfdom, forms of unfree labour, etc, but the obvious conclusion is that it was 
capitalism itself that is incompatible with free labour, and not only in situations of labour scarcity. The 
most thorough historical argument that bureaucratic capitalism engenders borders, divisions, and 
violence, blocking or succumbing in its attempts to block the freedom of movement of labour power, is 
Moulier Boutang, De l’esclavage au salariat, whose argument is that it would be not just that the 
eliminating of “unfree production relations would in effect knock away the bottom rungs of the ladder 




Plantations would have immediately collapsed, been run to the ground, capital would 
have dug its own grave if anything like negotiated wages—as well as the ability to 
withdraw from a contract—would have played out in the “scarcity”. As Ibrahim 
Sundiata has reasonably surmised: already in the 1890s “voluntary labor migration 
became increasingly difficult to maintain; given a free play of forces, plantation 
agriculture on the island would have probably collapsed.”20 Free labour was not more 
expensive; it simply was not an option if capital wanted to subsist.21 
The contract accommodated and induced much else besides the forced subjection or 
voluntary submission into temporary bondage. The contract could be a device for 
economically productive torture of kidnapped victims or an elective moment in the life 
of people who signed up not because of the wage, but because of the ancillary wage-
advances mediated by touts. The central plate of the contrato on the plantation island 
could shift in different directions, enabling the recruitment of unwilling captives as well 
as consenting beings, and indeed be spun out of joint completely by the latter. As soon 
as there was any semblance of agents pushing through their demands—always with the 
help of touts—everything changed. This instability was barely perceptible on the 
surface of the colonial order of contract things. Free and unfree recruitment cannot be 
read off from the contract, neither from a kind of unchanged essence inherent in it nor 
from its precisely worded letters. A history of free and unfree labour cannot anchor 
itself in the terms of contract: the contract ‘was this and this long’, wages were ‘so and 
so low’, it was ‘signed’, ‘attested’, etc.: “All of this is a poetics ably written on paper, 
                                                 
20Sundiata, ‘The Rise and Decline of Kru Power’, 38. 
21Neoclassical labour economics have noticed the same things of course: Coercion they say “is mainly 
about forcing workers to accept employment, or terms of employment, that they would otherwise reject,” 
Of contracted labour and coercion and “guns”, they say: “we assume that c(0) = 0 and that c(·) is strictly 
increasing, strictly convex, and twice differentiable, with derivative denoted by c’, and we also impose 
that lima→1 c(a) = ∞ to ensure interior solutions. Suppose that the market price for the output of the 
producer is P. Thus when the agent accepts contract (wy, py ) and chooses effort a, guns are equal to g, 
and output realization is y, the producer’s payoff is Pywy […]{g)”. Daron Acemoglu and Alexander 
Wolitzky, ‘The Economics of Labor Coercion’, Econometrica 79, 2 (2011): 555–600, 555, 557, 561. You 
don’t need a model to tell you this: “Our model also explains the more puzzling phenomenon, the almost 
complete reluctance to use free (non- indentured), wage labor, right to the end.” “The wage rate could 
not be consensual, even if effort were observable, because the units were not in competitive equilibrium 
in this labor market.” Steve De Castro, ‘Modern Slave Plantations to Firms and Labor Markets: Incentive 
Theory for a Growth Disaster’, in Programa de Seminários Acadêmicos (Instituto de Ciências Humanas 
Departamento de Economia, Universidade de Brasília, 2001), 6. All of this new labour economics is 




but none of it occurs in our colony.”22 There is not much to gain by asking whether the 
contracts themselves were technically free or unfree or semi-unfree. Depending on the 
circumstances the contract could make way to either one, even in their quasi-purest 
form. 
The political economy of contracts within a labour scarcity was weaved and laced with 
autonomous intermediaries that could contradict—add loop-holes and shortcuts—and 
cause the entire “economic force” to, alternatingly, intensify or crumble. Recruiters 
could surprise the imperial economics of labour demands; they could collide and jam 
the force of an entire agro-capitalist plantation island and make it collapse onto itself. If 
“the word ‘force’ appears too mechanical or too bellicose, then we can talk of 
weakness”,23 of constant decomposition and provisional patches, the only thing holding 
things up in Fernando Pó was in times of the “scarcity” crisis, a single screw, the 
contract. They compromised channels, found its weakest link and made visible the 
foundations and inconsistency of a colonial capitalist mode of production that had tried 
to distance itself from slavery and issue the false inauguration of the era of free labour. 
Touts could be collaborating agents of planters’ productivity or transgressive mediums 
of excess.  
6.3 Wider Conclusions: Trafficking and People Smuggling Today 
Present on Fernando Pó was a bridge that linked the (dis)continuities between the 
abolition and the slave trade and the range of new techniques often found in what 
would today be called human trafficking and people smuggling. These labels are a way 
to superimpose social and political meaning to a “crime”; to pile up and aggregate a 
range of mediators into the “unfree” blur range of the spectrum. As the historian Adam 
McKeown says in his study of indenture migration movements in Asia the “stark 
dichotomy” of free and unfree emerged from the African slave trade, “yet here were 
these new types of ‘slave-traders’ who were being mobilized to informally recruit 
indentured labour.” These brokers were being “excluded from the management of 
mobility”, and while they were being “pushed underground”, they found new 
                                                 
22Babiloni Navarro, ‘Los territorios españoles’, AGA, C-81/12427. 
23Latour, The Pasteurization of France, 155. 
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opportunities and techniques between and beyond “legal jurisdictions and 
frameworks.”24 These brokers continue to accompany us today. The labels “trafficker” 
and “people smugglers” continue to demonize brokers today, the media, politicians and 
activist use images and vocabulary that can be traced back, as McKeown shows, to 
nineteenth century debates over indenture.  
My dissertation has been situated in this context, and has aimed to show how these 
brokers were actually very ambivalent, just as they are today. It is with this 
ambivalence and volatility that I think we need to view contemporary forms of labour 
trafficking and human smuggling through. Touts, who have always been with us, are 
still here, in some busy places at the discordant junctions of unregulated supply and 
excess demand, they are everywhere. In the colonial period, they became a medium to 
explode the contradictions of colonial plantation—the contract and the regulated 
wage—and similarly today in our own form of bureaucratic capitalism, they open 
borders where these have been closed, they promise too much money and hope and 
they engender further contradictions. 
Last but not least, an attention to the type of touts whose movements, techniques and 
destinations I have been tracing, reveals a wider conclusion: something along the lines 
that capitalist exploitation of unfree labour works not through them but through the 
templates provided in the last instance by forms of state power. This capacity to 
become a medium, a medium that retains its ambivalence if circumstances change, 
provides credence to more recent critiques of the notion of “human trafficking” and the 
(mis)representation of its victims. While sociologists often speak in terms of choice and 
risk, assuming an individualistic configuration of personhood, they highlight the 
importance of accepting the migrants’ own nuanced gradients of dysphoria and 
transport needs, their assessment and acceptance of the opaque and unpredictable 
logistics of illicit brokers. It is touts who have the means and know-how to “assist” in 
the unauthorized emigration to destinations with a labour market, where migrants may 
or may not experience or expect severe coercion at the hands of disciplinarian 
employers or the punitive state—on Fernando Pó they certainly did if they refused 
                                                 
24McKeown, ‘How the Box became Black’, 22. 
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work or wanted to change employer or return home before the expiration of the 
contract.25 
The exercise of underlining the conditions set up by the colonial state that made 
recruitment possible is a way to give historical clout to the critique of the present; to 
find historical tools to critique contemporary political frames that either try to blame 
“gullible victims” or informal brokers for entrapping people into situations of 
exploitation. The critical literature on contemporary forms of human smuggling and 
unfree labour has argued and demonstrated that the creation of vulnerable, precarious 
and trafficked labour across border works largely within the interstices of state, rather 
than in the domain of the irresponsible organized crime of an autonomous underground. 
On the one hand this is either because officials are bribed or do not conduct 
inspections, or even if they weren’t or did, “informally” exploited labour cannot readily 
get out of their predicament because they would land in the hands of state agents. These 
state agents may provide for even worse conditions of torture, and the beatings and 
deprivations of prison can be followed by deportation and bankruptcy. As I showed in 
the dash chapter, when braceros complained that employers were using the dash to try 
to forcibly extend their contracts, Llompart Aulet, the Curador, did not hesitate to 
confine braceros and confiscate their dash and deport them for negotiating a wage that 
would have retroactively compensated their first few years of largely unpaid labour. 
Recruiters usually get a bad press and a rap sheet worthy of corporate criminals. Those 
arguing against indenture—both contemporaries and academics—obviously 
“mistrusted the ability” of “labor recruiters, tainted by the history of slavery, to be 
agents of emancipation.”26 But this is only because touts have been conflated with 
despots, something the braceros themselves never did. Asking any of the labourers on 
Fernando Pó, they would have told you that there is a world of difference between 
solicitation and conscription, between responding to an inquiry and a beating, between 
sceptical and uncertain alliances and imposed and fateful filiation. The tout lodged him 
or herself (many were women) as an external medium to people’s concrete desire to 
                                                 
25Julia O’Connell Davidson, Modern Slavery: The Margins of Freedom (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015), 111–2. On the non-possibility of exiting a contract as the common defining marker of unfree 
waged labour, see Brass, ‘Why Unfree Labour is not “so-called”’. 
26McKeown, Melancholy Order, 70. 
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navigate and profit from a growing un/known world. The tout was an always to be 
found medium, a dispensary of wealth, in the whirl of Fernando Pó’s boastful 
commercial demands. The despot only intermittently bursts onto the scene, recedes and 
constantly threatens to return. Entire political formations have been built on threats and 
small groups of armed subordinates. Touts do not seem very formidable in comparison; 
but they were. 
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Archives and Primary Sources 
 A spreadsheet for each archive with a detailed breakdown of the archival boxes 
and files that I consulted is available. 
 Abbreviations: For a full breakdown of dates and the full names of officers and 
varying bureaucratic designations, I have a spreadsheet: ‘Abbreviations and 
Proper Names: DGMC, GG, SubGG, Curaduria, Camara, British VC, etc.’ 
AGA = Archivo General de la Administración, Alcalá de Henares, Spain 
IDD 15 Fondo África 
IDD 15.004: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores Sección Colonias; Ministerio de 
la Presidencia del Gobierno: Actuación en Guinea, 1905–1986 
IDD 15.005: Ministerio de la Presidencia del Gobierno, 1905–1986 
IDD 15.006: Ministerio de la Presidencia del Gobierno, 1901–1985; Gobierno 
General de Guinea, 1925–1961 
IDD 15.018: Comisaría General de Guinea, 1911–1969; Gobierno General de 
Guinea, 1804–1969; Ministerio de la Presidencia del Gobierno, 1951–1969; 
Tribunal de la Demarcación Este de Guinea Ecuatorial (Distrito de Fernando 
Poo), 1939–1962 
81/06257; [...]; 81/06261; [...]; 81/06265; [...]; 81/06270; [...]; 81/06273; 
[...]; 81/06276; [...]; 81/06412; 81/06413; 81/06414; 81/06415; 
81/06416; 81/06417; 81/06418; 81/06419; 81/06420; 81/06421; 
81/06422; 81/06423; 81/06424; 81/06425; 81/06426; 81/06427; [...]; 
81/06433; [...]; 81/06444; 81/06445; 81/06446; [...]; 81/06453; [...]; 
81/06461; 81/06462; 81/06463; 81/06464; 81/06465; 81/06466; 
81/06467; [...]; 81/06527; [...]; 81/06476; [...]; 81/6561; [...]; 81/06718; 
81/06719; [...]; 81/06722; 81/06723; [...]; 81/06730; [...]; 81/06808; [...]; 
81/06843; 81/06844; 81/06845; 81/06846; 81/06847; 81/06848; 
81/06849; 81/06850; 81/06851; 81/06852; 81/06853; 81/06854; 
81/06855; 81/06856; 81/06857; 81/06858; 81/06859; [...]; 81/06864; 
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81/06865; 81/06866; 81/06867; 81/06868; 81/06869; 81/06870; [...]; 
81/06903; [...]; 81/06931; [...]; 81/06939; [...]; 81/06944; 81/06945; [...]; 
81/07056; [...]; 81/07124; [...]; 81/07141; [...]; 81/07176; 81/07177; [...]; 
81/07180; [...]; 81/07193; 81/07194; 81/07195; 81/07196; 81/07197; 
81/07198; 81/07199; 81/07200; 81/07201; 81/07202; 81/07203; 
81/07204; 81/07205; [...]; 81/07633; 81/07634; [...]; 81/07646; [...]; 
81/07717; 81/07718; 81/07719; 81/07720; 81/07721; 81/07722; 
81/07723; [...]; 81/07785; 81/07786; [...]; 81/07789; 81/07790; 
81/07791; [...]; 81/07796; 81/07797; 81/07798; [...]; 81/07848; [...]; 
81/07908 ; [...]; 81/07957; [...]; 81/07963; [...]; 81/07967; [...]; 
81/07992; [...]; 81/08028; [...]; 81/08055; 81/08056; [...]; 81/08063; 
81/08064; 81/08065; [...]; 81/08081; [...]; 81/08094; 81/08095; 
81/08096; 81/08097; 81/08098; 81/08099; 81/08100; [...]; 81/08125; 
81/08126; 81/08127; 81/08128; 81/08129; 81/08130; 81/08131; 
81/08132; 81/08133; 81/08134; 81/08135; 81/08136; 81/08137; 
81/08138; [...]; 81/08144; 81/08145; 81/08146; 81/08147; 81/08148; 
81/08149; 81/08150; 81/08151; 81/08152; 81/08153; 81/08154; 
81/08155; 81/08156; 81/08157; 81/08158; 81/08159; 81/08160; 
81/08161; 81/08162; 81/08163; 81/08164; 81/08165; 81/08166; [...]; 
81/08175; 81/08176; 81/08177; 81/08178; 81/08179; 81/08180; 
81/08181; 81/08182; 81/08183; 81/08184; 81/08185; 81/08186; [...]; 
81/08194; 81/08195; [...]; 81/08213; 81/08214; 81/08215; 81/08216; 
[...]; 81/08223; [...]; 81/08526; 81/08527; [...]; 81/08535; [...]; 81/08545; 
[...]; 81/08601; 81/08602; [...]; 81/08621; 81/08622; [...]; 81/08667; 
81/08668; 81/08669; [...]; 81/08691; [...]; 81/08696; [...]; 81/08701; 
81/08702; [...]; 81/08771; 81/08772; 81/08773; 81/08774; 81/08775; 
81/08776; 81/08777; [...]; 81/08781; 81/08782; [...]; 81/08802; 
81/08803; 81/08804; 81/08805; 81/08806; [...]; 88/08819; [...]; 
81/08827; [...]; 81/08882; [...]; 81/08895; [...]; 81/08935; [...]; 81/08938; 
[...]; 81/09010; [...]; 81/09017; [...]; 81/09175; [...]; 81/09979; [...]; 
81/10942; [...]; ; 81/11053; [...]; 81/11082; [...]; 81/11524; 81/11525; 
81/11526; 81/11527; 81/11528; 81/11529; [...]; 81/11717; [...]; 
81/11844; [...]; 81/11849; 81/11850; 81/11851; 81/11852; [...]; 
81/12095; [...]; 81/12300; [...]; 81/12373; [...]; 81/12408; [...]; 81/12422; 
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[...]; 81/12426; 81/12427; ; [...]; 81/12782; [...]; 81/12894; [...]; 
81/13037; [...]; 81/13039; [...]; 81/15865; [...]; 81/17137; [...]; 81/17700; 
[...]; 81/17764; [...]; 81/17770; 81/17771; 81/17772. 
Abbreviations: C-; L-; E- = Caja; Legajo; Expediente (Box; Bundle; 
File). Sometimes there are no legajos or expedientes, just a pile of 
‘emic’ original bundles totalling 5000 individual sheets of paper per 
Caja; sometimes the ‘emic’ expedientes are roughly chronological, for 
example ‘Curaduria, 1944’, other times there are etic or extraneously 
catalogued, roughly thematic, brown files with numbered expedientes 
but no title). 
AGS = Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, Spain 
Consejo de Estado 
Legajo 7411. 
AMAE = Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, 
Madrid, Spain 
H Archivo Historico 
R Archivo Renovado 
TR Archivo Historico. Tratados 
H 2891; H 3050 E-021; H 3102; H 3102; R.176 E-4; R 447 E-20; R 470 
E-14; R 735 E-4; R 757 E-13; R 802 E-8; R 815 E-3; R 887 E-33; R 887 
E-52; R 887 E-62; TR 439 E-012; TR 583. 
ANCB = Archivo Nacional de Cataluña, Sant Cugat del Vallés, Spain 
Fons 237 Casa de la Guinea Ecuatorial 
Caja 1; Caja 2; Caja 5; Caja 10. 
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ANC = Archives Nationales du Cameroun, Yaoundé, Cameroon 
APA Affaires Politique et Administrative 
APA 10165/A; APA 10165/B; APA 10165/C; APA 10222; APA 10225; 
APA 10908/B; APA 11805/A; APA.11805/E. 
ANG = Arches Nationales de Gabon, Libreville, Gabon. 
Gouvernement, Les papiers du Haut-Commissariat, Wolé-Ntem, Oyem: Région 
du Wolé-Ntem, Rapports périodiques. 
ANOM = Archives Nationales d'outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence, France 
FR ANOM Ministère des Colonies. Délégation du Cameroun et du Togo 
FR ANOM 110COL940/3033-3036; FR ANOM 61COL354; FR ANOM 
61COL363; FR ANOM DPCT57. 
BACL = Biblioteca Africanista del Colegio Claret, Luba, Equatrial Guinea 
Personal Archives Missionaries (Carpeta Roja de Botones) [no index] 
BArch = Bundesarchiv Lichterfelde, Berlin, Germany 
NS 5 VI Deutsche Arbeitsfront / Arbeitswissenschaftliches Institut 
NS 52 Kolonialpolitisches Amt der NSDAP 
R 2 Reichsfinanzministerium 
R 901 Auswärtiges Amt 
R 1001 Reichstkolonialamt 
NS 5 VI / 12 34788 B428; R 2/4989; R 901/6591; R 901/26743; R 




BMA = Basel Mission Archives, Basel, Switzerland 
Kamerun 
E-02.13; E-02.14; BMA E-02.15; [...] E-02.37; E-02.38. 
BNA = Buea National Archives, Buea, Cameroon 
 QD Cameroon Development Corporation 
QE Provincial Office, Buea 
Qe(1933)5; Qd/a (1947). 
BNE = Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, Spain 
Mss Biblioteca del Ministerio de Ultramar 
AFRC Africa, Cajas Folletos, Salon General 
D Sala de Prensa y Revistas 
AFRMPS África Mapas, Sala Goya 
Mss/13850; AFRC/7101/12; BN AFRC/7101/14; AFRMPS/1/04; 
AFRMPS/1/08; AFRMPS/20/1017. 
BNM = Biblioteca Nacional de Guinea Ecuatorial, Malabo, Equatorial Guinea 
Colección de Erika Reuss y otras adquisiciones, no index, but unique holdings 
such as: 
Map: ‘Ile de Fernando Põo’, 1901. 
Policía Gubernativa, Santa Isabel, ‘Registro de Incidencias 1953’. 
Partido Unico Nacional, ‘Formacion Politica Anticolonial’ (Santa Isabel: 
Diario de la Guinea Ecuatorial, 1971). 
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Union Revolucionaria de Guinea Ecuatorial and Akomamba, ‘Una 
Alternativa Socialistas Para Guinea’ (n.p, 1976). 
LON = League of Nations Archives, Geneva, Switzerland 
VI.B Slavery 
C.658.M.272 
LSE = Archives Division, London School of Economics, London, UK 
IAI International African Institute 
IAI/25/24; IAI/25/25; IAI/25/27. 
NAC = National Archives of Nigeria, Calabar 
CADIST Calabar District Office 
CADIST 3/3/324; CADIST 3/3/484; CADIST 13/1/13; CADIST 
13/1/286; CADIST 13/1/292; CADIST 13/1/414; CADIST 13/1/415.  
NAE = National Archives of Nigeria, Enugu 
ABADIST Aba District Office  
ABAKDIST Abak District Office 
ARODIV Arochukwu Divisional Office 
AWDIST Awka District Office 
CALPROF Calabar Provincial Office  
CSE Civil Secretary, Enugu 
EKETDIST Eket District Office 
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IKOTDIST Ikot Ekpene District Office 
OBUDIST Obudu District Office 
ONDIST Onitsha District Office 
OPODIST Opobo District Office 
RIVPROF Owerri and Rivers Provincial Office 
ABADIST 1/26/907; ABADIST 14/1/137; ABADIST 14/1/853; [...]; 
ABADIST 14/1/875; [...]; ABAKDIST 1/2/76; ABAKDIST 1/2/77; [...]; 
ARODIV 3/1/36; [...]; ARODIV 19/1/44; [...]; AWDIST 2/1/330; [...]; 
CALPROF 3/1/1447; [...]; CALPROF 3/1/1623; [...]; CALPROF 
3/1/1953; [...]; CALPROF 4/5/30; [...]; CALPROF 4/8/30; [...]; 
CALPROF 5/1/192; CALPROF 5/1/193; CALPROF 5/1/194; 
CALPROF 5/1/195; [...]; CALPROF 5/1/315; CALPROF 5/1/316; 
CALPROF 5/1/317; CALPROF 5/1/318; [...]; CALPROF 7/1/457; 
CALPROF 7/1/458; CALPROF 7/1/459; CALPROF 7/1/460; 
CALPROF 7/1/461; CALPROF 7/1/462; CALPROF 7/1/463; 
CALPROF 7/1/464; CALPROF 7/1/465; CALPROF 7/1/466; [...]; 
CALPROF 7/1/474; CALPROF 7/1/475; CALPROF 7/1/476; [...]; 
CALPROF 7/1/1651; [...]; CALPROF 17/1/277; CALPROF 17/1/278; 
CALPROF 17/1/279; [...]; CALPROF 53/1/553; [...]; CSE 1/85/5122; 
[...]; CSE 5/7/30; [...]; CSE 9/1/6; [...]; EKETDIST 1/2/65; EKETDIST 
1/2/14/6; [...]; IKOTDIST 14/1/44; [...]; OBUDIST 4/1/348; [...]; 
ONDIST 12/1/280; ONDIST 12/1/281; ; OPODIST 1/1/36; OPODIST 
1/1/37; OPODIST 1/1/38; [...]; RIVPROF 2/1/53; RIVPROF 9/1/135; 
[...]; RIVPROF 2/1/58; [...]; RIVPROF 13/1/21. 
NAI = National Archives of Nigeria, Ibadan 
CSO 26 Chief Secretary’s Office, Lagos 
CSO 26/2/11929; CSO 26/5/44869; CSO 26/5/46023; CSO 26/5/46119.  
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MNA = National Archive of Mauritius, Coromandel, Mauritius 
Z2A Police Reports and Correspondence 
JB 4; Z2B/6. 
TAD = Transvaal Archives Depot, Pretoria, South Africa (TAB) 
SNA Secretary for Native Affairs 
SNA 325,1657. 
TNA = The National Archives of the UK, London, United Kingdom 
CO Colonial Office 
554 West Africa Original Correspondence 
583 Nigeria Original Correspondence 
657 Nigeria: Sessional Papers 
847 Africa: Original Correspondence 
852 Economic General Department and predecessors 
927 Research Department: Colonial Social Science Research Council 
1047 Maps and Plans: Series II 
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
65 West African Department: Registered Files (JW Series) 
FO Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
93 Protocols of Treaties 
366 Diplomatic Service Administration Office 
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367 Records of the Slave Trade and African Departments  
371 Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906–1966 
458 Consulate and Legation, Liberia 
HS Special Operations Executive 
3 Africa and Middle East Group 
CO 554/105/3; [...]; CO 554/109/8; [...]; CO 554/114/10; [...]; CO 
554/119/5; [...]; CO 554/124/17; CO 554/124/18; CO 554/124/19; [...]; 
CO 554/127/13; CO 554/127/14; CO 554/127/15; CO 554/127/16; [...]; 
CO 554/139/5; CO 554/139/6; [...]; CO 554/154/1; CO 554/154/2; [...]; 
CO 554/169/1; CO 554/169/2; [...]; CO 554/329; CO 554/330; CO 
554/331; [...]; CO 554/657; [...]; CO 554/1344; CO 554/1345; CO 
554/1346; CO 554/1347; [...]; CO 554/2002; [...]; CO 554/2502; [...]; 
CO 583/176/8; [...]; CO, 583/193/8; [...]; CO 583/229/5; CO 583/229/5; 
[...]; CO 583/242/22; [...]; CO 583/248; [...]; CO 583/263; CO 
583/263/16; [...]; CO 657/52; CO 657/53; [...]; CO 847/26/1; CO 
847/26/7; [...]; CO 852/375/18; [...]; CO 927/158/3; [...]; CO 1018/36; 
[...]; CO 1047/243; CO 1047/688; [...]; FCO 25/732; FCO 58/1692; [...]; 
FCO 58/2100; [...]; FCO 65/327; [...]; FCO 65/431; FCO 65/432; [...]; 
FCO 65/617; FCO 65/618; FCO 65/619; FCO 65/620; FCO 65/621; 
FCO 65/622; FCO 65/623; [...]; FCO 65/928; FCO 65/929; [...]; FCO 
65/1097; [...]; FCO 65/1293; FCO 65/1294; [...]; FO 93/99/73; [...]; FO 
366/3211; [...]; FO 367/254; [...]; FO 367/268; [...]; FO 367/353; [...]; 
FO 371/22669; [...]; FO 371/23171; [...]; FO 371/23394; [...]; FO 
371/24510; [...]; FO 371/24526; [...]; FO 371/26904; [...]; FO 
371/26908; [...]; FO 371/26922; [...]; FO 371/31245; [...]; FO 
371/31266B; FO 371/31267; [...]; FO 371/34771; FO 371/34772; [...]; 
FO 371/39661; [...]; FO 371/49598; [...]; FO 371/49640; [...]; FO 
371/60141; [...]; FO 371/60392; [...]; FO 371/146562; FO 458/106; [...]; 




SAD = Central Archives Depot, Pretoria, South Africa 
NA Native Affairs 
NA 2,5766/2(2). 
SOAS = Archives & Special Collections, SOAS Library, London, UK 
CBMS Conference of British Missionary Societies 
MMS Methodist Missionary Society 
MMSL Methodist Missionary Society Library 
MCF Movement of Colonial Freedom 
Reading Room: Kingdom Overseas, Methodist Missionary Society 
CBMS Box CBMS\A\T\12.4\308; MMS West Africa Correspondence 
Fernando Po; French West Africa 1933/39 – 9; MMS West Africa 
Correspondence Fernando Po; French West Africa 1930/33 I; 
MMS/Special Series/Notes and Transcripts/FBN 1 (fiche 15-17); 
MMS/Special Series/Biographical/West Africa/Box 1193A; MMSL 
MSS/028; MCF/COU/046. 
RHL = Rhodes House Library, Oxford 
Private Papers of Former Colonial Officials  
MSS. Brit. Emp. s.16–25 Papers of the Anti-Slavery Society 
600.18 s. 21/XI (7); 600.18 s. 21/XI (10); 669 (175); 718 r. 6; 723.12 r. 
145 (1955 :2); 723.13 s.4 /1930; 723.14 r. 12; 723.14 s. 82 (1938-46); 
723.17 s.1; C05.R00585; C96.S00338; CO 657/53; Confined to Social 
Sci...; FCO, 65/384, lntellige...; JQ3702.A98; Mss Afr. 5 1927 (1); Mss 
Afr. 5 1983; Mss. Afr. s. 697 (1); MSS. Brit. Emp. s.22 ; MSS. Brit. 
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Appendix: Graphs and Tables  
Cacao and coffee exports from Spanish Guinea, 1884–1975.1 
 
  
                                                 
1Between 80% and 100% of the cacao was from Fernando Pó. A little over half the coffee was from Rio 
Muni. Data: Bravo, Fernando Póo, 129; Kobel, ‘La République de Guinée Equatoriale’, 195, 268; 
Jakobeit, ‘Äquatorialguinea’, 150; Inset of images from left to right, Sanz Casas, ‘Problemas de una 
agricultura colonial’, Appendix; MAE, 10 March 1962, ‘Desarollo de la economía en Fernando Poo’, 
AGA, C-81/13039, E-392; Delegación Peninsular para Café de las Camaras Oficiales Agricolas de 
Guinea, ‘Memoria del año 1971’, Appendix. 
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Demographic arch of Bubi and non-Bubi population on Fernando Pó, 1850–1968.2 
 
                                                 
2 adapted from Sanz Casas, ‘Problemas de una agricultura colonial’, 274, 280. Titled “Curvas 
demograficas de la poblacion Bubi y de la poblacion extranjera” or “Demographic graph of the Bubi 
population and of the foreign population.” The graph has been adapted and extrapolated in order to 
visualize the extreme devastation of the Bubi, and to highlight the rapid of growth of immigration, 
particularly in the post WWII decades. Post-war Bubi growth is a testament to Bubi and Nigerian 
marriages. Extra data points: Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery, 117, 182; García Cantús, ‘Fernando 
Poo’, 585; Terán, Síntesis geográfica, 64; Pélissier, Los territorios españoles de Africa, 48; Crespo Gil-
Delgado, Notas para un estudio antropológico; 30; Wolff, ‘Beitrag zur Wirtschaft’, 108; Llompart 
Aulet, Anuario Estadístico, 194; British Consul, Yaounde, 4 May 1961, ‘Despatch No.46’, TNA, CO 





Barracon Barracoon, Jails 
Bolsa de trabajo Labour burse or labour exchange; existed in Rio Muni in 1935 
Bracero Agricultural contract labourer 
Brigada 
Disciplinaria 
Disciplinary Brigades or penal road-gangs  
Cámara Agricultural Chambers of Commerce or Cámara Agrícola de Fernando Póo 
Capataz Overseer on the plantations 
Chapear Clear vegetation with a machete (Spanish-Cuban term) 
Curador, Curaduría Labour Officer / Labour Office; unique colonial term connoting protector and tutelage 
Dash Advances in relation to contract; generally, ancillary component to any exchange 
(Pidgin) 
Emancipados 2) Status conferred with license allowing an enlarged set of civil and economic rights 
for ‘elite’ Africans; never more than 200 people, codified in 1928; equivalent to the 
status of assimilado in the Portuguese Empire 
Finca, Finqueros Plantations, planters 
Fuga, Fugado Flight, deserter 
Ganchos Hooks or runners; recruiters who do the leg-work 
Guardia Colonial Colonial Guard; paramilitary force like gendarme; created by the Guardia Civil 
Indígenas Natives (used as a term for all Africans) 
Jefe Chief 
La recluta Labour recruitment in relation to el problema bracero 
Palabras Palavers or legal disputes  
Panya España or Fernando Pó (Pidgin) 
Panyarring Commercial Kidnapping; in different contexts also seizure for unpaid debts (Pidgin) 
Papel de libertad Freedom paper, (given after release or expiry of a contract, valid for 2 weeks); 
component of pass-laws; ‘walk-book’ (Pidgin) 
Peonaje Peonage 
Prestación personal Corvée; literally personal submission or offering (coined in an 1844 Spanish municipal 
code; post-feudal, Señorío or manorial corvée was abolished in 1811. It seems term 
was borrowed from French term prestation, that reinstitutionalized corvée for the state 
as legislated in 1824 and 1836); term was used in Philippines, Puerto Rico and Spanish 
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Guinea, but not in Cuba. 
Prima Bounty, ancillary bonus or wage advance 
Problema bracero The Labour Question 
Recluta libre Free recruitment (with and without licenses) 
Reclutador Labour Recruiter (with and without licenses) 
Reengancho, 
recontratado 
Re-hooked labourer, recontracted or signing a second contract 
Regalo Present or gift (in Spanish Guinea meant wage advance) 
Vagos y maleantes Vagrants and miscreants 
 
 
